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Abstract____________________________________________ 
 
This thesis makes a case for a revisited dependency analysis in understanding how 
socio-economic inequality is produced and reproduced.  It illustrates that a succession 
of Chilean governments has been unable, despite policies from across the full political 
spectrum, to disrupt the processes of disparity. As the study spans a considerable 
timeframe, the research is divided into two sections: 1964 – 1989 and 1990 – 2010. 
The data from the initial time period reveals that levels of inequality remained as high 
as at any other time in the previous thirty years. The return to democracy under the 
Concertación (1990 – 2010) brought a policy emphasis to reduce inequality, but the 
impact was also less than what had been hoped for. 
 
The research uses descriptive statistics to track persistent patterns of inequality in 
contexts such as income, healthcare, employment and education. This is combined 
with interviews with various academics and policy-makers concerning their 
perceptions of the roots and consequences of Chilean inequality, and their opinions 
regarding the impact of various policies upon it. 
 
Despite the considerable amount of existing research addressing socio-economic 
inequality there is a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding the role of dependency 
analysis.  The thesis includes a case study of educational inequalities under the 
Concertación and undertakes a dependency analysis of the situation. Through this 
work it is evident that the features of structural heterogeneity and educational 
commodification, along with a failure to place social and class relations at the centre 
of such an approach, has prevented any progressive change.  
 
The thesis posits a set of theoretical assertions and policy recommendations that are 
intended to counter the criticisms that have forced dependency to the peripheries of 
development thinking. In summary, this research makes theoretical, empirical and 
policy contributions to the understanding of the processes of socio-economic disparity, 
within and beyond the education sector, both in Chile and elsewhere. 
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Section One___________________________________ 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The OECD‘s economic survey of Chile in 2012 confirmed that the country continues 
to struggle to reduce high levels of socio-economic disparity. Despite a recent trend of 
modest decline, the report reveals that income inequality is the highest in the OECD. 
This is despite the broad scope of socio-political and developmental approaches 
implemented over the past fifty years. 
 
This thesis tracks and documents socio-economic inequality in Chile, 1964 – 2010, 
and assesses the political responses to it. The research focuses particularly, though not 
exclusively, on educational disparity and analyses its causes. Current data have shown 
Chile to have the most segregated educational system in the OECD (OECD, 2011b) 
and recent events, most significantly the continuing student demonstrations known 
collectively as the ‗Chilean Winter‘, have highlighted the importance of this research. 
 
Chile is an ideal context for the study, as over the past five decades it has been 
governed by presidents representing the full spectrum of political ideology and, by 
2010, the dominant political paradigm had travelled full circle. Between 1958 and 
1964 Jorge Allesandri led a centre-right conservative administration that was replaced 
by Eduardo Frei‘s Christian Democratic centrist reformist government from 1964 to 
1970. Salvador Allende‘s ill-fated ‗Chilean road to socialism‘ was terminated 
violently in 1973 and replaced by an extreme right-wing dictatorship led by Augusto 
Pinochet that would eventually see Chile become the most neoliberal economy in the 
world. Democracy was restored in 1990 and a centre-left coalition of Christian 
Democrats and socialists termed the Concertación held power under the successive 
presidencies of Aylwin (1990-94), Eduardo Frei (jr) (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos 
(2000-06), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-10). In 2010 Sebastián Piñera led a centre-
right coalition into power; this represented the first time since the early 1960s that an 
administration of the right wing had governed.  
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Perhaps one of the only constants during this half-century of extreme transformations 
in Chilean politics has been the spectre of socio-economic inequality.  Successive 
administrations have sought solutions – to varying degrees and with very different 
methods – to the predicament. In many ways Chile became a policy laboratory for 
social and economic progress – defined differently during the various periods. 
Unfortunately, the inequality gap, measured in terms of material possessions and 
opportunity, has remained stubbornly high throughout all administrations and today 
remains as wide as it was in the early 1960s.  
 
This particular research suggests that underlying structures and dependent social 
relations play a significant role in perpetuating asymmetries, and proposes that a 
contemporary dependency approach may be able to make a contribution to finding 
potential solutions for disrupting the processes of socio-economic inequality. The 
approach explores the multidimensional nature of inequality by analysing social 
relations and suggesting policies to impede ongoing uneven relationships, especially 
within an educational context. 
 
Recent research incorporating relevant Chilean-specific data includes: Spagnolo 
(2008) and Aguirre (2008) on levels of income inequality; Agostini and Brown (2007) 
on spatial segregation, comparing inequality levels at disaggregated geographical 
levels; Agostini at al (2009) on inter-ethnic poverty and inequality; and McGuire 
(2010) on the provision of, and access to, basic healthcare. There has been extensive 
writing done on examining the effectiveness of policy on inequality, including: 
Hojman (1996); Cuesta (2009); Frenz (2007) and Larrañaga (2009). There is also a 
substantial recent body of work on education in Chile, including: Aninat (2005) on 
educational disparities; Torche (2005) and Carnoy and McEwen (2003) on the 
impacts of a privatised education system; Drago and Paredes (2011) on the quality 
gap in schools; and Mizala and Torche (2012) on social stratification and the school 
voucher system. Despite the considerable amount of research addressing current 
socio-economic inequality, and specifically educational disparity, there is a 
conspicuous gap in the literature regarding the role of dependency. 
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Having introduced the main concepts of the thesis, the rest of this chapter is structured 
as follows. The contemporary relevance of the study is further explored, before the 
aims and objectives of the research are outlined. The final section reveals the structure 
of the work.   
 
1.2 Further contemporary relevance of the research 
In Latin America the benefits of economic growth have not been equally distributed 
over decades, making the region one of the most unequal on the planet. ECLAC 
(2007, 63) notes that:  
 
―In European countries, the income of the richest 10% exceeds 
that of the ninth decile by no more than from 20% to 30%, 
whereas in Latin America, the gaps between those two deciles 
is greater than 100% and sometimes even exceeds 200%.‖  
 
The financial crisis of 2007 ―cut short the longest and most vigorous phase of 
economic growth seen in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1970s‖ (ECLAC 
2010, 15) and the indications are that this period has had a negative impact on poverty 
and inequality, with unemployment rising sharply in many countries. World Bank 
Development Indicators from 2012 show that inequality is particularly marked in 
Chile, with the Gini coefficient
1
 standing at 52.1, making it one of the most unequal 
countries in Latin America. The income distribution in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
for example, worsened from 1960 to 2005, with Chile almost increasing its Gini 
coefficient by ten points. Aguirre (2008, 12) observes ―the deterioration of inequality 
in Chile seems to have been more dramatic and widespread than in most other 
countries.‖  
 
Such historically consistent patterns indicate the need for a fresh approach. For twenty 
years, until 2010, the Concertación followed what was labelled as neostructuralism 
(discussed in Chapter Six). This was initially hailed as a critique of neoliberalism, and 
                                               
1 The Gini coefficient measures inequality in, for example levels of income. A Gini coefficient of zero 
indicates that everyone has the same income, while a coefficient of one indicates one person has all the 
income. 
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was in part an attempt to prevent established inequality from worsening. However, the 
‗Chilean Winter‘ may be seen as evidence of the failure to achieve this.  
 
The Chilean education system, which at the tertiary level has been labelled the most 
expensive in the world (Meller, 2011a), is an important case study of the privatisation 
of the ‗right‘ of education.  There has been clear progress since the end of Pinochet‘s 
rule in 1989: over one million students now attend tertiary education, a significant rise 
from 200,000 in 1990. This totals close to 45% of all 18-24 year olds and over 70% of 
these students are the first generation in their families to go on to higher education 
(Franco et al, 2011, 20). However, inequality remains embedded in the system and, on 
average, greater levels of exclusion are understood to lead to worse outcomes (OECD, 
2011b). This ‗educational apartheid‘ is a consequence of a rigid social stratification. 
Mario Waissbluth (2011), president of the Educación 2020
2
 foundation, comments on 
this in a media statement: ―The kids from the posh suburbs study in those suburbs, go 
to university in those suburbs, get jobs as company executives in those suburbs and 
employ friends from the schools they went to themselves.‖ Such a situation has 
brought the concept of inequality to the forefront of social awareness and protest 
movements, including the ongoing ‗Chilean Winter‘ demonstrations. These protests 
have since attracted hundreds of thousands of people, not only students but also 
disillusioned members of the working and middle classes who share the desire for 
change. This desire for change also has a contemporary global relevance.  
 
―The truth is that both the broken society and the broken 
economy resulted from the growth of inequality.‖ (Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2009, 5) 
 
In the book Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, written 
before a series of protests and uprisings started on a global scale (the Arab Spring
3
, 
                                               
2 Educación 2020 is a non-profit foundation, created as a citizens' movement that seeks quality and 
equity in education in Chile.  
3 A series of riots and demonstrations in the Arab region, which started in December 2010. At the time 
of writing, governments have been forced from power in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and further 
unrest in, among others, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman and Syria. 
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riots in the UK
4, and the escalation of the ‗Occupy‘5 movement), Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2009) examined some of reasons as to why socio-economic disparity may 
potentially contribute to political and societal breakdowns; what they call the ‗costs of 
inequality.‘ These ‗costs‘ include: high levels of crime, social immobility, increasing 
debt, poor health and low education performance.  
 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
Aims 
Having provided the context for the research, this section lays out the aims and 
objectives, and elaborates upon how these will be addressed. The core aims are as 
follows: 
 
1. Conceptualisation: to examine the notion that underlying structural 
dependency plays an integral role in the production and continuance of socio-
economic disparity 
2. Description: to set-up an exploration of this notion through the tracking of 
Chilean socio-economic inequality, 1964 – 2010, and the policies that sought 
to address it, with a specific investigation of educational disparity, 1990 – 
2010. 
3. Analysis: to investigate why policies were ineffective in reducing socio-
economic disparity, 1964 – 2010, and consider the role played by structural 
dependency in its production and continuance 
4. Prescription: to investigate the application of a revisited dependency approach 
to disrupt asymmetrical relationships in education during this timeframe and 
consequently initiate a discussion on how this approach may be used to reduce 
socioeconomic disparity 
 
Objectives 
For Aim 1: 
a. To ascertain the processes that operate to create socio-economic inequality  
                                               
4 The riots involved a high incidence of looting and arson between 6 – 10 August 2011 in several 
London boroughs.  
5  An international movement concerned with socio-economic inequality and opposition to 
multinational corporations and the global financial system. The first Occupy protest was in New York 
City in September 2011. 
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For Aim 2: 
b. To quantify social and economic inequality in Chile, 1964 – 2010 
c. To undertake Aim 2 with special reference to inequality in economic 
(income), social (health) and structural (labour and housing) spheres 
d. To quantify disparity in the context of education in Chile, 1990 - 2010 
For Aim 3: 
e. To consider the effectiveness of policies and broad political objectives 
designed to alleviate inequality between 1964 and 2010  
f. To analyse the role of structural dependency in inequality within the 
context of education in Chile, 1990 – 2010  
For Aim 4: 
g. To define what a revisited dependency approach might look like applied to 
education 
h. To discuss the potential application for further research in addressing 
broader socio-economic inequality in Chile and internationally 
 
The eight objectives identified here require further explanation. The first aim of the 
research is to better understand the mechanisms that contribute to and perpetuate 
socio-economic inequality. Objective (a) is therefore designed to be both analytical 
and explanatory of the process. The second aim is to facilitate the first aim by 
establishing a framework for the analysis, and this is to be achieved through 
objectives (b), (c) and (d), which track and quantify disparity in various social 
contexts between 1964 and 2010, before focusing on a more specific context 
(education) and timeframe (under the Concertación, 1990 – 2010). The objectives for 
the third aim are more analytical. The aim is to explore why the policies implemented 
in Chile between 1964 and 2010 were unable to diminish the levels of socio-economic 
inequality, and more specifically why the Concertación failed to reduce inequality in 
education and, by doing so, investigate the role of structural dependency in the 
process. Objective (e) seeks to lay out the various policies implemented and examine 
the levels of inequality in that timeframe. Objective (f) works at a more detailed scale 
in the case study of education to analyse the role that dependency plays. The final aim 
is to establish if a revisited dependency approach has relevance to a contemporary 
context and objective (g) outlines how the analysis might function with special 
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reference to education. Objective (h) initiates a discussion on the utility of a fresh 
dependency approach for various analytical scales and considers its theoretical 
contribution to development.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
In order to fulfil the above aims and objectives the thesis is divided into four sections 
and nine chapters. The general nature of each of these chapters and their purpose in 
terms of the fulfilment of the aims and objectives are considered below: 
 
Section One – Introduction, theory and methodology 
Section One is made up of this introductory chapter and Chapter Two. Chapter Two 
discusses the philosophical underpinnings, theoretical framework, methodology and 
methods employed in the research. The chapter outlines a critical realist philosophy of 
social science and a structuralist approach that underpins the research. The methods of 
primary and secondary data collection and analysis are then outlined, before the 
chapter concludes with some reflexive observations about the overall research 
process. 
 
Section Two – Theories of inequality and dependency 
Section Two is made up of Chapters Three and Four. The objective of this section is 
to establish the theoretical context for the research. Initially Chapter Three examines 
what inequality is and why it is important, its discursive evolution is then discussed 
along with its multidimensional nature and units of measurement. It is established that 
the concept functions across time and space and employs interactive elements at the 
disaggregated scales of global, national and individual. This section then introduces 
the theoretical approach of dependency by tracing its rise to the forefront of 
development thinking in the 1960s and its fall following the established dominance of 
Neoliberalism. Dependency is introduced as an approach most commonly associated 
with underdevelopment but here it is viewed within a context of socio-economic 
inequality. Chapter Four prepares the ground for the discussion of a revisited 
dependency analysis in Section Four. 
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Section Three – Chilean inequality: a case study of  disparity 
Section Three is made up of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Section Three builds on 
the examination of the concept of inequality and places it within the case study of 
Chile, 1964 – 2010. Chapter Five begins with an overview of the persistence of 
inequality in Latin America between 1964 and 2010 to provide an historical and 
empirical context. Following this, the chapter looks at how each of the three 
governments in the period 1964 – 1989 pursued very different policy directions, 
ranging from Frei‘s structuralist approach and Allende‘s ‗Road to Socialism‘, to 
Pinochet‘s neoliberal laboratory. Chapter Six introduces Neostructuralism and 
explores how each administration of the Concertación (1990 – 2010) – to one extent 
or another – explicitly recognised inequality as a major issue in Chilean society and 
instigated policies of various formats and aims to combat the problem.  
 
The effects of these paradigmatic shifts on levels of contextual inequality (income 
distribution and poverty rates, employment participation, health indicators and 
housing) are discussed at the end of both chapters. In order to more precisely ascertain 
the causes of various forms of inequality Chapter Seven focuses on the persistence of 
educational inequality in Chile under the Concertación, discussing the types of 
disparity suffered leading to the protests of the Chilean Winter. The chapter ultimately 
asks why the policies failed and asks what can be done: a question that is tackled in 
Section Four.  
 
Section Four – A dependency analysis and conclusions 
Section Four is made up of Chapters Eight and Nine. This section follows the 
discussion of why the educational policies implemented by the Concertación failed to 
reduce inequalities. It considers that a dependency analysis might assist in 
understanding these issues, both for education and for the broader socio-economic 
disparities experienced in Chile and globally. The analysis is undertaken in the 
context of the Concertación‘s education system and creates a method of analysis using 
the inequality process model introduced in Chapter Three, and the concept of social 
relations of dependency. Chapter Nine considers the aims and objectives of the thesis 
and discusses the implications of such an analysis at national and global scales. 
20 
 
 
Finally a policy package from a dependency perspective is proposed along with 
further research questions.  
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Chapter Two 
Research methodology and reflections 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the aims and objectives of this research in the previous chapter, it is 
imperative to now outline how these will be achieved. This chapter clarifies the 
philosophical position and the methodological approach and is structured as follows. 
The philosophical underpinnings and theoretical approach of the research are 
discussed, especially the relevance of critical realism. Secondly, the methodological 
approach adopted is introduced along with the research methods employed in the 
collection of both quantitative and qualitative primary and secondary data. The final 
section reflects on the applicability of the overall approach, and reflects briefly on any 
ethical dimensions to the research.  
 
 
2.2 Philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the research 
The ontological and epistemological positioning of this research builds the foundation 
for, and informs, the theoretical perspective assumed. As a social science, 
Development Studies needs to engage in the debate between objective and subjective 
knowledge, and subsequently that between realism and anti-realism. As Graham 
(2005) comments, ―the epistemological debate revolves around the question of what 
role mental constructions (representations) play in our knowledge of the world‖ (cited 
in Flowerdew and Martin, 2005, 20). This chapter does not attempt to seek resolutions 
to this debate but simply to describe particular philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions that help to justify the findings and conclusions.  
 
This research is driven by the possibility, and consequently the responsibility, to 
contribute to the disruption of the processes of social relations and institutions that 
create and perpetuate socio-economic disparity. To do this, an approach that finds 
middle ground in the philosophical debates, and demonstrates a moral dimension, is 
the best way forward and it is suggested that the approach to achieve this is a critical 
realist one.  
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2.2.a Critical realism and structuration  
A critical realist philosophy suggests that there is a real world assembled from 
mechanisms and structures beyond our perceptions, and acknowledges that our 
experiences, values and perspectives influence how we construe reality, but not how it 
is constructed (Sayer, 1984). Evidently then, critical realists ―retain an ontological 
realism, while accepting a form of epistemological constructivism and relat ivism‖ 
(Maxwell 2008, 165). Critical realism discusses the interaction between social 
structures and human agency. Graham (2005, 21) suggests that ―human interactions 
are not haphazard or random but are ordered in lots of different ways‖ and that the 
task of a social scientist is to find order in these interactions. Such a dialogue raises 
the question of determinism within the debate between structuralism and human 
agency. A Marxist perspective introduces the notion of historical materialism, which 
focuses on the material conditions of human existence and an essentially economic 
social organisation. Subsequently determinism arises as a potential problem in 
Marxist analysis because: 
 
―it sees meanings in events, which, it argues, are often hidden 
from the participants themselves. Individuals are said to be 
imbued with a false consciousness as the beliefs, roles and 
rules which influence the conduct of their everyday lives are 
part of an ideological superstructure.‖ (ibid, 24) 
 
A human agency rejection of this would refute that humans are passive cogs in 
societal and economic structures, but rather fully conscious and in control. A critical 
realist approach would argue for a conciliation of sorts between these theoretical 
positions by rejecting determinism and yet suggesting a dual character, in which 
social structures and agency are co-determinate and alter each other in a constant 
cycle. Likewise, by perpetuating social structures, human agency produces its own 
conditions. To avoid deterministic interpretations, Bhaskar developed a 
‗transformational model of social activity‘ (TMSA), which maintains aspects of both 
humanism and structuralism, but acts as an alternative to both (Collier, 1994). It can 
be argued that the TMSA shares important consistencies with the structurationist 
social theory, promoted most notably by Giddens (1984), in which spatial structure 
23 
 
 
can be understood as a context where social relations develop and become 
established. The environment within which an individual is situated plays a significant 
role in enabling or restricting action within these relations and the individual needs to 
act to create the most conducive conditions. Harvey (2002, 170-171) comments that 
social structures and environments are dependent on a variety of concepts other than 
individuals however. He suggests that social production and reproduction is 
dependent on individuals‘ interpretations and conceptions and that social structures 
vary in time and from place to place. 
 
Therefore a critical realist philosophical perspective sees social phenomena as 
operating in complex systems that are created by a ―lattice work‖ (Collier, 1994, 140) 
of interrelationships between people, observable events and underlying structures and 
mechanisms. As a result any given social phenomenon is ―the outcome of a 
multiplicity of causes in a continually changing configuration‖ (Manicas, 2006, 39). A 
critical realist standpoint, then, would argue that research cannot produce laws and 
that all knowledge is intrinsically imperfect.  
 
A critical realist philosophy, imitating aspects of a hermeneutic approach, suggests 
that knowledge of social phenomena is based on experience, and is consolidated by an 
empirical observation, theorisation, reflection, and critique. Critical realist research 
requires an approach that devises theories of fundamental causal structures based on 
visible phenomena and the social and historical context within which this takes place. 
It therefore helps the testing and generation of theory alongside empirical observation. 
For, as Graham (2005, 31) states, ―it is only through a dialogue between theory and 
practice that knowledge and understanding will be advanced‖. 
 
In Chapter Three a conceptual process model of inequality is introduced and is later 
used as a framework (in Chapter Eight) within which to understand various elements 
of a dependency approach in relation to disparity. Such a model, consistent with a 
critical realist approach, emphasises the active link between social structures and 
human agency. The model might be labelled as a ‗soft‘ hypothesis. The adjective 
‗soft‘ is justified by two reasons: first, the hypothesis will not be subjected to rigorous 
scientific assessment; and second, in rejecting or not rejecting the ‗soft‘ hypothesis, 
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there will be no support for a general law. In this way, the process model is strictly 
contextual and conceptual and intended to apply to the Chilean case study only. 
However, it is mentioned that an exploration of testing the model operationally would 
be one of the potential outcomes of the research. 
 
2.2.b A dependency approach 
In the context of this thesis, the general concepts of structuration theory and, more 
broadly, critical realism are extremely useful in the analysis of the role dependency 
plays in the process of inequality. A deterministic approach would not only mean that 
a dependency approach was still vulnerable to existing criticism, but also that the 
changes in Chile‘s economic and social conditions had not been taken into account 
during half a century of persistent disparity. The criticism levelled at dependency 
often focused on the over-reliance of external interests but critical realism, and 
structuration theory, enables the analysis of a reciprocal relationship between 
structures and agency at both macro and micro scales. With this in mind, the research 
is sensitive to the contextualities of the particular relationships being explored. For 
example, in the context of the case study of education, economic structures interact 
with socio-culture structures at various scales. 
 
Ultimately the core goals of the dependency approach were to analyse the 
development of Latin American capitalism and to better understand the processes of 
underdevelopment and inequality. Although these goals were conceived of in different 
ways by structuralists (a critique of conventional theories of trade and development) 
and Marxists (a critique of the articulation of developing societies into the global 
economy and a re-creation of the theory of class conflict at a global level), 
dependency maintained the view that the core was the cause and the periphery was the 
outcome, and maintained an analysis on the interplay between external domination 
and internal conditions. These ideas are more fully developed in Chapter Four. The 
writings of Cardoso, notably Dependency and Development in Latin America (1979), 
suggested a methodology based on concrete and specific examples of dependent 
relationships, observing the interplay between internal and external structures that 
formed a complex whole. As Kay (1989, 160) explains, 
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―The fact that underdeveloped countries have their own 
internal dynamic which can only be comprehended within the 
matrix of the international system is the raison d‘etre of 
dependency analysis.‖ 
 
The research aims to make a unique contribution to the substantial body of work on 
Chilean inequality by examining the relevance of a revisited dependency approach to 
reducing inequality. By disaggregating the components of socioeconomic inequality, 
it has helped create valuable targets to work with, however – as with poverty – 
isolated ‗solutions‘ do not reduce inequality or weaken its structure. Therefore a 
revisited dependency approach would aim to interrupt the processes of inequality 
traps by targeting the mechanisms that drive them: the unique dependent structural 
networks and relationships that the traps operate within, and seeking to lessen the 
nature of dependency / power.  
 
A critical realist approach recognises that these mechanisms are in a constant state of 
flux, with human agency altering the structures that ultimately make human action 
possible. For example, for inequality to exist there needs to be at least two entities to 
compare between, and it is within the relationship between these entities that 
inequality operates. Therefore inequality is essentially about the relationships between 
agency-created structures. Examples of uneven social relationships are inter-ethnic, 
gender, income groups, class and spatial segregation. It is suggested that the process 
of inequality within these relationships is driven by a combination of structural 
mechanisms and human agency such as: marginalisation, debt traps, and consumption 
patterns.  
 
A revisited dependency approach considers inequalities to be unique to particular 
circumstances, which supports Cardoso and Faletto‘s (1979) recommendation of 
focusing on ―concrete situations‖. These situations operate at various scales and 
through various networks and relationships simultaneously. Such an approach is 
consistent with structurational social theory in that both micro- and macro-levels of 
analysis are required. These scales can be geographical: global, national and local but 
also temporal, as an historical approach is necessary to understand the structural roots 
26 
 
 
of inequality. This research aims to isolate various dependent structural relationships 
and the inequality processes within them, and subsequently discuss socioeconomic 
policy and developmental approaches that may help disrupt them.  
 
2.2.c Why Chile and education? 
As stated in the previous chapter, over the past five decades Chile has experienced the 
full spectrum of political ideologies and one of the consistent features during such a 
tumultuous half-century has been the persistence of socio-economic inequality.  The 
failure of consecutive administrations to disrupt the processes of such disparity makes 
Chile a fascinating case study of how inequality operates and persists regardless of 
political context. Due to the nature of Chile‘s political history and current socio-
economic predicament there is a considerable school of research, both theoretical and 
statistical, to draw from and this is another reason why Chile is a suitable case study.  
 
The focus on Chile was also in part due to practical reasons. Victoria University‘s 
strong links with Latin America have resulted in the Victoria Institute of Links to 
Latin America, while a number of postgraduate studies are related to Chilean topics. 
This ensured that there was a contemporary body of research to draw from and a 
network of contacts in place to make use of.  
 
It was decided part way through the research that a focused case study on education 
under the Concertación would be appropriate. This was related to a number of factors, 
not least of which was the momentum being carried by the student demonstrations 
into the timeframe within which I was to be doing my fieldwork in Chile. The 
demonstrations started in May 2011, however the origins of the agitation can be 
traced back to 2006, when a student protest movement took to the streets. These 
protests are discussed fully in Chapter Seven. The situation meant that the notion of 
inequality within education was being broadly discussed, both privately and in the 
media, and therefore it presented an opportunity to engage with a contemporary and 
relevant topic to this research, which would contribute to the contextualisation of the 
findings. It should be noted that, while the situation made accessing some people a 
little easier, it also made it more difficult to interview others. For example, politicians 
were not interested in discussing such a hot topic, while student leaders were heavily 
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involved in the movement and within the media. At one point, when it seemed it 
would be possible to make contact with the talismanic student leader, Camilla Vallejo, 
the enquiry was directed to her newly appointed personal assistant! Nevertheless, on 
the whole, it was a theme that people were very engaged with and being in Chile 
during the demonstrations was certainly beneficial to gaining insights and opinions on 
how inequality operates and how it is being protested against and resisted. There is 
also a considerable amount of available data on inequality within education, not only 
from within Chile but also from international organisations such as Unicef and 
UNESCO. Such data is invaluable in understanding patterns of disparity and 
establishing the importance of education in intergenerational debt and inequality 
traps.  
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
In the context of this study a mix of quantitative and qualitative research is crucial. In 
order to understand how inequality persists, despite numerous policies to reduce it 
within various contexts and at various scales then quantifiable data will be necessary 
and it should be tracked statistically. Similarly, to examine the manifestation of 
disparity in particular social relationships it is likely that a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative data will be valuable. This is a useful method to analyse opinions and 
perceptions. This section introduces the methodology employed in the compilation 
and analysis of data. It is valuable to have suitable methods that both understand 
observable data and can uncover underlying causes and origins.  
 
2.3.a Qualitative and quantitative methods 
This research uses a mixed methodology of both primary and secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data as detailed in Table 2.1 and the subsequent sections. 
Brockington and Sullivan (2003, 72) support this approach: 
 
―Qualitative and quantitative methods are not mutually 
exclusive to learning. Both can be necessary depending on 
the question being asked. We have both combined complex 
28 
 
 
statistical analyses of data with detailed qualitative interviews 
to learn more about the place and people we were studying.‖ 
 
In the context of this thesis a combination of the approaches is crucial in order to track 
the levels of socio-economic inequality, while understanding the various social 
relations that operate within it. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Methods used to achieve objectives 
Objective Method 
A To ascertain the processes that operate to 
create socio-economic inequality  
 
Use the discourses about inequality and dependency 
from secondary sources to design a conceptual process 
model for inequality  
B To quantify social and economic 
inequality in Chile between 1964 and 
2010 
Use secondary sources to track inequality trends in 
Chile across the successive administrations 
C To achieve objective B with special 
reference to inequality in economic 
(income), social (education & health) 
and structural (employment & housing) 
spheres 
Disaggregate inequality into various contexts and 
track these separate trends within the timeframe 
D To quantify disparity in the context of 
education, 1990 - 2010 
 
Use secondary sources to track inequality trends in 
Chilean education during this timeframe. 
E To consider the effectiveness of policies 
and broad political objectives designed 
to alleviate inequality in Chile between 
1964 and 2010  
Use the information collated from Objectives B – D, 
and primary-sourced qualitative material from 
interviews in Chile, to inform a better understanding 
of the process of Chilean inequality  
F To analyse the role of structural 
dependency in inequality within the 
context of education in Chile between 
1990 and 2010  
 
Use information from Objectives A – E, and further 
qualitative material from Chilean interviews to inform 
the validity of a revisited dependency approach 
G To define what a revisited dependency 
approach might look like  
Use secondary sources and further qualitative material 
from Chilean interviews to propose the content of a 
revisited dependency approach  
H To discuss the potential application for 
further research in addressing broader 
socio-economic inequality in Chile and 
internationally 
Use the findings of Objectives A – G to discuss the 
opportunities for further research 
 
 
 
2.3.b Collection of primary data 
Primary data was gathered through fieldwork incorporating a series of interviews. In-
depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 26 people between October and 
November 2011. Interviews, conducted in English, contained a range of open-ended 
questions outlined in the Information Sheet in Appendix A. The research in Chile was 
directed predominantly toward collecting qualitative data and accounts from various 
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actors of their involvement and understanding of governmental policies responsible 
for persistent inequality. Semi-structured, semi-formal interviews were employed to 
gather the opinions of key stakeholders (government employees and academics) on 
the impact of various policies on inequality, the role of structural dependency and the 
validity and relevance of a revisited dependency approach. However, beyond this 
dialogue was free ranging and conversational, and interviewees were encouraged to 
share their perspectives. Interviews were conducted at a variety of locations, including 
universities, government departments and less-formal locations such as restaurants. In 
almost every case the interview lasted no longer than one hour.  
 
The data from these interviews assisted in the analysis of the effectiveness of policies 
in reducing inequality between 1964 and 2010 and, more specifically, inequality in 
the education system under the Concertación, 1990 - 2010. Subsequently, they 
contributed to the question of whether a revisited dependency approach would be 
relevant to understanding the processes of these inequalities. The dependency school 
is very much a part of Latin America‘s developmental and theoretical fabric, and by 
discussing a revitalised approach with policy-makers and academics a better 
understanding of the significance of a fresh approach was obtained. Material from 
these interviews is concentrated in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
 
Key stakeholders were identified through a variety of different ways. Some were 
recommended with the help of academic contacts at Victoria University and 
subsequently the Universidad Pontificia Católica and the Universidad de Chile, while 
others were selected through the reading of dependency literature. Other suggestions 
were made by friends in Santiago (who helped me get interviews with government 
representatives and teachers) and it was also possible to identify others by following 
up media releases concerning the student demonstrations which were occurring at the 
time. By developing relationships with local people contacted via a language-
exchange website in Santiago, most of whom were students or teachers, and who had 
considerable social circles, it was also possible to follow up on various leads. 
 
Through these initial contacts, clusters of key stakeholders began to emerge and the 
number of contacts grew via a process of gradual accumulation and references. Visits 
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to regions outside of Santiago came about due to good contacts already established in 
that region or through connections made through academics in the capital city. Travel 
outside of Santiago was undertaken to Valparaíso by bus and to Temuco by air. 
 
The Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington required ethics 
approval for all primary interviews and this was sought in the early stages of the 
project and granted in September 2011 before the commencement of fieldwork in 
Chile. The field research approach was designed so as to protect the anonymity of 
research participants and safeguard their privacy; therefore no interviewees are 
identified in this report unless they have explicitly opted to be. All participants were 
provided with a written information sheet identifying the researcher. The informed 
consent of all participants was required. All interviewees participating in a formal 
capacity signed a written consent form (Appendix A). Some respondents in 
governmental or NGO positions were happy to participate but did not consent to 
having information or opinions given in the interview attributed to them personally. 
No interviews were taped and transcribed and most information was recorded in note 
form during the interview. All participants were offered a summary of the final 
research findings, and some indicated an interest in receiving this. A full list of 
interviewees can also be found in the appendix. 
 
2.3.c Collection of secondary data 
This thesis required a thorough understanding of contemporary inequality (1964 – 
2010) within a Latin American and Chilean context and this was achieved through a 
tracking of trends from secondary material. The quantitative data required consists of 
publicly available, official statistics and other secondary data. The main sources for 
this include: the Chilean Ministry of Planning and Cooperation‘s (MIDEPLAN) 
CASEN surveys (1985 – 2009)6, Banco Central de Chile‘s Statistical Synthesis of 
Chile, 2005 – 2009 and Chile Social and Economic indicators, 1960 – 20007, and the 
                                               
6 The National Socio-Economic Survey, Casen, is conducted by the Ministry of Social Development 
with the aim of providing information to estimate the extent of poverty and income distribution, assess 
the various gaps separating different social groups and geographical area and evaluate the impact of 
social policy. Its subject is households. Casen Survey has been conducted by the Ministry of Social 
Development for the years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 
2011. 
7 These publications from the Central Bank of Chile contain information in five years blocks on general 
characteristics of the country, such as a wide range of social and economic indicators. 
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World Bank‘s World Development Indicators Database8. These resources permit a 
disaggregation of inequality into relationships such an inter-ethnic, spatial and income 
disparity, and components such as access to education and healthcare, employment 
and housing. 
 
Pizzolitto (2005, 3) assesses the reliability of poverty and inequality measures and 
discusses methodological changes within them. Concerning the CASEN surveys he 
suggests, ―most of these limitations arise from using the processed databases by 
CEPAL
9, instead of the original ones, which are not available to the public.‖ He notes 
changes in the survey, such as the redefinition of urban and rural in 1996 and a new 
survey sampling frame also since 1996, and questions if results across time are 
consequently comparable. Further issues such as non-response, invalid answers, 
misreporting, non-monetary income and regional variances are also discussed. In each 
case he concludes that the measures are robust, with the inequality trends remaining 
consistent despite any statistical adjustments. Agostini and Brown (2007, 1) also 
consider difficulties in obtaining local information in Chile but reveal that ―recent 
theoretical advances have enabled the combination of survey and census data to 
obtain estimators of inequality that are robust at disaggregated geographic levels.‖ 
 
The scope of research on the causes and persistence of inequality in Chile since the 
1960s has been considerable. A significant proportion of this work has tracked the 
successes of poverty reduction, including: the main household survey in Chile, 
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN), which is currently 
undertaken every three years; Foxley (2004) and Murray and Kousary (2009). 
However, despite a large sector of the Chilean population rising out of poverty, 
inequality has persisted and has led to a further body of research that explicitly 
considers the issue of inequality, either alongside the topic of poverty or inclusive of 
it. This includes: ECLAC (2010), Huber (2009) and Diaz (2010). As Murray and 
Kousary (2009, 159) suggest, ―A new shift to equality as a policy objective, as 
                                               
8  The World Bank collection of development indicators is compiled from officially-recognised 
international sources. It includes national, regional and global estimates and is updated four times a 
year in April, July, September and December. 
9 CEPAL, the Comisión Económica para América Latina, is the economic commission of the UN for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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opposed to viewing poverty and the poor through a safety net lens, may well serve to 
redress specific structural imbalances in Chilean society.‖  
 
2.3.d Data analysis and interpretation 
Primary qualitative data was collected through interviews while in Chile, and 
secondary qualitative data was mostly taken from the academic, governmental and 
NGO material. The interviews were transcribed, coded and sorted and, in some cases, 
the qualitative data has been incorporated into the text and commented upon. 
 
As previously established, this research uses both qualitative and quantitative data. 
The quantitative data was descriptive statistics used to track patterns of inequality 
over a set timeframe. The limitations here were in finding unbroken sets of data that 
spanned half a century, or being able to locate comparative data over the same 
timeframe. This limited the research to contexts such as income, healthcare, 
employment and education, with elements of housing. Even within these contexts the 
topics have been confined to those which have enough unbroken data across the 
timeframe. For example, when discussing health indicators in Chapter Five the 
dialogue has been limited to infant mortality rates, vaccinations and the availability of 
hospital beds. Although these indicators are considered strong markers for the context 
of healthcare, more detailed research (e.g. solely focused on health) might have 
produced further data on other relevant indicators.    
 
It is also difficult to establish the direct impact of policies due to a number of issues, 
including time lag, intervening factors (such as the global financial crisis), poor data 
and cross-correlation. However, the consistency of disparity levels across such a 
significant timeframe does suggest socio-economic inequalities that are resistant to 
policy changes. 
 
2.3.e A reflection on conducting research in a foreign language 
All of the primary interviews in Chile were conducted in English and, as most of the 
meetings were with academics, educators, NGO officials and government 
representatives it was straightforward to do so. Occasionally a contact would 
accompany me to an interview if the interviewee indicated in advance that some 
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concepts or vocabulary might require clarification. This was beneficial to ensuring 
that there were no misunderstandings in the questions or responses, which ensured an 
accurate recording of their opinions and accounts. The issue of language in the 
context of foreign-area research necessitates discussion and it is no different in this 
case, however, due to my limited Spanish the interviews that were undertaken could 
only be conducted in English. There were occasions when I was invited to speak with 
someone who had no English; in these cases I attended with a translator but have not 
included these meetings in my list of interviews or referenced them at any point as 
such a methodology was not included in the ethics approval. However, they assisted 
in setting the context for my research and helped shape my views on the matters at 
hand. 
 
Indubitably my intermediate level of Spanish prevented more in-depth discussions 
and a broader range of interviews, but it does also need to be recognised that the 
topics the interviews were discussing were quite academic and specialised and 
therefore the majority of stakeholders relevant to the research did have high levels of 
English communication. In Temuco, where I visited the Universidad de la Frontera, I 
was chaperoned solidly for two days by a German member of staff who had excellent 
English. Occasionally it was very useful to have the linguistic clarity but overall the 
members of staff I interviewed were very proficient. In one case I was allowed to 
interview a class of second-year Social Science students but the English levels were 
very low and I was uncomfortable in the translation process and so this has had to be 
removed from the research. 
 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
In summary, this research adopts a structurationist theoretical framework, 
underpinned by a critical realist philosophy and a mixed methodology of primary and 
secondary qualitative and quantitative data is used. It is suggested that an integrated 
dependency analysis is predicted to produce improved understandings of the 
underlying structures, processes and mechanisms that operate to determine uneven 
social development, particularly within the context of education. 
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Section Two___________________________________ 
 
The objective of this section is to establish the theoretical context for the research and 
to show the value of a dependency approach to understanding socio-economic 
disparity. To do this Chapter Three examines what inequality is and why it is 
important. Such a discussion informs the later case study of disparity in Chile (1964 – 
2010), including a focus on educational inequalities under the Concertación (1990 – 
2010). Chapter Four then introduces the theoretical approach of dependency by 
tracing its rise to the forefront of development thinking in the 1960s and its 
subsequent decline.  
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
Concepts of inequality 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of inequality, discussing its discursive evolution, 
its multidimensional nature and units of measurement. It is established that the concept 
functions across time and space and employs elements at various scales from the 
global to the individual. The numerous impacts of its constructive and destructive 
nature are examined, as well as considering the existence of a moral imperative to 
reduce any suffering that results. This is followed by a proposal that inequality 
operates as a process, and a conceptual model is introduced to visualise the 
mechanisms that drive the process. 
 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
Inequality is a complex and multidimensional concept. For it to exist there needs to be 
a comparison of a quality (or qualities) between two or more entities, and in order for 
it to be meaningful they must be interpreted as having certain values. Without these 
values Peter Westen (1982, 547) says, 
 
―Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral 
content of its own. Without moral standards, equality remains 
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meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about 
how we act.‖  
 
These values often have a moral weight, but in the context of development there are 
also non-moral relationships, and therefore non-moral comparisons. Contrasts 
between individuals, groups within nations, class, gender, race, and between nations 
themselves, can be made. Globalisation has made such comparisons explicit and 
unavoidable on almost every scale.  This is why it is no longer sufficient to simply ask 
‗what is equality?‘ – it is now necessary to also ask ‗equality of what?‘ and ‗equality 
between whom?‘ And if the concept is being approached with a view to progress and 
improvement, then the questions of ‗why is it important?‘ and ‗how does it work?‘ 
must also be addressed.  
 
 
3.2 Contexts of inequality 
3.2.a Discursive evolution   
The discourse of inequality has developed over many centuries and has adapted to 
various revelations and revolutions. Plato (The Laws, as quoted in the World 
Development Report 2006, 76) argued that, ―if a state is to avoid…civil 
disintegration…extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to rise in any section 
of the citizen-body, because both lead to disasters.‖ And this was followed up by 
Aristotle‘s principle that ―Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just is to be 
equal, to be unjust is to be unequal‖ (as cited in Westen 1982, 543). Although both 
philosophers supported the structure of social hierarchies, there are a few clear 
standards held within these statements – social cohesion, wealth-equality and social 
justice – that can be traced as constant dimensions of inequality throughout the 
evolution of this complex and dynamic discussion.  
 
The writings of social contract philosophers, and of Enlightenment thinkers, 
challenged such an acceptance, as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau questioned if 
authority and subordination were indeed rational and natural states. Locke embraced 
the libertarian precept of individual free will in his Two Treatises of Government 
(1690, 134) writing, ―every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has 
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any right to but himself‖, and later Rousseau, in his Discourse on Inequality (1753), 
was to separate out natural and artificial inequality. In The Social Contract (1762, 
442) he went on to state, ―Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and 
force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all 
legitimate authority among men.‖ As expressed by Hampton, discussing the 
established power structure of inequality (1986, 26),  ―it is a critical premise of any 
social contract theory that seeks to explain political power and political subordination 
as something unnatural, something created by human beings and maintained with 
their consent.‖ 
 
In 1776 Adam Smith published his The Wealth of Nations writing, ―No society can 
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor 
and miserable.‖ (1776, 70) Importantly Smith understood that inequality was not only 
recognised in terms of wealth, but also within dignity and societal judgment. He 
notes, 
 
―A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a 
necessity of life… But in the present time, through the greater 
part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed 
to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which 
would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of 
poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into 
without extreme bad conduct.‖ (ibid, 352) 
 
Such ideas challenged societal structure and order and, Rousseau‘s in particular, have 
often been associated with the French Revolution of 1789, a revolt that won the 
admiration and support of Thomas Paine who wrote in his Rights of Man (1791, 36 – 
37) 
 
―Men are all of one degree, and consequently that all men are 
born equal, and with equal natural right, in the same manner 
as if posterity had been continued by creation instead of 
generation…consequently, every child born into the world 
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must be considered as deriving its existence from God. The 
world is as new to him as it was to the first man that existed, 
and his natural right in it is of the same kind.‖  
 
Such egalitarian convictions were, at that time, also in evidence within utilitarianism.  
 
As can be seen, inequality was no longer being considered as inevitable but rather as a 
consequence of human corruption and manipulation. Bottero‘s later comment on 
disparity is relevant here: ―if inequality was socially produced it could also be 
removed by social action‖ (2005, 20). However, despite the French and American 
revolutions inequality endured, most disturbingly within slavery. Such perseverance 
of ingrained social attitudes, despite widespread reform, led to evolved accounts of 
the biological basis of discrimination. These accounts included the emergence of an 
emphasis on biological determinism; of race and of physical attributes such as 
strength and health, which was an easy validation of slavery.  Concepts such as Social 
Darwinism and the discipline of eugenics, which went as far as suggesting that the 
lower classes should be prohibited from procreating, followed. Inevitably 
objectionable biological characteristics were soon connected to the supposed 
questionable moral qualities of certain races and classes. As a result, instead of 
relying on a belief in divine order to assuage guilt for social inequalities, privileged 
groups could focus on a justification of the ‗survival of the fittest‘ principle.  
 
This institutionalisation was made easier by the stratification of industrial society. 
Marx proposed that classes were simply economic categories, and that these 
categories created economic inequality. From here the argument could be developed 
that such divisions also contribute to the reinforcement of negative labels and 
behaviours, which perpetuate other inequalities. Marx believed that it is the material 
conditions of lives that determine actions and thoughts. He argued that, ―it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness.‖ (Marx, 1845, 245) In other words, if you 
are disadvantaged due to the social strata you are classed within, then those conditions 
and labels structure how you see the world and your place within it. For Marx, who 
saw that capitalism had the potential to create a respectable standard of life for all, the 
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mechanisms of unfair distribution due to the exploitative relations of production 
needed to be overthrown.  
 
Marx‘s work was challenged and expanded by the stratification theories of Émile 
Durkheim and Max Weber. Kerbo (2007) notes that, in his 1893 work, The Division 
of Labour in Society, Durkheim discussed two types of inequality: external and 
internal. External inequality was an asymmetrical circumstance enforced on an 
individual in the form of status, while internal inequality – more common in industrial 
society – was based on ability. As Kerbo (ibid, 229) comments, ―What Durkheim 
anticipated was a meritocracy based on equality of opportunity.‖ Weber also 
expanded Marx‘s one-dimensional view of stratification beyond economic divisions, 
creating a complex approach that has been termed the ‗Three Class System‘, which 
was first published in 1920. This suggested that society was divided by class, status 
(honour and prestige) and power. Weber also introduced the concept of life chances, 
elements of which can be seen in luck egalitarianism and Sen‘s Capabilities 
Approach, both of which are discussed shortly.  
 
The role of ‗power‘ in stratification was discussed on a larger scale a few decades 
later, emphasised within the Cold War rhetoric of Harry Truman‘s inaugural 
presidential address in 1949.  
 
―…we must embark on a bold new programme for making 
the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas. More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. They are victims of disease. 
Their economic life is primitive and stagnant.‖  
 
The issue was further brought into the public arena by the work of economist Simon 
Kuznets. In the 1955 he proposed a thesis that involved what was to become known as 
the Kuznet‘s Curve, ―the workhorse of the modern theory of income distribution‖ 
(Milanovic 2011, 89). This argued that a developing country will suffer greater 
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income inequality during growth, and that this disparity would reduce once a certain 
level of average income was achieved.  
 
The issue of distributive justice is best known through the work of John Rawls. By the 
time he wrote A Theory of Justice in 1971, the concept of global inequality was in the 
public consciousness. The fact that ‗others‘ were living in abject poverty and 
abhorrent circumstances had become a moral topic and subsequently an issue of 
justice. Rawls returned to the social contract tradition of Rousseau and Locke to 
develop a concept of justice, which  
 
―requires that basic social goods – liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – be equally 
distributed, unless an unequal distribution is to everyone‘s 
advantage.‖ (Freeman 2003, 1)  
 
Rawls argued that, if placed behind a ‗veil of ignorance‘, that is that if people were 
unaware of their own position in society, then they would select a system of 
distributive justice that would benefit everyone equally using the principle of equal 
liberty. A second principle, that of permitting unequal distribution only when it would 
assist those who are most in need, was also proposed.  Rawls‘ work contributed to the 
development of luck egalitarianism, a view of justice that suggests that, 
 
―society should try to equalise the effects of brute luck and 
misfortune…we need to neutralise as best we can not only the 
effects of social class but also the effects of the distribution of 
natural talents and (dis)abilities and other accidents of 
fortune.‖ (Freeman 2007, 111) 
 
Even with the considerable diversification of the dimensions and scale of inequality, 
Amartya Sen has added to the concept further through his Capabilities Approach. 
There is a clear change here from a discussion centred on equality of outcomes in 
material terms to equality of opportunity. ―Justice is understood in terms of 
capabilities: egalitarians must, Sen thinks, express their ideal in terms of equality of 
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capability.‖ (Qizilbash 1996, 1211) Sen placed his emphasis on equal opportunities 
for everyone to achieve their basic capabilities. These capabilities reflect a person‘s 
ability to do and be, and therefore alter from individual to individual. Here is an 
important challenge to the way inequality is generally understood in much of western 
academia, as it shifts the perspective from where disparity is often viewed. Inequality 
is different from the viewpoint of the sufferer, then it is for the observer, and it will 
always be contextually relative. ―The capability approach is concerned primarily with 
the identification of value-objects,‖ (Sen 1992, 43) says Sen, ensuring that there is a 
flexibility built in to the discussion.  
 
Clark (2005) comments that Sen‘s work acknowledges connections back to Aristotle, 
Smith, Marx and Rawls, and such a remark demonstrates the nature of the discourse‘s 
evolution. Inequality is a complex, global and multidimensional concept that has 
divided opinions and societies for centuries and continues to do so. ―When we assess 
inequalities across the world…we are not merely examining differences in well-being, 
but also in the basic freedoms that we value and cherish.‖ (Sen 1992, 69) As 
previously mentioned this forces other questions to be asked so that a truer 
understanding can be achieved; questions such as inequality of what and between 
whom? 
 
3.2.b Inequality of what? 
When discussing the question ‗equality of what?‘, which was pervasive in Sen‘s 
work, it is useful to consider the overlapping, interactive categories of: economic and 
non-economic, actual and potential, and natural and artificial. The purpose of this is to 
stress the multidimensional nature of inequality and to isolate the factors through 
which people suffer injustice. It would be possible to simply create a list of 
disparities, but this would fail to deepen an understanding of distinct differences in the 
types of existing inequalities and the scale within which they interact. It would also 
fail to allow for the recognition that inequality for one person is different from the 
next person, or from country to country.  
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Actual and potential: This category is based on Sen‘s Capability Approach, which – 
as previously mentioned – focuses on an individual‘s opportunity to achieve value-
based goals.  
 
―The notion of advantage deals with a person‘s real 
opportunities compared with others. The freedom to achieve 
well-being is closer to the notion of advantage than well-being 
itself.‖  (Sen 1985, 3)  
 
An obvious difference between well-being (actual) and advantage (potential) is that 
the latter is much more difficult to observe or measure. This is commented upon in the 
World Development Report 2006, (2006, 4) which accepts that generally there will be 
a need for a reliance on ―highly unequal outcomes across groups defined by 
predetermined circumstances – such as gender, race, family background, or country of 
birth – as markers for unequal opportunity.‖ Martha Nussbaum, as will be discussed 
later in this section, attempted to circumvent these issues by creating a capabilities 
list. 
 
Economic and non-economic: While it is useful to create these two categories in order 
to better survey the landscape of inequality, it is, as Todaro and Smith (2009, 209) 
state, impossible to truly untangle them.  
 
―We cannot really separate the economic from the non-
economic manifestations of inequality. Each reinforces the 
other in a complex and often interrelated process of cause and 
effect.‖ 
 
When considering how inequalities are generated within countries, it is immediately 
apparent how multidimensional and interactive the process is. The most easily 
accessible and published elements of inequality are economic measures. This is mostly 
due to how quantifiable they are, their use in observing formal and informal markets, 
and how effective they at reporting poverty. A nation‘s economy also relates to its 
investment in infrastructure. For example, factors such as transport, communications, 
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and energy, are important measures not only of a country‘s development, but also of 
developmental comparison between regions, such as urban and rural. The concept of 
urban bias (Lipton, 1977) contests that authorities have long favoured the urban 
centres as that is where the better educated and more politically minded voters are 
situated. This can also include the discussion around the lack of accessibility to quality 
resources, such as health and education, as well as poor infrastructure for rural areas.  
 
Just as these components contextualise an environment into which a person may be 
born, there are a number of other elements that need to be considered. One such 
example is the intrinsic needs of an individual; in this case, these basic needs refer to 
elements such as shelter, nutrition and sanitation to allow an individual every chance 
to engage in education or employment without hindrance. This would include a 
person‘s well-being, described by Sen (1995, 3) as being ―concerned with a person‘s 
achievement: how ‗well‘ is his or her ‗being‘?‖ 
 
Education and healthcare are two further components used in examining inequality. 
Educational statistics may refer to items such as attendance, quality (materials, 
curriculum and qualified teaching staff) and accessibility (in terms of cost and 
location) of the education system. Attendance in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education is a good indicator of equality of access, as are literacy rates. This factor 
also includes access to the knowledge and skills for employment training. All of this 
information can be disaggregated to better view disparities across, among others, 
gender, location, and income. Such information can inform policy and its importance 
can be understood in ECLAC‘s (2010, 40) comment that ―Education and knowledge 
are certainly essential to give equality its rightful place at the intersection of 
productive capabilities and social development.‖  
 
Natural and artificial: Rousseau (1753) saw explaining how ‗artificial‘ inequality had 
come about as the foremost issue in his Discourse on Inequality. He defined artificial 
inequality as separate from natural, such as strength and intelligence. In terms of 
understanding how inequality comes about, and how it can be addressed, then it is 
vital to differentiate the two, so as to generate successful approaches and policies. 
Natural qualities, such as gender and age, for example, are subject to inequalities that 
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can be improved through changes to attitude and perception. Artificial inequalities, as 
defined by Rousseau, have been caused by societal conventions and structures and 
therefore can be solved by altering those structures.  
 
An individual is born into a unique situation and, while his/her attributes are not fixed 
and vary over time, they do continually impact upon opportunities. These include, but 
are by no means limited to natural attributes such as aptitude and physicality, race and 
age. It is worth noting that Bloor (2007) describes race as discoursal, not physical, and 
questions if race creates stereotypes and associations that prevent individuals from 
fulfilling their potential. Such an approach can, of course, also be used in discussions 
of gender inequality. It can also be extended to non-natural attributes such as religion 
and class. Marx viewed class as economic categories which can cause people to lead 
what Sen (1984) has called ‗constrained‘ lives (cited in Qizilbash 1996, 1211).  
 
Building off this examination, the following section discusses the various units of 
measurement to permit accurate comparisons between units of analysis. 
 
3.2.c Units of analysis 
As was raised earlier in this chapter, to describe something as equal or unequal 
requires a comparison of a particular quality, between two or more entities (e.g. 
inequality between whom?). When discussing global inequality the entities used are 
commonly nation-states, but when looking at hospitals, for example, within a country 
then the spatial comparison might be between rural and urban regions. Gender, race, 
age, private and public schooling, developed and underdeveloped nations – all of these 
are commonly used as entities to set up comparisons.  
 
Particular measurements can be used at various scales, for example: life expectancy, 
GDP, literacy rates, incomes, unemployment rates etc. Often composite indices are 
used to compare multidimensional measurements, and these include the Human 
Development Index (HDI
10
), the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and the Human Poverty Indices (HPI-1 and 
                                               
10 As the Human Development Index is used later in Chapter Five when discussing Latin American 
inequality a definition can be found in Appendix A. 
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HPI-2). Another well-known measurement is the Gini coefficient, used for income 
distribution, along with Generalised Entropy (GE) and the 90
th
/10
th
 percentile ratio.  
 
Sen‘s Capability Approach, as already mentioned, problematises this issue of analysis. 
Concerned as it is with value objects and freedom to achieve them, Sen acknowledges 
that ―if we are interested in the freedom of choice, then we must look a the choices a 
person has, not the resources.‖ (Sen 1992, 38) Hence Sen has no definitive list of 
capabilities because, as Clark (2005, 5) explains, ―different people, cultures and 
societies may have different values and aspirations.‖ However Martha Nussbaum has 
resisted this approach and has attempted to create a catalogue, including bodily health 
and integrity, imagination, play, affiliation and emotions. Despite this, Sen‘s (2004) 
reservations remain: 
 
―The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but 
with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of 
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social 
discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, 
emanating from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of 
fruitful public participation on what should be included and 
why.‖ (cited in Clark 2005, 7) 
 
Greig et al (2007, 13) comment that, despite the concept of equality of opportunities 
remaining dominant for many development thinkers, it is usually the data on actual, 
not potential, outcomes that is used.  
 
This section‘s work on the multidimensional nature of inequality permits a more 
comprehensive approach to the question of its importance. The consequences of 
unevenness are widespread and unique to individuals and contexts, however they are 
also interactive and work across time, space and scale. Therefore it is extremely useful 
to an overall understanding of inequality to ask, ‗why does it matter?‘ 
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3.3 The importance of inequality 
This section discusses various perspectives on the significance of inequality. Disparity 
functions on various scales and across time; its dimensions interact and have 
outcomes that are felt across space. ―Disadvantage tracks people through their lives,‖ 
warns the Human Development Report 2005 (2005, 6), and by recording the 
consequences of disparity at different scales, in various situations, it is possible to 
better understand its full impact. It can be argued that inequality is a productive 
process: it incentivises growth and hence should not be viewed as a harmful 
condition. Additionally, it might be also be asked why inequality is any more urgent 
than the issue of poverty. Or further still, the viewpoint that inequality is morally 
objectionable can be challenged. The UNDP‘s Human Development Report 2005 
(2005, 52) comments that, ―most people would accept that not all inequalities are 
unjust‖. These opinions are discussed in this section, examining whether inequality is 
actually detrimental, if there is a moral obligation to confront it, and if there are other 
more critical dilemmas that need to be addressed first.  
 
A right-wing viewpoint would emphasise that economic growth is the obvious and 
practical answer to poverty and inequality. Conceptually, the stronger the economy is, 
the more there is to distribute, and as the benefits of this growth start to trickle down 
positive activity should be stimulated. This idea has held firm through Smith‘s 
‗invisible hand‘ of the market, Rostow‘s stage theory of modernisation and some 
proponents of globalisation, such as hyperglobalists. Wolf argues, ―Rapid growth 
reduces poverty dramatically.‖ (Wolf 2008, 187). Krueger (2004) agrees,  
 
―the solution is more rapid growth – not a switch of emphasis 
towards more redistribution. Poverty reduction is best 
achieved through making the cake bigger, not by trying to cut 
it up in a different way.‖ (cited in Woodward and Simms 
2007, 132) 
 
If this is indeed the case, then the material profits of globalisation will allow the 
developing nations to catch up with the rest of the world. Further to this ‗trickle-
down‘ concept, is the idea that more equal distribution could erode incentives for 
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people/businesses/nations to improve. The argument runs that growth would be 
stymied, as profits would be used for redistribution instead of for investing in 
progress. Sen (1992, 139) supports part of this argument, adding, ―Inequality may, 
thus, play a functionally useful role in encouraging work, enterprise and investment.‖ 
Grusky and Szelényi (2007, 4) draw attention to a similar argument, outlining a 
narrative supportive of free trade, which suggests that as the free market evolves, 
there will eventually be no employment discrimination as it will be too expensive to 
hire only desirable employees. ―In standard renditions of this account, it is presumed 
that discriminating firms will gradually be selected out by the market.‖  
 
Naturally there are rebuttals to such claims and these shall be given in the following 
five segments: poverty and inequality; growth and redistribution; convergence and 
divergence; incentivisation and the question of moral obligation.  
 
 
 
3.3.a Poverty first, then inequality 
Krueger (2002) states, ―Poor people are desperate to improve their material 
conditions…rather than march up the income distribution ladder.‖ (cited in Milanovic 
2007, 15) Valid as this may be, it cannot be forgotten that poverty, like inequality, is a 
multidimensional concept. Poverty does not exist in isolation, just as inequality does 
not; it is part of a larger process of nature, of oppression, bad choices and bad luck, of 
established unjust power structures, of maldistribution and discrimination. If the focus 
is solely on ‗resolving‘ the situation of poverty, then what of the discrimination of 
gender, caste and race, of the unequal educational opportunities of rural and urban 
children, of the lack of representation for indigenous people in governments, of the 
importance of economic convergence for social cohesion? All of these elements 
contribute to the coming about of poverty, and poverty cannot be suppressed and 
ended without an appreciation of them, and of how they are transmitted across 
generations. The Human Development Report (2005, 5) supports this notion saying, 
―Overcoming the structural forces that create and perpetuate extreme inequality is one 
of the most efficient routes for overcoming extreme poverty.‖ However it could just 
as easily be argued that overcoming poverty is the best way to overcome inequality, 
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and such a case is made in defence of the absence of an explicit economic inequality 
goal in the Millennium Development Goals. Inequality is after all a composite notion 
of wealth, health, education, power, sustainability and partnership. 
 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) take a different approach to emphasising the importance 
of inequality by stressing that many of the world‘s most pressing problems are not the 
consequence of poverty at all, but rather the result of inequality. They worry that 
deteriorating mental health, health issues, and increasing violence (both domestic and 
between nations), among others, are direct products of inequality. The effects of 
social and cultural inequalities at a national level are discussed in great detail in The 
Spirit Level (ibid). They investigate the interaction occurring between the global and 
national scales. The result, it is argued, of increased stratification is more violence, a 
weaker educational performance and social dysfunction. They (ibid, 181) claim, ―the 
truth is that the vast majority of the population is harmed by greater inequality.‖ 
 
Inequality also prevents opportunities to engage with the employment market, either 
through poor education, access to training or discrimination. The result is a swelling 
informal market, which creates a situation in which ―those with limited skills are the 
most vulnerable in the informal economy as they are most likely to work under 
inhumane conditions and accept low wages.‖ (The Inequality Predicament, 2005, 30) 
The opinion that the informal economy prevents resources from being returned to the 
economy is worth commenting on. This is seen to ultimately reinforce the situation, 
and deprives local governments of the taxes and investment needed for policies to 
address situations of inequality. This can be responded to by arguing that an informal 
sector can actually contribute to the reduction of disparity and poverty by providing 
wages.  
 
3.3.b Growth and redistribution 
Woodward and Simms (2007) stringently oppose the theory that greater growth will 
indisputably reduce inequality. They argue against it on a number of fronts. 
Essentially, their argument is that to continue current growth is unsustainable, 
creating heavy environmental costs with every dollar earned. However, by 
redistributing part of the riches accrued by the wealthy to the poor it improves the 
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quality of life for billions without necessarily increasing consumption or 
manufacturing. To add to this, partial redistribution can have a major impact on the 
poor without having a deleterious effect on growth. ECLAC (2010, 40) agrees that 
unmanaged economic growth does not have inevitable benefits, commenting that,  
 
―Growth has a negative effect on social inclusion and 
cohesion when its benefits tend to be concentrated, which 
in turn undermines the future growth dynamic.‖  
 
The ECLAC publication, Time For Equality: Closing gaps, opening trails (2010, 41), 
reasons that without social cohesion there is no sense of community, which can lead 
to conflict and undermine sustainable progress. The argument is that improved 
capabilities and inclusiveness stimulate greater production: 
 
―In the long term there is a virtuous circle between the 
narrowing of social divides, the closing of productivity gaps 
and more dynamic and sustained growth. There is conclusive 
evidence that economic development and social equity tend 
to go together.‖ 
 
3.3.c Convergence and divergence 
 Just as can be argued that globalisation has stimulated a convergence between the 
developing and developed world, evidence can also be given to assert the opposite. 
Convergence reasoning tends to rely on economic figures to emphasis the faster rate 
of growth of particular developing nations and regions over the more industrialised 
areas, but inequality‘s complex nature makes this a rather one-dimensional approach. 
As Bob Sutcliffe (2007, 51) comments: ―There seems something very suspect about 
ignoring inequalities within countries and only comparing those between them.‖  
 
The impacts of inequality at a global scale are substantial and contentious.  Murray 
(2006, 15), however, is quite clear in his opinion,  
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―Globalisation simultaneously creates spaces of exclusion 
/marginalisation leading to an increase in social, economic, 
political and cultural unevenness across space.‖ 
 
When considered on such a large scale, inequality can be said to contribute to the 
marginalisation, and subsequent economic retardation, of certain nations and regions. 
That less-developed nations suffer enduring economic unevenness due to their 
controlled integration into, and participation in, the global system is an interesting 
gauge of the consequences of international inequality. As will be seen in Chapter 
Four, the dependency approach maintained that the core was the cause and the 
periphery was the outcome, and focused its analysis on external domination and 
repression, pointing to the declining terms of trade as a major driver in the process of 
underdevelopment and inequality. It was argued that poverty and marginalisation 
were the results of such an asymmetrical system and that the barriers to fair 
integration needed to be removed. 
 
The disparity inherent in the system is revealed in Table 3.1. The comparisons 
between the GDP and GDP per capita as a world average in high, middle and low-
income countries since 1970 are significant, and contradict the notion of greater 
growth stimulating convergence. Although the GDP of high-income countries reduced 
from 79% of the world total in 1970 to 71% in 2009, the low-income countries‘ GDP 
fell from 1.6% of the global total to 0.7%. In 1970 the GDP per capita of the low-
income countries was 0.2 of the global figure, while in 2009 it was 0.06. In the same 
period the high incomes moved from being 3.5 times the global figure to 4.3 the size.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Selected global economic trends, 1970 – 2009 
 GDP (in current US$ billions) 
(% of global GDP) 
GDP per capita (current US$) 
(compared to global GDP per capita) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 
High 
Income 
2,279 
(79%) 
8,640 
(78%) 
18,218 
(83%) 
26,352 
(82%) 
41,607 
(71%) 
2,734 
(x3.5) 
9,467 
(x3.8) 
18,583 
(x4.5) 
25,071 
(x4.7) 
37,264 
(x4.3) 
Middle 
Income 
581 
(20%) 
2,343 
(21%) 
3,534 
(16%) 
5,680 
(18%) 
16,213 
(28%) 
230 
(x0.3) 
753 
(x0.3) 
942 
(x0.2) 
1,309 
(x0.3) 
3,369 
(x0.4) 
Low 
Income 
47 
(1.6%) 
124 
(1%) 
155 
(0.7%) 
176 
(0.6%) 
432 
(0.7%) 
145 
(x0.2) 
296 
(x0.1) 
284 
(x0.07) 
253 
(x0.04) 
511 
(x0.06) 
World 2,879 11,107 21,904 32,209 58,259 781 2,472 4,149 5,293 8,599 
Source: World Bank (2011) with author‘s calculations 
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Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 5) build on such stark statistics and link the uneven 
global structure to destructive consequences at national and local levels. They propose 
that it is the interaction of inequalities across scales that strengthen these barriers to 
equal opportunity and suggest that the 2007 global economic crash was a consequence 
of this; ―The truth is that both the broken society and the broken economy resulted 
from the growth of inequality.‖ 
 
3.3.d Incentivisation 
A further important concept is that of the distinction between constructive and 
destructive inequality. The Inequality Predicament (UN, 2005, 15) defines 
constructive inequality as an incentive to an efficient use of resources, while 
destructive inequality creates envy and maldistribution. ―Finding the right balance 
between equality and competitiveness is essential.‖ Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 30) 
highlight the consequences of destructive inequality, both between-countries and 
within-countries. Clearly rejecting the idea of incentivisation through disparity, they 
claim, ―If you want to know why one country does better or worse than another, the 
first thing to look at is the extent of inequality.‖ Within-country, they discuss the 
effects of the wealth gap within societies and claim that, rather than inspiring 
individuals, ―the consumption of the rich reduces everyone else‘s satisfaction with 
what they have.‖ (ibid, 222) This is also linked to dissatisfaction with status, 
 
―Income differences within rich societies matter so much 
more than the income differences between them. Once we 
have the necessities of life, it is the relativities which matter.‖ 
(ibid, 225) 
 
Such discontent can have dangerous consequences, as pointed out through Wilkinson 
and Pickett‘s The Spirit Level (2009), such as increased violence and the erosion of 
community life. ECLAC (2010, 42) also comments on this, proposing that rather than 
creating incentives, stratification creates vulnerability and exclusion. The 
recommendation is for positive discrimination and for an agreement that, 
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―the equality agenda needs to be supplemented by an agenda 
of difference – not, by any means, to make difference a 
euphemism for inequality, but for the sake of progress 
towards greater equality between people who are unalike.‖ 
 
3.3.e Moral obligation 
In 2005 the Commission for Africa called the disparity between the global rich and 
the African poor as ―the greatest scandal of our age‖ (cited in Greig et al 2007, 1). 
Inequality is indubitably a moral issue for many people; the world‘s major religions 
view it as such, with the Roman Catholic Church even naming economic inequality 
among the new ‗deadly sins‘ it issued in 2008 (Owen, 2008). In his forward to Paul 
Farmer‘s book Pathologies of Power, Sen quoted the author as saying,  
 
―Human rights violations are not accidents; they are not 
random in distribution or effect. Rights violations are, rather, 
symptoms of deeper pathologies of power.‖ (Sen 2005, xiii)  
 
What Sen was focusing on was Farmer‘s anguish that those with power deliberately 
manipulated people‘s deprivation and loss – a cruelty that the author often called 
‗structural violence‘, and what Sen labelled ‗a quiet brutality.‘ (Sen 2005, xvi) If this 
is accepted then so too must the potential impacts of subordination and inequality: 
discrimination, loss of self-esteem and marginalisation.  
 
The pejorative nature of inequality can destroy dignity, self-confidence and esteem. In 
his work Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire (1970, 544) gives his opinion on 
why this process is so important.  
 
―The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established 
itself in their innermost being. They discover that without 
freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet although they 
desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and 
the same time themselves and the oppressor whose 
consciousness they have internalised.‖  
52 
 
 
 
Freire‘s work highlights the destructive elements of inequality, often leading to an 
individual internalising their position in relation to others. The result is the 
perpetuation of a context in which individuals are prevented from an equality of 
opportunity either through discrimination or through their own lack of self-belief. 
Performance at school or in the workplace, ambition, and domestic violence can all be 
related to the expectations set up by society.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Rawls‘ work A Theory of Justice (1971) 
established a moral philosophy, which required that certain important liberties be 
provided equally for all, and that these ‗basic‘ liberties have priority over collective 
social well-being. These liberties, which in some cultures include freedom of thought, 
movement, association, choice of careers, and a right to personal property, are 
fundamental to our moral being; they are immutable. Such concepts are also in 
conflict with the ‗structural violence‘ talked of by Farmer; the individual is more 
important than the combined needs of the many. ―Each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override.‖ (Rawls 1971, 3) 
 
 
3.4 The processes of inequality 
This section initially considers various opinions on how inequality operates before 
proposing a conceptual model of the process. Inequality is understood in different 
ways, for example, politically, stage theorists might view between-country inequality 
as a growth phase in which gaps will be progressively overcome, while,  
 
―structuralists argue that rather than looking at the symptoms 
of inequality (individual opportunities and outcomes), the 
focus should be the underpinning processes and causes 
(social structures that foster unequal power relations).‖ (Grieg 
et al 2007, 13)  
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Alternatively, an economic perspective might point to Kuznet‘s hypothesis that an 
inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the scale of economic development and 
income inequality. Greig et al (2007, 10) recognise this breadth of opinion and 
comment, ―the way that…inequality is conceptualised has profound implications for 
the identification of its ‗causes‘.‖ Further to this, de Ferranti et al (2004, 7) suggest 
that a ―pretence to an exhaustive discussion of the causes of inequality is thus a 
shortcut to failure.‖ While this section in no way seeks to construct a definitive 
understanding of the causes of inequality, it presents a simplistic conceptual process 
model (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: A conceptual model of the process of socio-economic inequality 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
This process is understood from a structuralist perspective and is not designed to be 
operational (although this is an option for potential future research) but has been 
created to visualise the mechanisms that play a role in creating and perpetuating 
inequality. It is based upon the approach presented by Greig et al (2007, 13): 
 
―Inequalities are not simply carefully constructed 
measurements scales but complex webs of dynamic social 
relations that privilege some while constraining the life 
chances of others.‖  
 
The model focuses upon the inequality experienced by an individual and has two 
starting assumptions: the first is that Sen‘s Capability Approach defines the ultimate 
goal of equality, which is that an individual should have the power and freedom to 
achieve their unique value objects, labelled as ‗possibility‘ in this model. The second 
assumption is that the barriers an individual confronts in achieving their value objects 
Position 
 
Uneven integration 
(power and prejudice barriers) 
Participation 
Uneven integration 
(power and prejudice barriers) 
Possibility 
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(possibility) begin from the present time. It is implicit that the unique history of the 
individual has created their current position. 
 
To allow the consideration of the interplay between external and internal factors, as 
Cardoso (1979) promoted, the model can be argued to sit within an ‗external‘ 
environment (made up of geo-political, historical, economic, socio-cultural and 
environmental aspects) and the model itself can be seen as the ‗internal‘ process. One 
of the most obvious examples of historical influence is colonialism; whether 
understood as a beneficial or a pernicious legacy, it has contributed to disparity in 
many countries. A structuralist approach is likely to consider a developing nation as 
suffering from the legacy of colonialism, or from neo-colonial practices, as it is placed 
in a disadvantaged position of dependency for international trade and growth. 
Wilkinson and Picket agree with this historicist approach, that every nation has a 
unique history, and this history contributes to how inequality has evolved there. They 
write, 
 
―The prevalence of ill-health and of social problems in these 
societies is not simply a patternless reflection of so many 
unique histories. It is instead patterned according to the 
amount of inequality which has resulted from those unique 
histories.‖ (2009, 181) 
  
In other words, they view the process as follows: history has created inequality, and 
inequality has subsequently created health and societal difficulties. Aguirre (2008, 1) 
reflects on income inequality specifically within this internal/external interaction, 
seeing it as ―the result of numerous decisions made by households, firms, 
organisations, and the public sector, and of micro- and macro-level shocks.‖  
 
Internally, the process that an individual experiences is influenced by their position in 
society and their ability to participate. To attain the goal of equality they will come up 
against the barriers of prejudice and power. Prejudice creates a barrier through which 
an individual must pass to participate fully in their society, and these prejudices are 
largely based upon the position of the individual. As stated, this is only a conceptual 
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model, but for the purposes of creating a better understanding of a structural approach 
to the inequality process, it is suitable. The rest of this section will examine in more 
detail the barriers and process. 
 
3.4.a Position  
An individual‘s personal choices interact with the history, geography and policies of 
their nation; just as such national attributes interrelate with other countries‘. These 
choices may have been well made or badly made, but the ‗internal‘ contextual 
environment that an individual is situated within also may have created restrictions. 
Through no action of their own, an individual‘s context is shaped by advantages and 
disadvantages, and also by prejudices inherent in that context. This idea is consistent 
with Gidden‘s structuration theory (1984), in which people are understood to create 
their own histories in conditions not of their own choosing. 
 
An individual‘s position alters over time, as the context they were born into is fluid, 
although the extent of the mutability varies greatly. The importance (or weight) of the 
different position-variables also fluctuates from community to community, and nation 
to nation. In this process then, as with prejudice, it is important to consider how 
different weights for different position-variables have come about. Similarly, it is 
necessary to clarify between whom or what a comparison is being made in order to 
establish an inequality. 
 
In response to the latter, a comment from Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 25) can be 
used; ―What matters is where we stand in relation to others in our own society.‖ This 
idea is supported within the model, as it considers the barriers to equality from an 
individual‘s perspective and hence that is the scale to which it is constructed. It is 
accepted that between-country inequality, for example, will impact significantly upon 
an individual‘s ability to work towards the freedom to achieve their value-objects, and 
this is also taken into account when considering how individuals‘ positions vary from 
country to country and community to community, as well as within the framework in 
which the model is situated.  
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A combination of position-variables can be understood to create a unique position for 
each individual. These include: physicality, gender, age, aptitude, race, religion, family 
structure and wealth, among others. Therefore before discussing how an individual‘s 
position (both natural and contextual) moves beyond the prejudice barrier, just how 
position-variables can alter in importance needs to be considered.  
 
Common discrimination established against the natural position-variables of physical 
impairment, gender, age or innate aptitude, has already been discussed. However, 
further to that, it is worth looking at another perspective, luck egalitarianism, which 
goes beyond prejudice to the process of neutralising any natural inequalities. To have 
the option of choosing, regardless of natural position, is a core feature of the 
theoretical stance of luck egalitarianism. The idea is that ―people are not held 
responsible for brute luck, the accidents of birth and fortune that beset them during 
their lives.‖ (Freeman 2007, 123) Ronald Dworkin is one of the main contributors to 
this concept, and he contends that a person should not only be responsible for the 
choices made after having the effects of luck have been neutralised, but also for the 
consequences of those choices, what he calls ‗option luck‘. A person therefore 
contributes to their position through personal choice (which may have already been 
affected by discrimination), before tackling the prejudice barrier from the current 
starting point.  
 
The influence of an individual‘s material and non-material inheritance (wealth) can be 
significant. Materially, a person may be born into wealth, which will likely affect what 
quality of area the home is located in, with no concerns for their intrinsic needs such as 
nutrition, shelter or sanitation. Or on the other hand, it may be quite the opposite. The 
likelihood of either rises or falls depending on what part of the world, or what part of 
their country, a person is born into and if that country has high or low levels of social 
mobility. Milanovic (2011, 121) calculates that a person‘s income is explained by:  
 
―only two factors, both of which are given at birth: his 
citizenship and the income class of his parents. These two 
factors explain more than 80 percent of a person‘s income. 
The remaining 20 percent or less is therefore due to other 
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factors over which individuals have no control (gender, age, 
race, luck) and to the factors over which they do have control 
(effort or hard work)‖. 
 
Therefore a context within which a good or bad inheritance can be collated, 
transmitting opportunity, or lack of, across generations can be argued to exist at birth. 
For example, whether that individual‘s parents attended school, gained fairly paid 
employment or were able to invest or save. The World Bank‘s IBRD 2010 Human 
Opportunity Report for Latin America and the Caribbean (2010, 14) supports this, 
suggesting, ―your parents‘ level of education will very likely determine yours. And 
your birthplace is still the most powerful predictor of whether you will have access to 
basic infrastructure.‖ 
 
Given the complexity of the factors that combine to create an individual‘s position, it 
comes as no surprise that each position is unique and complex. It is made up of many 
variables that carry different weights in different locations. This is further complicated 
by the influence of global factors, such as the particular nation‘s representation in 
global institutions, environmental pressures and the current state of the global market. 
Despite the intricacy of position-variables, each individual enters into society looking 
to participate equally.  
 
3.4.b Integration: prejudice and power barriers 
Prejudice plays a major role in the perceptions that perpetrate and perpetuate 
inequalities. Some of the more explicit forms can be seen in gender discrimination, 
racism, religious intolerance, class bias, and attitudes towards disabilities, however 
there are countless more within day-to-day life. Age, ability, family, income, 
rural/urban, language – just as a few further examples – can also be seen to alter the 
manner in which an individual is perceived and treated. An important question to ask, 
therefore, when considering the process of inequality, is how do prejudices come 
about. This section discusses the factors of discourse around gender, religion and race. 
 
According to Jan Jindy Pettman (1997), women are reinforced as being powerless and 
dependent, perpetuating male social, and political, dominance. Avoiding any potential 
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issues of similar relativism, V. Spike Peterson (2003) investigates the notion of the 
informalised economy and how the ‗invisible‘ can be made visible in this area. 
Women can be forced into accepting low wages and pitiful conditions as they are 
considered as labour made cheap and reliable employees; they are seen as willing to 
take on such roles to ensure the security of their family, while men often refuse to 
participate in such ‗unskilled‘ work. The transnational economy of the ‗maid trade‘ is 
a good example of this, forcing women, usually from developing regions, to hunt for 
or be placed into, domestic work overseas, work that is considered unskilled. Without 
a gendered account of this movement and oppression, it may be easy to accept that this 
is a natural freedom that many women have chosen to take advantage of. The sex 
industry should also be discussed here. The participation of women in their own 
objectification is not solely a result of the feminisation of poverty but also due to race, 
class and culture, for these help commodify them as, for example, exotic or 
submissive. Such propagation of the concept of the ‗other‘ as valid helps to valorise 
skills and attributes and the impact of such a loss of respect and self-esteem can be 
seen in the fact that, 
 
―Women account for half the people living with HIV 
worldwide…Worldwide, gender inequalities continue to 
affect women‘s decision-making and risk-taking behaviour, 
and vulnerability to HIV infection is often beyond a woman‘s 
individual control.‖ (Millennium Development Goals Report 
2009, UN 2009, 33) 
 
The prejudices and perspectives that have resulted from religion and race can also be 
approached from a post-colonial perspective. Bunche (1968, 38), when writing on 
modern imperialism, makes a remarkably strong charge that, ―Strenuous efforts are 
made to make these peoples think of themselves as backwards.‖ This is a powerful 
reminder that often prejudices haven‘t developed naturally but have been manipulated 
with objectives in mind. Martin Bernal‘s Black Athena (1987, 189) returns to 
eighteenth-century Egypt to support this point, 
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 ―In the long run we can see that Egypt was also harmed by 
the rise of racism and the need to disparage every African 
culture…Greece, by contrast, benefited from racism, 
immediately and in every way.‖  
 
Bernal reveals the reworking of history, just as Edward Said‘s (1994, 41) work 
highlights the inextricable link between knowledge and power: 
 
―Orientalism reinforced, and was reinforced by, the certain 
knowledge that…the West commanded the vastly greater part 
of the earth‘s surface.‖  
 
Knowledge is power, power is knowledge and both can revise history to its advantage. 
Said (1993, 4) is indignant; ―there is no just way in which the past can be quarantined 
from the present,‖ and Claude Ake (1979, 100) similarly despairs at how Western 
scholarship controls ―Third World perceptions of their world and eventually 
behaviour.‖ The consequential perception of ‗us‘ vs. ‗them‘ is a reality, reified by 
greed
11
, by fear
12
 or utter arrogance
13
, and was bemoaned by Bernal (1987, 189) as the 
reason why Greece was recognized as the ―fount of European civilisation‖  rather than 
Egypt. Claude Ake (1979, 112) urges the Third World countries to stop subordinating 
themselves to the West by accepting the West‘s definitions of development. ―If one 
must group nations as inferior and superior, it would seem that such classifications 
should be based ultimately on the quality of life,‖ and not, as Lewis (1997, 129) 
believes, as a result of the fact that ―the standards of the dominant civilisation always 
define modernity.‖ 
 
Said (1993, 40) is disgusted at how so many unquantifiable aspects of what it is to be a 
human within a culture can be ―contained and represented by dominating 
frameworks.‖ These linguistic frameworks are a result of a language that comes from 
                                               
11 ―The directing motive is this process is human greed‖ (Bunche 1968, 38), also Adam Smith, (1776) 
―Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate.‖ (532) 
12 ―European Christendom lived under the constant and imminent menace of Islam.‖ (Bernard Lewis 
1995, 11) 
13 ―Just as unfailingly, the Western societies are assigned the higher extreme of the evolutionary 
continuum.‖ (Claude Ake 1979, 105) 
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knowledge that comes from power and this is what Said‘s Orientalism attempts to 
dismantle. Said is also aware of the different scales of these frameworks; to him it isn‘t 
simply a case of changing the discourse around race or religion or gender in individual 
nations; the prejudices are buried deep in time and in geography and therefore require 
a change of authority as well to de-centre and destabilise established propositions and 
discrimination.     
 
―Everything about human history is rooted in the earth…Just 
as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is 
completely free from the struggle over geography.‖ (Said 
1993, 7) 
 
The process of creating and establishing a prejudice is complicated and occurs over 
both space and time, however once in place they are difficult to dislodge. 
Discrimination feeds into day-to-day life, just as it helps shape policy. Kallen (2004, 
33) agrees, ―once invalidating labels are imposed, dominant authorities can justify 
injustice.‖ Kallen identifies three distinct types of discrimination that perpetuate 
inequalities: institutional, structural or systemic, and cultural. All of these can lead to 
the destruction of an individual‘s, or group‘s, opportunities and/or way of life. These 
are then ―perpetuated by the elite and internalised by the marginalised,‖ (World 
Development Report 2006, 3) leading to the establishment of the prejudice filter. 
 
―One reason discrimination is so hard to eliminate comes 
from its sheer insidiousness. Beliefs about differences are 
embedded in everyday attitudes and practices in a way that 
neither the discriminator nor the discriminated against may be 
conscious of, even though these beliefs transform how they 
both behave. This is what underlies the power of the 
stereotype.‖ (World Development Report 2006, 94)  
 
The conceptual model in Figure 3.1 suggests that the authority of the community or 
nation can still impact the freedom to achieve equality of possibility; this can be 
called the ‗power barrier‘. The authority may choose to permit or prohibit certain 
61 
 
 
actions or situations that influence an individual‘s ability to attain a goal. 
Dependency analysts view the whole model as the dynamics of dependency, 
suggesting that ultimately authorities and the established processes deliberately keep 
minorities as minorities through their use of power.  
 
This stage of the process model emphasises the interplay between external and 
internal influences. The external process of economic, environmental, political and 
socio-cultural components creates a context within which a nation must operate, for 
example on a global scale. Such a context will influence the priorities a government 
has, which in turn affects how an individual functions in that society. Tax rates, 
interest rates, indigenous land claims, state welfare, military spending, education and 
health investment are all examples of how policies can restrict or encourage an 
individual to achieve value objects.  
 
3.4.c Participation 
To have the freedom to make choices about achieving value objects, an individual 
needs to be actively engaged in society. This participation is multifaceted and again 
will differ from society to society, composed of access to education and health 
resources, legal and political representation, fair employment and income and the 
opportunity to invest and consume. Ideally, to attain equality of participation an 
individual should experience no prejudice as a result of their position, and have any 
natural or contextual disadvantage neutralised. At this stage of the process there should 
be no barriers to prevent full engagement with society. However, the process is not an 
all-or-nothing exercise. The conceptual model in Figure 3.1, though, is examining the 
process of how inequality is created and therefore considers all potential barriers; it 
does not suggest that all barriers have to be removed before progress can be made. 
What the model does is simply highlight the components that interact to restrict 
opportunity.  
 
One of these essential components, as already discussed, is education. Not only does 
education create more employment opportunities, but it also has far reaching effects as 
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well, such as improving the intergenerational transmission of knowledge and skills
14
. 
Unfortunately inequality – particularly positional inequality – does prevent education 
opportunities. According to the Millennium Development Goals Report 2009, 
 
―Children from poor communities and girls are the most 
likely to lose out. In some less developed countries, children 
in the poorest 20 per cent of the population are three times 
less likely to be enrolled in primary school than children from 
the wealthiest 20 per cent…Ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities also have fewer opportunities.‖ (UN, 2009, 16) 
 
If, regardless of race, class, gender, wealth (and other variables), a person is free to 
pursue employment without restraint and expect a fair salary for the work done, then 
equality in this area will have been achieved. However there are numerous factors to 
be considered before this can occur. Even if an individual‘s position does not create 
discrimination or disadvantage, then there are still global influences to overcome. For 
example, the 2008 financial crisis has deteriorated labour markets around the world, 
with the Millennium Development Goals Report 2009 (UN, 2009, 22) suggesting that 
an extra 24 – 52 million unemployed people were created in 2009, with women‘s 
unemployment ―likely to continue increasing at a rapid pace…(as)…the financial 
crisis is now hitting female-dominated industries and services and may affect women 
more profoundly over the long term.‖ This situation will also impact the informal 
market, raising inequality by reducing the demand for formal labour and therefore 
wages.  
 
3.4.d The process of inequality traps 
Figure 3.1 affords a better understanding of the barriers an individual must overcome 
to achieve equality of opportunity, but the process by which inequality as a concept 
persists also needs to be considered. Inequality is inefficient and also morally 
offensive, so why then – despite it being talked about for centuries – is it still so active 
today? The World Development Report 2006 (World Bank, 2006, 20) contends that the 
                                               
14 ―Although good schools make a difference, the biggest influence on educational attainment, how 
well a child performs in school and later in education, is family background.‖ (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2009, 103) 
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answer lies in the establishment of inequality traps; ―These unequal social and 
economic structures tend to be readily reproduced.‖ The traps are constructed from 
interactive political, economic and socio-cultural inequalities, which essentially create 
the context that the model presented here functions within, and the result is a ―circular 
causality for wealth, income, social and cultural capital and power, mediated through 
institutions, [that] evolves throughout time and history.‖ (ibid, 23) In The Bottom 
Billion, Paul Collier (2007, 79) contends that,  
 
―All the people living in the countries of the bottom billion 
have been in one or another of the traps I have described 
[conflict, natural resource, bad neighbours and bad 
governance]…some countries have been in more than one 
trap, either simultaneously or sequentially.‖  
 
Although Collier doesn‘t believe that these traps are ‗black holes‘, he proposes that 
they are difficult to escape from and many of the countries ensnared simply don‘t have 
the resources to progress further, even if they do struggle free from the trap. Collier 
acknowledges the work of Jeffrey Sachs in promoting the notion of poverty traps as an 
explanation of inequality‘s persistence. Sachs‘ 2005 work, The End of Poverty: How 
we can make it happen in our lifetime discusses how traps are constructed: inability to 
save or invest, geographical obstacles, past debt, poor domestic and international 
governance, and population growth. These components of a poverty trap are inevitably 
intrinsic to the process of inequality traps. Sachs was discussing these traps on a global 
scale, analysing how certain developing nations were being left behind, however the 
concept of such a trap can be used in understanding how inequality – at any scale – 
persists. 
 
 
This section has introduced a conceptual process model from a structuralist 
perspective in order to visualise the mechanisms that play a role in creating and 
perpetuating inequality. It is based upon the approach that disparity is constructed 
from complex social relations and reveals the underlying social and economic 
structures (also called power and prejudice barriers) that construct a process that 
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individuals, communities, nations or regions can pass through in an attempt to attain 
an equal playing field of opportunities. The initial social, political, physical or 
economic position is understood to influence the extent of participation in society or 
in markets. Ultimately that participation decides the opportunity to achieve objectives 
or ‗value goals‘.  
 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary  
As has been regularly raised throughout this chapter, the concept of inequality is a 
multidimensional one. When considering the diverse qualities that are compared, and 
the entities involved, it quickly becomes apparent that inequality exists across time and 
space. It is important because it can at once demand a moral and an economic 
response; because it can be blamed for the loss of countless lives and the restriction of 
many more; because it is inefficient and environmentally destructive.  
 
This chapter has discussed opinions on why disparity might be considered both a 
constructive and destructive situation. This research assumes the view, as has been 
discussed in this chapter, that inequality is a process and is inefficient, damaging and 
deprecating, and that it does not incentivise growth. The need to reduce the current 
levels of inequality at a global, national and local scale, and to oppose the structures 
that force marginalisation at these scales, is a moral, as well as a growth, issue.  
 
The second chapter of this section turns to the theoretical introduction of dependency. 
Chapter Four follows the rise and fall of this approach to prepare the ‗theoretical 
ground‘ for later discussions on the influence of structural dependency within 
inequality processes. 
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Chapter Four 
The rise and fall of the dependency school 
 
This chapter charts the rise and fall of the dependency approach. This is most 
commonly associated with underdevelopment but here an attempt is made to view it 
within a context of socio-economic inequality, as defined in Chapter Three. This 
includes its origins and evolution, the themes and pressures that came to define it, and 
the reasons behind its theoretical marginalisation. This chapter then considers the 
question of the ongoing relevance of a dependency approach despite criticisms of it, 
before arguing that a revisited perspective is capable of making a significant 
contribution to an understanding of the process of inequality. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
―Neither external relations nor internal ones, however, are 
‗determining‘; rather they exert different forces at different 
points in time and in different ways‖ (Johnson 1981, 144) 
 
Theories and concepts are not developed in isolation; they are conceived out of 
necessity at a unique time with particular exigencies, building on analyses that went 
before. Dependency analysis was no different, evolving through inimitable historical 
and theoretical contexts to confront the issue of expanding global inequality. However, 
due to the diversity of influences that shaped the perspective, it proved challenging for 
dependency to establish a lucid revolutionary theory and its influence waned. Despite 
this, the concept of structural dependency may still remain relevant today and can 
potentially help to forge a better understanding of the persistence of inequality.  
 
 
4.2 Evolution – an analysis of the rise of dependency  
Historically, following the end of the Second World War, a conceptual space was 
forced open by a series of unique pressures. These pressures, such as the Cold War, 
global economic restructuring and the rebuilding of national identities, met a landslide 
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of revolution and poverty head-on, the result of which was an opening in which the 
voices of the developing world could be heard and where polemicists saw 
opportunities to unsettle established structures. Within this space, most notably in 
Latin America, the concept of dependency, cultivated over a few decades by the 
disruption and fusion of various policies and theories, matured to provide a framework 
for the protesting voices to cogently rise up. The events that contributed to the creation 
of the conceptual space within which dependency was to situate itself will be analysed, 
followed up by an overview of the theoretical evolution of dependency.  
 
4.2.a Historical evolution 
Post-war landscape: Although the seeds of dependency had been sown many years 
previously, most notably in the work of José Carlos Mariátegui (1928), it was in the 
three decades between 1945 and 1975, when the world experienced significant change 
both economically and ideologically, that a conceptual space opened for the 
perspective to develop. Mariátegui‘s 1928 publication Seven Interpretive Essays on 
Peruvian Reality had anticipated the discourse that dependency would generate. The 
essays discussed exploitation at the hands of foreign and domestic interests, the 
marginalisation and exclusion of indigenous Indians and the need for agrarian reform 
to arrest such processes, and considered topics such as regionalism and centralism. All 
of these themes were to surface again in Latin American structuralist and dependency 
debates years later. Samir Amin (2000, 6) sees this as the result of the stable structures 
of post-war growth collapsing. 
 
―History then enters a phase that might be described later as 
transitional, but is lived as a transition toward the unknown, 
during which new historical subjects crystallize slowly. These 
subjects inaugurate new practices, proceeding by trial and 
error, and legitimise them through new ideological 
discourses, often confused at the outset.‖ 
 
Many of the new historical subjects, the dissenting voices, were from the complex 
space of Latin America, which, during the same timeframe, had endured a period of 
violent upheaval and widening inequality. It created a ‗Third World‘ perspective that 
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challenged the traditional viewpoints of the industrialised nations, and subsequently 
gave the new space the authenticity and validity to nurture the discourse of 
dependency. By labelling these post-war changes as economic and ideological it is 
possible to construct a framework to better understand how these various pressures 
combined to give the perspective momentum, particularly inside Latin America. 
 
Economic Change: Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001, 627) highlight the main economic 
shift, that ―the United States emerged from World War II with its economy intact – 
able and willing to help rebuild the countries of friends and foes alike.‖ The setting up 
of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947 facilitated such a process. Indeed Hobsbawm (1994, 230) 
points out that the U.S. government was at that time far more concerned with avoiding 
a repeat of the 1929 slump than with preventing any potential future conflicts. With 
this in mind, and while establishing a clear ideological and moral order that was 
evident in Truman‘s 1949 inaugural address, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank and GATT set about ensuring that the U.S. dollar became the key 
global currency. By 1950 most European countries had, aided by U.S. dollars through 
the Marshall Plan, returned to pre-war GDP levels and some of the socialist countries 
were also experiencing an economic surge. To maintain this momentum the 
industrialised countries, using aid and loans, sought to maximise global comparative 
advantage by promoting increased primary-good productivity within developing 
regions to meet the rising demand for raw materials brought about by the economic 
growth in the centre.  
 
All of this occurred across a timescale when neoclassical and Keynesian economics 
were vying for dominance and so economic transformations also tended to initiate 
ideological shifts. As Sunkel (1977) comments,  
 
―If theory did not correspond to reality, so much the worse 
for reality: it would have to be changed so that it would 
correspond to the assumptions of neoclassical and 
macrodynamic theory.‖ (cited in Kay 1989, 4) 
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Murray (2006) keeps an eye on these historical economic pressures by highlighting the 
rise of a new international division of labour in the 1960s that revolved around a form 
of neocolonialism defined as ―economic dependence combined with political 
sovereignty.‖ (102) This concept was built around the growing control of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) within developing countries due mainly to developments in 
technology and communications.  
 
During the same decade the economic landscape in Latin America, having experienced 
the global rush of post-war optimism, began to fall further behind the rest of the world. 
Unemployment, inflation and devaluation combined with mass political upheaval 
created a situation wherein Latin America produced only 4% of the world‘s GDP with 
an average annual growth rate of 2.4%. The average for the underdeveloped world was 
2.5%. In such circumstances, and with such disappointment, the nature of the writing 
that emerged from the region at that time should come as no surprise. Celso Furtado 
wrote Development and Underdevelopment (1964), the first of three major texts he 
published during the decade, in which he developed the themes of revising the 
structuralist work of the ECLA and shifting policy focus away from the economic to 
the political. These themes will be investigated later in this chapter but they can 
certainly be associated with the political economy of the period. The 1960s also saw 
Frank‘s The Development of Underdevelopment published in 1966, Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America (1967), followed by Cardoso and Faletto‘s 
Dependency and Development in Latin America in 1969. When combined with the 
ideological shifts the world was experiencing at precisely the same time, this economic 
environment created an intense pressure that sprung open a new conceptual space and 
caused the calls for change to echo louder inside it. These ideological shifts are 
outlined in the following section. 
 
Ideological Change: From 1945 until Frank‘s The Development of Underdevelopment 
was published in 1966, the United States enjoyed a worldwide political and cultural 
hegemony. Immanuel Wallerstein (1988, 432) attributes this to four main policy 
initiatives: the construction of the ‗free world‘ leadership, funded through the Marshall 
Plan; the stylised Cold War with the USSR; the gradual decolonisation of Asia and 
Africa to avoid disgruntled colonies finding solace in communism; and the creation of 
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a united front at home by minimising internal class conflict. These four proposals 
provide a suitable architecture for an examination of the ideological strains placed on 
the developing world and why, in combination with economic realities, the result was 
fertile ground for the dependency movement. 
 
The first policy regarding ‗free world‘ leadership, and the symbiosis of dogma and 
economy, has already been discussed in the previous section, while the second 
initiative introduces the ideological clash that dominated the political landscape at the 
time. Hobsbawm (1994, 174) explains how the post-war anti-fascist wave absorbed 
both the anti-communist and anti-imperialist feelings of the time. 
 
―In spite of their conflicts of interest, which were to re-
emerge after the war, the anti-fascism of the developed 
Western countries and the anti-imperialism of their colonies 
found themselves converging towards what both envisaged as 
a post-war future of social transformation.‖ 
 
It was this vision of social transformation that shaped the ideological geography of this 
period. Once the threat of fascism had receded, capitalism and communism once again 
clashed over how exactly this change would come about. Possibly it was the relief of 
having the focus removed for a period of time while the forces of the world combined 
against fascism; perhaps it was pure opportunism but there was a renewed sense of 
momentum in the communist factions following the war. In 1949 Mao Zedong 
established the People‘s Republic of China after decades of fighting and, right on the 
USA‘s doorstep, Fidel Castro led a successful revolution in Cuba in 1959.  
 
At the same time the colonial system was being broken down. At the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 opposition to colonisation was explicitly raised, but by this time 
Syria and Lebanon had already gained their independence in 1945, followed by the 
Philippines the following year. India and Pakistan achieved theirs in 1947 and one 
year later Burma, Sri Lanka and Indonesia all declared their independence. This third 
policy mentioned by Wallerstein – decolonisation – was driven by the fear that 
dissatisfied and disenfranchised nations would turn to communism if their lot didn‘t 
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improve, and subsequently it was implemented swiftly. However as the movement 
swept into Africa (Sudan, 1956, and Ghana, 1957), Latin America also took its turn. 
Between 1947 with the start of the Paraguayan civil war, to 1973 when Pinochet 
overthrew Salvador Allende in Chile, almost every Latin America nation underwent a 
military coup or revolution. Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay and 
Ecuador all experienced fundamental change during this time. All of this caused, as 
noted by Amin (2000, 9), critical thought to move out towards the edges of the system, 
leading to ―the periphery‘s dazzling entry into modern thought.‖ Amin recognised that 
this new critical thinking had shifted away from the schism of industrialised and non-
industrialised nations to a new form of polarisation; the distribution of income. Such a 
change may have been initiated by the rise of national populism in, for example, Latin 
America, which served as an attempt to engage the world in a debate outside of the 
oversimplified iron curtain. However, the new, developing voices prompting the 
debate were not in fact original, as Mariátegui, as already mentioned, had written his 
Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality in 1928. The difference was that 
suddenly there was a space within which these voices were being heard. 
     
The fourth initiative put forward by Wallerstein was the minimisation of internal 
conflict so as to muffle the noises being made in the peripheries. However this proved 
impossible. 
 
―Nineteen sixty-five was a watershed year in North American 
society and politics. In April U.S. Marines landed in Santo 
Domingo. In August Watts exploded. Throughout the year 
the war in Vietnam escalated, and political protests and 
movements swept the country. A country shaken by the 
murder of its President began to wonder whether its 
pathologies were systemic.‖ (Packenham 1992, 1) 
 
Frank‘s 1966 English text The Development of Underdevelopment entered the US at a 
time when the country was extremely receptive to new ideas. The race riots in Watts, 
Los Angeles, which Packenham refers to above, stress the racial inequalities of the 
time, and the need for the marginalised communities to find a voice. While at the same 
71 
 
 
time the failure of the US troops to make progress in Vietnam and an increasingly 
weak dollar underlined the hegemony‘s vulnerability, encapsulated in the assassination 
of President Kennedy in 1963. The global reaction to what Wallerstein considered the 
USA‘s strategic hegemony created opportunities for dependency to establish itself. 
However it was the 1968 crisis that truly instigated its rapid rise: 
 
―The world revolution of 1968…(was) the crucial moment in 
which the hegemony of liberalism in the geoculture of the 
modern world-system was effectively challenged.‖ 
(Wallerstein 1988, 355) 
 
In 1968 the world experienced an explosive reaction to US dominance, with France, 
Czechoslovakia and Mexico, among others, all undergoing fundamental change. A 
series of left-led strikes and protests in Paris led to the downfall of the De Gaulle 
government, Mexico witnessed a student massacre in the Night of Tiatelolco, while 
the Prague Spring‘s push for ‗socialism with a human face‘ came to an abrupt end with 
a Soviet incursion. In this situation of ideological attacks on both modernisation and 
orthodox Marxism, alongside snowballing decolonisation, the concept of development 
warped. With the additional pressure of a heavily imbalanced political economy it was 
the perfect opportunity for a new discourse from the periphery. A theoretical 
conjuncture took place within a conceptual space that had been forced open by 
historical pressures, both economic and ideological, and it was from this that a 
recognisable dependency movement emerged. The theoretical evolution of this 
movement through various influences will be discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2.b Theoretical Evolution 
Dependency emerged from the conjecture of several theoretical movements that 
overlapped within Latin America, creating a new, but unstable, perspective. The crisis 
of orthodox Marxism, the influences of imperialism and neo-Marxism spilled over 
from the Left, while the failures of ECLA‘s Latin American structuralism (which is 
discussed shortly), the Eurocentric modernisation theory and the liberal economic 
theories created an opportunity for a fresh approach. This section uses two categories 
in an attempt to better understand the theoretical evolution of dependency: (i) the 
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influences of Marxism, Imperialism, neo-Marxism and Latin American structuralism, 
and (ii) the responses to classical economic approach and modernisation. 
 
4.2.b(i) Influences of Latin American Structuralism, Marxism, Imperialism, neo-
Marxism 
Although Marxist thought has unquestionably directly informed dependency, its more 
immediate evolutionary influences arguably came from Latin American structuralism, 
as well as imperialist and neo-Marxist approaches. However, to fully understand its 
evolution it is useful to start with Latin American Structuralism.  
 
Latin American Structuralism: In 1947 the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) was established, an agency whose,  
 
―initial concern lay in discovering the major obstacles to 
development in Latin America and suggesting policies to 
overcome these. Thus, the concern was more practical than 
scholastic.‖ (Kay 1989, 25)  
 
The ideas of the structuralist school of thought quickly gathered pace and support and 
were so well accepted in the1960s that the US and some reformist governments in 
Latin America acknowledged many of them. Latin American structuralism was based 
primarily on the polarisation of the international economic structure between the 
industrial core and the more agrarian periphery. As Kay (1989) suggested, the core-
periphery paradigm is the cornerstone of structuralism; this structure creates the single 
process of development and underdevelopment through international trade. 
Ultimately, the peripheral countries are not able to follow through the same growth 
stages of the core industrial countries as they are trapped in an established system of 
competitive disadvantage. Palma (1978, 906) suggests that the ECLA analyses drew 
heavily from a Keynesian approach but that this ―in no way denies their originality; 
this lay in the way they applied the Keynesian analysis to the Latin American 
situation, and to the theory of economic development.‖ While neo-classical theories 
championed comparative advantage as the justification for asymmetrical international 
trade, and argued that the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries 
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would narrow as a result, structuralist Raul Prebisch was asserting that the gap was 
actually widening. He believed that the periphery was being forced to produce 
primary products by the international division of production and consequently an 
unequal exchange, a ‗dynamic disparity of demand‘, was being established. As 
Murray succinctly explains,  
 
 ―It was argued that primary products face income-inelastic 
demand, while manufactured products face income-elastic 
demand. Therefore as global income increases, the demand 
for, and therefore the price of primary products will decline 
relative to that of manufactured products.‖ (Murray 2006, 
292)  
 
Love (1990) suggests that the terms of trade analysis became the point of departure 
for the structuralist school, emphasising macroeconomics and the role of institutions, 
especially the state. He cites Raul Prebisch‘s (1963, 147) opinion on the deterioration 
of internal terms of trade between agriculture and industry as well, including the 
explanation that, 
 
―the insufficient dynamism of development, which does not 
facilitate the absorption of the labour force [because such 
absorption is] not required by the slow growth of demand [for 
agricultural products] and the increase of productivity in 
primary activities. This insufficient dynamism prevents a rise 
in wages in agriculture parallel to the increase in productivity, 
and…[thus] primary production loses in part or in whole the 
gains from its technological progress.‖  
 
Together with the terms of trade analysis, the core-peripheral concept was also to 
heavily influence the dependency approach. The division between the core and the 
periphery came about due to a number of capitalist processes, not least of all ―an 
unequal distribution of technical progress.‖ (Preston 1996, 184) The periphery was 
forced to import its technology, quite often obsolete technology, which was largely 
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used within primary commodity production. The result of which was a continued 
reliance on (income-inelastic) primary product exports and consequently a stronger 
hand for the industrially developed core and this meant that the periphery had to 
export an increasing quantity of raw materials in order to continue importing the same 
amount of industrial commodities. Any advanced technology that was brought in was 
done so within the control of foreign ownership and management, leading not only to 
a situation where local surplus labour was not soaked up, but also to the expropriation 
of surplus profit, preventing it from being re-invested back into the periphery. Both 
Paul Baran and André Gunder Frank make this point by drawing on the Marxist 
analysis of the expropriation of surplus value, ―which emphasised the potential 
surplus which could be made available for investment under non-capitalist 
influences.‖ (Kay 1989, 32) 
 
Prebisch‘s work sets out economic recommendations as to how the lopsided terms of 
trade might be rectified. The ECLA ―argument for industrialisation rests on [the] 
analysis of the periphery‘s deterioration of the terms of trade and the limited 
international mobility of factors of production.‖ (Kay 1989, 36) State-sponsored 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) was the main policy put forward, as well as 
tariffs placed on any industrial imports whose production was to be substituted. 
Favourable foreign exchange, ‗healthy protectionism‘, land reform and subsidies for 
local industry were all also proposed, as was a ―rapid assimilation of new technology 
[that] requires a prodigious effort to train the masses of the population.‖ (Prebisch 
1961, 623)  
 
These ideas were behind Latin America Structuralism‘s drive to modernise Latin 
America via industrialisation, using the state as the crucial – and explicit – agent of 
development. Leiva (2008, 4 - 5) disaggregated the role of the state to instigate 
structural reforms, steer capital accumulation, develop key industrial sectors, protect 
the economy from any external fluctuations, and absorb any pressure that resulted 
from conflicting social groups. Leiva (ibid) describes the outcome of such an 
approach as when ―the economy is subordinate to politics.‖  
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―It was expected that this substitution process would lead to 
two types of structural transformation: changes in the 
structure of production as industry‘s share of national income 
increased, and changes in the structure and composition of 
imports as these would form a smaller proportion of national 
income.‖ (Kay 1989, 38)  
 
Expectations of structural transformations were troubling ECLA from as early as 
1952. ISI led to the adoption of inappropriate technology, inveterate problems with the 
balance of trade and payments, the exposure of poor local knowledge and 
management, and did not lead to the hoped-for diversification of exports, as there 
remained a heavy reliance on primary products, as well as a lack of rural growth. ISI 
countries often developed considerable budget deficits and consequently suffered from 
inflation and, being capital-intensive, ISI also had a debilitating impact on 
employment. Tavares (1964, cited in Love 1990, 150) adds to these problems, 
suggesting that it did not diminish capital and fuel imports, could not prevent unfair 
terms of trade or ceilings on the domestic market due to unbalanced income 
distribution, and didn‘t prompt the agrarian reforms that were necessary to increase the 
necessary food supply. These failures not only can be seen to have contributed to the 
more radical dependency theories but also added to the evolutionary progression 
towards the later modern world systems theory.  
 
Theorists from within ECLA did realise later that industrialisation should not work 
solely within a national market and ―vigorously promoted the idea of regional 
integration by encouraging the setting up of a Latin American common market‖ (Kay 
1989, 40). Developing countries also looked to organise themselves internationally, 
establishing the Group of 77 in 1955 to press for higher prices for exports and greater 
access to the markets of the developed countries. Although some concessions were 
achieved, the flaws of ISI remained. Therefore it can be said that in the 1960s, while 
Rostow, among others, was advocating rapid industrialisation, the Latin American 
structuralists had already been investigating this option for a number of years.  
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This failure to develop further beyond the ‗easy phase‘ of ISI can certainly be argued 
to have created an urgent need for an alternative approach. Dependency fulfilled that 
role, integrating, as previously discussed, Marxist concepts while at the same time 
continuing to use well-known ECLA language. In this way the ECLA had three major 
impacts on the evolution of dependency. The first was in how the more conservative 
dependency writers, people such as Furtado, Sunkel and Cardoso, were essentially 
born of ECLA‘s failures, and yet were still determined to continue working with the 
same concepts as Prebisch had established, maintaining the belief that the solution lay 
in structural reforms from within the capitalist system; reforms dealing with problems 
such as the agrarian pattern of latifundia and minifundia and established social 
stratification. The second impact was more fundamental, in that the Marxist 
dependency writers, for example Marini, Dos Santos and Frank, building on the work 
of Baran, supported the destruction of the structures that caused inequality. For them 
ECLA‘s policies had failed, and reforming the system would simply continue to 
propagate the same problems of backwardness in developing regions due to external 
domination. The ECLA was said to have only attacked the symptoms and not the 
problems and a solution could only be found in a new system. Dos Santos argued that 
ISI only brought more dependence, as it increased external vulnerability, 
unemployment, income concentration and reliance on foreign investment. Sánchez 
(2007, 7) cites Dudley Seers in support of this line of thought; ―the realisation that 
import substitution created new, and possibly more dangerous forms of dependence 
converted the ECLA structuralists into dependency theorists.‖ This was also the case 
with internal dependence, as Roxburgh (1979, 44) highlights, 
 
―What in effect the ECLA economists had done was to jump 
over the intervening level of social structure. They had 
ignored the specific class interests and the relationships 
between classes which led to the continuous reproduction of 
the structures of dependency.‖ 
 
Marini‘s concept of sub-imperialism, which will be discussed later in this chapter, 
attempted to rectify this omission, as did the theory of internal colonialism.  
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The third influence can be seen in an expansion of argument. Prebisch had pitted his 
work mostly against Ricardian and neo-classical ideas, but when the analyses began to 
absorb the social science elements of modernisation then a new framework was 
required. 
 
―It is out of this complex pattern of debate which revolved 
around the exchange of metropolitan centres and Latin 
American economies that the notion of dependency 
crystallises. The theory of dependence is a response to the 
problems of structuralist analyses.‖ (Preston 1996, 189) 
 
The major influences are summarised below in Table 4.1. With such a variety of 
contradictory forces at work, it is unsurprising that dependency developed a 
revolutionary fervour, and its landmark ideas will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of the major influences of Latin American structuralism on 
the dependency approach 
1. Terms of trade Dependency accepted ECLA‘s analyses of a declining terms of trade 
(secular decline) 
2. External domination The idea of external domination and exploitation was also central to 
the dependency approach 
3. Core and periphery This terminology was continued and the idea extended to exist 
within nation-states 
4. ISI It was argued that ISI only created more dependence for developing 
countries 
Source: Author 
 
 
Marxism: Palma (1978) outlines three areas of Marxist concern that directly 
influenced the dependency school: the development of the advanced capitalist 
societies; the economic and political relations between these advanced societies and 
developing ones; and the slow growth in the developing societies. He suggests that 
dependency emerged from concern with the latter, the analysis of underdevelopment, 
although was not exclusively restricted to that. (885-6) While Marxism considered the 
capitalist stage to be a progressive one, dependency analysts disagreed and understood 
the consequence of underdevelopment as destructive. Indeed one half of the 
dependency school saw it as so destructive that it demanded that developing nations 
de-link from the global capitalist system. As can be seen in Table 4.2 there are a 
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number of Marxist features that can be seen to have influenced dependency. Most of 
these will discussed in much greater detail in Section Three of this chapter, for 
example the centrality of class analysis to any theoretical approach and the notion of a 
division of labour. The Marxist way of interpreting the world – historical materialism 
– views the organisation of society as inherently economic and historicist and these 
theoretical perspectives are largely carried on within a dependency approach.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of the major influences of Marxism on the dependency 
approach 
1. Mode of production Dependency writers saw Capitalism as a mode of exchange 
 
2. Division of labour Picked up by imperialism and structuralism (on a global scale) and 
discussed in the dependency school 
3. Class analysis Although criticised for its lack of class analysis, the dependency 
school discussed class in internal dependency 
4. Revolution Some dependency writers demanded that the periphery should revolt 
and delink from the capitalist system 
5. Historical materialism Dependency provides a similarly materialist interpretation of the 
capitalist system but on an international scale 
6. Progressive Marx saw the capitalist stage as progressive, while some 
dependency analysts called it destructive 
Source: Author 
 
 
Imperialism: Imperialism can be seen to have created the framework within which 
dependency inhabited: core and periphery; exploitation and accumulation; domination 
and subordination. Smith (1985, 345) commented that, ―dependency literature studies 
the effects of imperialism, not the nature of imperialism itself‖ and one of 
dependency‘s best-known writers, Dos Santos, keenly supported a reformed 
imperialism theory to better understand dependency (1970). Roxborough (1979) 
agreed, arguing that if imperialism‘s focus was on the accumulation of wealth in the 
core, then dependency focuses on the losses in the periphery. Palma (1978, 887) has a 
similar opinion, stating that dependency ―is intimately connected with the theory of 
imperialism, and in no way [is] intended as an alternative to it, as some of its critics 
have wrongly argued.‖ Another concept that can be seen to have influenced 
dependency is the process of surplus expropriation, which is understood to be a result 
of monopoly capitalism. Dos Santos (1970) wrote at length of the potentially negative 
consequences of this condition for development. 
 
 
79 
 
 
Table 4.3 Summary of the major influences of imperialism on the dependency 
approach 
1. Monopoly capitalism Dos Santos (1970) wrote on the dangers of monopolies causing high 
profit expropriation 
2. Accumulation Frank‘s work placed capital accumulation at the centre of 
underdevelopment 
3. Exploitation Both Marini (1973) and Dos Santos (1970) wrote of the super-
exploitation of labour 
4. Core and periphery While imperialism focused on accumulation in the core, dependency 
looked at peripheral loss 
Source: Author 
 
 
Neo-Marxism: Essentially a critique of Marxism, neo-Marxism is a loose term for 
various approaches that revise Marxist theory, typically by incorporating aspects of 
other intellectual traditions. Both dependency analysis and world-systems theory, as 
will be discussed later, can be classified as neo-Marxist but to achieve an accurate 
overview of the evolution of dependency it is productive to consider some concepts 
and ideas in their own right. It is also useful to regard it as a perspective from the 
periphery, rather than from the centre like Marxism and imperialism. Two very 
relevant elements of neo-Marxist thought are the development of non-material and 
material repression.  
 
Non-material repression: Many notable neo-Marxists wrote from a sociological, 
philosophical or psychological perspective, often emphasising the need for different 
forms of liberation. The suggestion was that the power of ignorance is deliberately 
propagated by developed countries through a technique of repression that Marcuse 
describes in his text One Dimensional Man (1964) as domination transformed into 
administration. Marcuse was vocal in promoting oppositional thought and behaviour in 
the face of a system that retarded people‘s ability to think critically. He argued that 
individuals were being made imbeciles by the mass media creating false needs, a 
process made all the more important when looked at in the context of Marx‘s idea that, 
‗life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life.‘ 
 
Material repression: The neo-Marxist idea that the capitalist system restricts 
development, fundamentally an economic interpretation of imperialism, is discussed in 
Paul Baran‘s The Political Economy of Growth (1957), which is a response to 
modernisation‘s assumption that the developing world would be able to benefit from 
its initial backwardness.  In it Baran argued that economic development is ultimately 
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detrimental to the interests of the industrialised core because monopoly capitalism, as 
exposed by Lenin, has a tendency towards stagnation. This stagnation is caused by the 
same under-consumption that Hobson highlighted. These dual factors leave the 
capitalist system permanently fighting to avoid slumps, which it does through 
permitting state spending of economic surplus. This was Baran‘s theoretical departure 
– if the surplus output is used for investment rather than waste, or for the military as 
often is the case, then the undeveloped areas of the world could be transformed. There 
was no dual role of destruction and regeneration for capitalism as Marx had argued; 
there was only destruction. The three forces (national capital, foreign capital and the 
state) that Baran saw as having the capacity to increase surplus, and use towards 
growth, had no predisposition towards – and indeed were hostile to – the development 
of the backward regions. Baran‘s impassioned writing anticipates that of dependentista 
Dos Santos over a decade later.  
 
―The difference is not, as in the advanced countries, between 
higher and lower degrees of development, between the now 
reachable final solution of the entire problem of want and the 
continuation of drudgery, poverty and cultural degradation; 
[it] is the difference between abysmal squalor and decent 
existence, between the misery of hopelessness and the 
exhilaration of progress, between life and death for millions 
of people.‖ (Baran, 1957, 219) 
 
Various notable writers, such as Frank and Wallerstein, unmistakably built on the 
ideas of Baran, evidencing his considerable influence on the progress towards a 
dependency analysis (as can be seen in Table 4.4). Dependency clearly functions 
within a similar theoretical framework as imperialism and neo-Marxism. For example, 
neo-Marxists see the bourgeoisie as the creation and tool of imperialism, incapable of 
liberating the forces of production, an idea that is prevalent in the work of Marini 
(1973). Indeed it can be suggested that the tension between imperialist and neo-
Marxist writers contributed to the creation of the theoretical space that dependency 
filled. Barone (1985) saw dependency as a new variation of a neo-Marxist theory of 
imperialism, Brewer (1980) believed that it filled the gap in neo-Marxism by 
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explaining underdevelopment, and Walleri (1978) suggested a link with informal neo-
colonialism. 
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Table 4.4 Summary of the major influences of neo-Marxism on the dependency 
approach 
1. Stagnation Baran discussed the concept of economic stagnation that was also 
used in the dependency approach 
2. Profit repatriation The expropriation of profits was at the core of accumulation and 
monopolisation  
3. Economic surplus Economic surplus was blatantly not used for reinvestment within 
developing nations 
4. Economistic  A movement away from solely economic exploitation to include 
non-material repression 
Source: Author 
 
 
4.2.b(ii) Responses to classical economic approach and modernisation 
As has been referred to previously, dependency grew from a variety of influences and 
pressures. Some of these pressures came in the form of responses to the schools of 
thought of classical economic theories and modernisation. In a fashion the dependency 
approach – like structuralism – is a critique of these theories and as such they have 
played an important role in its evolution. 
 
Classical economic approach: Adam Smith‘s Wealth of Nations (1776) and David 
Ricardo‘s theory of comparative advantage are commonly used as the founding 
concepts of the classical economic approach. Smith emphasised specialisation (the 
division of labour) and productivity as essential to economic growth, which, in turn, 
led to the need to access larger markets and global specialisation (an international 
division of labour). This process, combined with the Ricardian idea of each nation 
producing to its optimum comparative advantage, had obvious free trade outcomes as 
tariffs or restrictions on the movement of goods or capital were nothing more than 
impediments to growth. That the market should be open to function on its own merits, 
with as little government intervention as possible, was key to the success of free trade. 
These principles were not immediately implemented, nor indeed accepted, as Frieden 
points out - ―the heyday of European free trade came a hundred years after Smith had 
demonstrated its desirability.‖ (2006, 32) This peak expanded to encompass a global 
capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that was only to come to 
an end with the onset of the First World War. However, despite the growth and 
success it had enjoyed to that point, this early globalisation (along with colonisation) 
also isolated and exploited many regions of the developing world, causing much of the 
inequality and dualism that structuralism was to later confront. 
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While Latin American structuralism is very much a reaction to the classical economic 
approach, dependency can also be described as having a similarly polemical position. 
However dependency is better defined as a critique of a combination of classical 
analysis (as seen in Table 4.5) and modernisation theories (Table 4.6). Add to this the 
pressure applied by the conflicting structuralist approach and the result of such an 
incompatible fusion was the buckling of established opinion and a new conceptual 
opening. Dependency writers believed that there was no genuine free trade and that 
Ricardo‘s comparative advantage was nothing more than an ideological tool used to 
justify the exploitation of developing countries.  They dismissed the idea that 
inequality was an abnormality in the capitalist system; it was an implicit mechanism of 
the whole operation. The trickle-down theory was seen as nothing but a myth as the 
nature of the insertion of peripheral nations into the global capitalist economy simply 
reinforced the unequal distribution of opportunity and wealth.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of key dependency responses to a classical economic 
approach  
1. ‘Trickle-down’ theory Dependency strove to discredit the ‗trickle-down‘ concept as false 
 
2. Free trade Free trade was a misnomer and only served to increase dependency 
and exploitation  
3.Comparative Advantage Ricardo‘s law was dismissed as an ideological tool to maintain 
inequality 
Source: Author 
 
 
Modernisation: Following the boom of post-war restructuring, there was a sense of 
economic buoyancy. The concept that capital accumulation would lead to ‗modernity‘, 
whatever that was, was made extremely popular by Walt Rostow‘s stages of economic 
growth in The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto (1960, 13).  
 
―These stages are not merely descriptive. They are not merely 
a way of generalising certain factual observations about the 
sequence of development societies. They have an inner logic 
and continuity. They have an analytical bone-structure, 
rooted in a dynamic theory of production.‖  
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This Eurocentric view was a simple idea well sold in a public arena, gaining 
international recognition despite severe criticism of its singularly economic path to 
attain the ultimate goal of mass consumption. Rostow‘s theory, with its ahistorical 
emphasis on poorer countries‘ internal development, was believed by dependency 
analysts to be unrealistic and regressive. As Frank said, modernisation was deficient 
because the problems weren‘t internal; they were external too. 
 
―Dependency theory says the failure of modernisation to look 
outside is nothing more than an ideological smokescreen 
behind which North American imperialism operated freely.‖ 
(Smith 1985, 552) 
 
Although Andre Gunder Frank‘s work will be looked at in more depth later in this 
chapter, it is worth noting here that the ‗reluctant dependentista‘, as Kay (1989, 155) 
called him, argued that not all countries had gone through the same economic or social 
processes as the developed countries had. He suggested that not all countries had been 
permitted to enjoy equal resources or opportunities to progress at a similar rate and 
condemned colonisation as a profoundly exploitative practice, which prevented the 
colonised world from participating in a capitalist global economy on an equal footing. 
This assertion represented a major change of focus from the work of ECLA, 
introducing a more explicitly political commentary. As a result, one of dependency‘s 
main tasks was ensuring that such abusive and repressive histories were taken into 
account when considering the development of poorer countries.  
 
The hopes for Rostow‘s prescriptive route to ‗take-off‘, and the hopes of a subsequent 
‗trickle-down‘ effect into the developing nations, dwindled towards the end of the 
decade as described by Hewitt (1992, 293):  
 
―Approximately 70% of capital flows into developing 
countries in the 1960s were from the investments of 
transnational corporations. This raised the question of how 
much of the observed economic growth was of an isolated 
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type dependent on the location decisions of these 
corporations and how much it built up national capacity.‖  
 
As a result the terms of trade further weakened, forcing countries such as China, India 
and Brazil, which had a focus on primary products, to consider diversifying into 
industry through ISI. This took place at different speeds in different countries and 
―these patterns of industrialisation reinforced the existing diversity of developing 
countries.‖ (Hewitt 1992, 295) Growth, if there was any, was not enough for sustained 
progress and the realisation that all countries were not the same, not moving through 
the same stages, took hold.  
 
However by the 1970s it was clear that growth and development were two different 
processes and did not necessarily collide, allowing writers such as Dos Santos to 
promote their work to a more responsive audience. Dos Santos preached of the need 
for developing countries to withdraw from the capitalist system, the reverse of the 
modernists‘ creed of integration. This also highlighted another pressure point between 
the two approaches, that being that modernisation uses the nation-state as its unit of 
analysis, while dependency uses the world system. These responses are collated in 
Table 4.6. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Summary of key dependency responses to modernisation 
1. Rates of growth A major driver of dependency was to explain the different rates of 
growth around the globe 
2. Ahistorical  The stage theory of modernisation was ahistorical and consequently 
wholly inaccurate 
3. Emphasis of internal Modernisation adopted a Eurocentric emphasis on internal factors 
that dependency rejected 
4. Growth & development Dependency snubbed the idea that growth and development were the 
same process 
5. Unit of analysis While modernisation used the nation-state, dependency used the 
world-system 
Source: Author 
 
 
4.2.c Summary 
The evolution of the dependency discourse was chaotic. In amongst the turbulent fall-
out of two world wars dependency borrowed, rejected and reacted against ideas and 
theories from across the entire political spectrum, leaving it as somewhat of a 
hotchpotch solution to changing issues. However as the issues of growing inequality 
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and ongoing underdevelopment came more into focus, so too did dependency, 
becoming in the process the vehicle through which the previously muffled voices of 
the periphery could reverberate around the world.  
 
 
4.3 Dependency – reform and revolution 
As the concept of dependency evolved it became clear that there was a schism 
developing. The more conservative wing of dependency, which became known as ‗the 
old dependency‘, aimed to remain working within the system and held the opinion that 
the integrated sectors of society no longer wanted reform and therefore it was up to the 
non-integrated groups to bring about change. On the other hand, the ‗new 
dependency‘, the revolutionary neo-Marxist dependentistas, had ideas that were 
framed in the Marxist terms of anti-thesis with the goal of revolution. The two 
‗parties‘ have since been labelled as reformist and revolutionary, prompting Palma 
(1978, 881) to question if the concept of dependency actually ever evolved into a 
coherent theory and wonders if it is more appropriate to talk of a ‗school of 
dependency‘. The most important differences between the two sides were in how 
dependency was understood to come about and what were the best solutions to 
eradicate the dependent relationships. The following section will outline some of the 
main themes from both the revolutionary and the reformist camps to pinpoint the 
major stresses within the framework.  
 
Influential writers such as Cardoso, Sunkel, Furtado, Frank and Dos Santos all 
acknowledged that the global capitalist system had over time created a collection of 
debilitating pressures that had established an international division of labour. At the 
moment of history within which they were writing, this system was forcing certain 
regions, most notably Latin America, to depend upon an advantaged group of 
industrialised nations. These pressures included the consistently unfair integration of 
these poorer countries into the global capitalist system, mostly due to deteriorating 
terms of trade. The depedendistas argued that this imbalance inevitably led to the 
interests of the dominant powers, as predicted by theoretical imperialism, being 
internalised by the peripheral countries. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate these shared 
understandings of how dependent states are constructed, and also reveal various other 
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foci of the reformist and revolutionary strands in the creation of dependency, its 
consequences and potential solutions. 
 
In reality the dependency writings do not delineate these factors as cleanly as they are 
presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Writers often focused on more than one issue but for 
the objective of discussing internal pressures in the dependency school this method of 
differentiating foci is useful.  
 
4.3.a Reformist Dependency 
The reformist dependentistas tended to focus on the declining terms of trade and 
foreign-owned industrial bases. Sunkel (1972) saw foreign ownership as preventing a 
diversification of exports and consequently a reliance on the export of a limited 
number of primary products. The result of this was a vulnerability to external changes 
and a lack of foreign currency, leading to considerable debt. All of this contributed to 
Latin America being caught in a debt trap, and left with financial dependency.  
 
―The Dependency perspective has contributed by pointing out 
the origins of the debt trap, the impact of the debt problem on 
the debtor nations, and the complicated issues that are 
involved in solving the debt problem.‖ (So 1990, 123) 
 
The larger these debts grow, the greater the outflow of capital becomes. Dependent 
countries require this capital for successful industrialisation and the absorption of 
unemployment, and ISI for the reformists was still seen as a way to break out of the 
trap. The reformists did recognise the manifold failures of ISI but were confident that 
further support of it would deliver progress. This was in no small part due to the work 
of Furtado, who looked beyond ECLA and attempted to analyse underdevelopment in 
political terms and historical periods.  
 
―…Behind the region‘s superficial similarities, there is a wide 
variety of historical conditions, which makes it likely that the 
struggle to overcome underdevelopment will continue to take 
many forms…Structural change requires a far greater 
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political effort than had previously been envisaged.‖ (Furtado 
1970, 303 –4) 
 
Here Furtado‘s marriage of ECLA language and an historical-structural approach can 
be seen; the classical economical tradition was not suitable to the unique historical 
unfolding of the Latin American region but the economic structure could be. However 
the many forms of struggle predicted above were complex. Kay (1989) stated that the 
key for Furtado was the imposition of consumption patterns from the centre. These 
patterns manipulated the type of technology developed and imported for developing 
countries, commonly permitting control of the market to pass to multinational 
corporations. Furtado wanted such inequitable relationships to be changed and a fairer 
participation implemented for the developing nations within the established economic 
structure. 
 
These pressures created the dependency under which Latin America, in particular, 
struggled. This was a specific point in history during which the local bourgeoisie 
established enclave economies that represented core countries‘ interests in the 
periphery and further held back growth. The Marxist dependency writers proclaimed 
this to be postponing the revolution, as the local bourgeoisie were not powerful 
enough to instigate it, belonging as they did to the capitalist powers. However the 
reformists did not support such a theoretical link and rather saw it has a purely 
economical hindrance; for them it was simply part of the internal pressures that were 
working as a result of external dependency. 
 
―Underdevelopment is rooted in a specific connection, 
created in a particular historical setting, between the internal 
process of exploitation and the external process of 
dependence.‖ (Furtado 1974, 19) 
 
Cardoso, emerging as one of the key reformist dependency writers, agreed and helped 
to re-focus the analysis from a purely external perspective and called for an 
examination of the ‗internationalisation of external interests.‘ (Cardoso 1979, xvi)  
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―The problem of development in our days cannot remain 
restricted to a discussion about import substitution, not even 
to a debate on different strategies for growth, in terms of 
export or non-export policies, internal or external markets, 
orientation of the economy etc. The main issue is people‘s 
movements and consciousness of their own interests.‖ 
(Cardoso, quoted in So 1990, 136) 
 
He wanted to employ dependency not as a general theory but as a methodology to 
analyse actual and specific dependency situations, emphasising internal social 
structures of dependency, such as class conflict and the interests of the local 
bourgeoisie, over economic formations. The writings of Cardoso, notably Dependency 
and Development in Latin America (1971), established a new, coherent methodology, 
with a focus on concrete and specific examples of dependency, observing the interplay 
between internal and external structures that formed a complex whole. Cardoso 
rejected stagnationist theories and the Marxist argument that revolution was necessary 
as capitalism had lost its progressive nature and therefore was only capable of 
generating underdevelopment. He coined the term ‗associated-dependent 
development‘ to describe the open-ended process that he saw dependency as. While 
modernisation theory claimed that development could only occur with modernisation, 
and Neo-Marxist theorists saw such a relationship as stagnationist, Cardoso was more 
optimistic. 
 
―To some extent, the interests of the foreign corporations 
become compatible with the internal prosperity of the 
dependent countries. In this sense, they help to promote 
development.‖ (Cardoso 1973, 149) 
 
Disassociating himself from the modernisation school, Cardoso admits the costs of 
such a new phase of development: poverty and repression, inequality and 
marginalisation, increased foreign debt and vulnerability and higher levels of 
unemployment. His work was based on a study of the Brazilian military state in 1964 
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and his model heavily influenced a new investigation, also in Brazil, of the triple 
alliance among the state by Peter Evans (1979).  
 
―Dependent development is a special instance of dependency, 
characterised by the association or alliance of international 
and local capital. The state also joins the alliance as an active 
partner, and the resulting triple alliance is a fundamental 
factor in the emergence of dependent development.‖ (Evans 
1979, 32) 
 
Evans based his alliance on the interrelationships between multinational corporations 
(international capital), the local bourgeoisie (local capital) and the state. He believes 
that the true framework for the study of these ‗partners‘ is imperialism but he is a 
strong advocate of the checks and balances that a tripartite relationship offers over 
dual models. Such a triple alliance can initiate dependent development from within the 
established economic structure.  
 
This half of the dependency approach is recognised as the more conservative of the 
two, locating its investigations and suggestions firmly within the established global 
economic structure, and arguing that the non-integrated groups will ultimately provoke 
socialist change. In the meantime Cardoso recognised that progress could still be made 
by unpicking the network of relations between social groups and classes, as it is these 
connections that make possible the dependent relationships between nations. The 
revolutionary writers however, were more interested in the eradication of any such 
external links rather than a reconfiguration.   
 
4.3.b Revolutionary Dependency 
Working within an imperialist framework the goal was, as mentioned, to recreate the 
theory of class conflict at a global level and reveal the machinations of an 
asymmetrical world in which peripheral countries were forced to function within a 
dependent relationship with industrialised nations. Similarly to the reformist 
dependistas, this approach purported that the global political economy enslaved the 
developing countries by making them dependent on the capitalist nations of the core.  
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―By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy 
of certain countries is conditioned by the development and 
expansion of another economy to which the former is 
subjected.‖ (Dos Santos 1970, 231) 
 
The only way forward, according to revolutionary dependency writers, was to de-link 
from the global system. However such revolutionary aspects of dependency ultimately 
made it too dangerous for core powers, such as the USA, to allow it to run its course 
but it still succeeded in presenting revolution as a feasible outcome. Dos Santos was in 
no doubt about what was needed;  
 
―Everything now indicates that what can be expected is a 
long process of sharp political and military confrontations 
and of profound social radicalisation.‖ (Dos Santos 1970, 
233)  
 
There is an explicit political focus here that is very much a precursor of Wallerstein‘s 
later work in World Systems Theory: tinkering with nation-states and local economies 
by themselves was no longer sufficient, things had to change, the system had to 
change and this clearly signalled the shift of the argument into a political arena.  
 
Just as the reformist dependency writers had gauged the failures of ISI, so too did the 
revolutionary group. Dos Santos was particularly critical of the strategy and Landsberg 
(1979) expanded this by suggesting that ISI had actually exacerbated the unequal 
terms of trade by creating a more urgent need for foreign capital and technology. 
Dependency writers placed particular emphasis on technological dependence and 
disarticulation. While structuralist thought had emphasised the influence of 
technological backwardness as a major cause of underdevelopment, dependency 
theory took the idea even further. Not only did it signal the sucking dry of peripheral 
capital – necessary capital if any development was to be achieved – but it also marked 
the loss of control. Dos Santos bemoaned how such a timid surrender would never 
equalise the terms of trade;  
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―Foreign capital retains control over the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy and repatriates a high volume of 
profit.‖ (Dos Santos 1970, 233)  
 
This dislocation between developing industries was further emphasised in Evans‘ 
work on the technological disarticulation in the periphery.  
 
―Peripheral economies are ‗disarticulated,‘ that is, firms on 
the periphery are not connected to each other in the same way 
as forms in an autocentric economy.‖ (Evans 1979, 28)  
 
Such a situation naturally retarded any potential progress, reinforcing the unfair 
economic integration into the global market and further excluding the periphery from 
equal participation. This exclusion is exacerbated by, as Dos Santos wrote years 
previously, foreign finance, which is necessary for industrialisation, creating a vicious 
circle; ―Foreign capital and foreign ‗aid‘ thus fill up the holes that they themselves 
created.‖ (Dos Santos 1970, 233) This is a clear step away from Prebisch‘s initial 
support of external investment. 
 
Indeed exclusion and disarticulation are persistent characteristics of dependency. Not 
only were the peripheral nations being isolated but the workers were becoming 
increasingly excluded as well. They were excluded as consumers but also as partakers 
in any new technology that was implemented. The technological monopolies had led 
to the local management being trained in foreign methods, which simply perpetuated 
the external control of local industry by dictating who had the knowledge for progress. 
Innovation was consequently kept in the core, imposing a division of labour on the 
periphery between those with the knowledge and those without. This neo-colonial idea 
of the monopolisation of the mind is a vital part of dependency theory. As Peter Evans 
says, ―In the context of dependency development, the need for repression is great, 
while the need for democracy is small.‖ (Evans 1979, 48) This repression results in 
alienation and is one cause suggested as to why the exploited majority has not united 
in opposition. 
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As a result of this disarticulation it was suggested that the economies of the developing 
world were stagnating and atrophying. From this argument Marini developed his thesis 
of sub-imperialism, defining such a situation as an attempt to fix the issues of internal 
markets that were insufficient to stimulate and maintain greater profit. Similar to 
Furtado‘s work on consumption patterns, Marini noted that policies had been 
promoted to increase the demand for consumer durables and capital goods. This had 
led to collaboration between the local bourgeoisie and international imperialism, a 
comment that can also be compared to work already introduced, that of Peter Evans 
and the ‗triple alliance‘ and Frank‘s concept of the lumpen-bourgeoisie. Marini calls 
this development of a consumer society absurd but also logical, lamenting that it was 
the workers who were unable to gain access to a market dominated by those who 
contribute no value to it. The obvious consequence is a widening class division and 
inequality. Evans pulls no punches when discussing this; 
 
―the ruling groups in the more advanced peripheral societies 
have discovered that the kind of economic development they 
need to sustain their own lifestyles requires the increasing 
political exclusion of the mass of the population.‖ (Evans 
1979, 29-30) 
 
This link (between the local bourgeoisie and international imperialism) is key to the 
‗internalisation of the domestic market‘ and ongoing repression. Evans‘ work here is 
key as he introduces the concept of scale. While acknowledging the dependent 
development of Cardoso, Evans emphasises that one of dependency‘s greatest 
contributions has been to show the impacts of imperialism on internal social structures 
of developing nations. Within dependency discourse, developing countries‘ 
governments essentially exist to administer foreign capital and the workers are reliant 
on that same capital, effectively leaving no resistance to external domination. 
 
Scale is integral also to Marini‘s notion of super-exploitation. The basis of this concept 
is the maintenance of low wages as this perpetually reproduces the unequal relations of 
production. Low wages are fundamental to the periphery‘s comparative advantage, 
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which makes it the basis of any dependent development and of repression. 
Exploitation however is not only an external pressure. 
 
―With the disappearance of the direct domination of 
foreigners over natives, the notion of domination and 
exploitation of natives by natives emerges.‖ (González 
Casanova 1965, quoted in Kay 1989, 59) 
 
From the recognition of such repression emerged the theory of internal colonialism 
from Latin America. The notion of colonialism between countries being mirrored 
within countries is explored here, and the criticism of economic and social dualism is 
intensified. Fair comparisons can be drawn between these concepts of spatial and 
social polarisation between regions with John Friedmann‘s core-periphery model 
(1966) and Frank‘s metropolis-satellite chain, but the focus is more on the extra-
economic elements of domination, such as class and race discrimination that prevents 
political participation. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Summary of causes and results of dependency approach 
Causes of dependency  Results 
Shared Reformist focus Marginalisation 
Vulnerability 
Poverty 
Inequality 
Unemployment 
Debt 
‗Triple Alliance‘ 
‗Associated-
dependent 
development‘ 
Unfair integration 
External domination 
Internalisation of external 
interests 
 
Declining terms of trade 
Foreign-owned industry 
Multinational Corporations 
Debt trap 
Consumption patterns 
 
Revolutionary focus 
Lumpen-bourgeoisie/ 
Class structure 
Colonial dependency 
Internal colonisation 
Sub-imperialism 
Super-exploitation 
Stagnation / hypertrophy 
Export-led industrialisation/ 
Industrial-financial dependency 
Technological disarticulation/ 
Industrial-technological dependency 
 
 Source: Author 
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Figure 4.2 Proposed solutions to dependency (reformist and revolutionary) 
Reformist Revolutionary 
Concentrate on obstacles to growth 
Reformulate ECLA ideas; continue ISI 
 
De-link from the global capitalist system 
Socialist revolution 
Auto-centred development 
Single division of labour 
Source: Author 
 
 
4.3.c Summary 
Having evolved across such a wide spectrum of theories and historical events, the 
dependency approach was stretched across an expansive framework, the result of 
which was two different forms of analysis. As the two halves of dependency analysis 
struggled to establish themselves against the centrist theories of modernisation and 
neoclassical economics, an internal tension grew that made the analysis vulnerable to 
attack. These theoretical assaults were only part of the reason as to why dependency 
fell so quickly out of favour. Again historical events played their part, creating, for 
example, a global context within which neoliberalism was to flourish. When the global 
economy suffered a significant transformation as a result of the oil and debt crises of 
the 1970s, the space that had opened for the peripheral countries to be heard quickly 
shut again, forcing the collapse of dependency‘s analysis of inequality. However, 
dependency also found itself coming to terms with a new theory that had grown out of 
itself, that being the world-systems theory. The next section of this chapter looks at the 
criticisms levelled at the dependency approach, causing a change to occur that resulted 
in brand new developmental concepts. 
 
 
4.4 An analysis of the fall of dependency 
Having endured importunate criticism throughout its investigations, the dependency 
approach increasingly found itself in an untenable position to deliver policies or a 
coherent theory. Sánchez (2007, 8) is particularly strong in his summary of such 
weaknesses of the dependency approach: 
 
―A few scholars still hold that dependency is a more fruitful 
approach than neoliberalism for the analysis of the problems 
of underdevelopment…This view is untenable, not least 
because it assumes that dependency is a fully developed, self-
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contained theory of development, when it is not. Dependency 
analysis has no specific proposals for how to improve 
productivity, increase the rate of growth, wage the war on 
income inequality, diversify and expand exports, or increase 
domestic savings, to name a few crucial economic 
challenges.‖ 
 
Such opinions played a major role in the marginalisation of the dependency approach 
following its peak of influence, and it is useful here to outline some of the main issues 
that contributed to it being pushed to the margins. As outlined earlier in this chapter, 
global events created a conceptual space within which dependency was able to evolve 
theoretically, and the same can be said of its fall. Again, as with the concept of 
evolution, the process of its demise is messy and these proposed paradigm shifts did 
not proceed as tidily as the labelling in this section might suggest, but for the purposes 
of this overview it is useful. Before that however, it is helpful to sketch a brief 
overview of the global situation at the time to allow a more complete understanding of 
the context that dependency‘s collapse took place within.  
 
4.4.a Historical  
The 1973 oil crisis created serious economic, political and social consequences but 
perhaps the most disappointing aspect for the Third World was that the OECD 
countries continued to preach free markets, while in practice greater protectionism was 
being overtly put in place. This later took the form of structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs), which demanded, among other policies, the removal of price controls, less 
intervention in labour markets, the reduction and / or removal of import quotas and 
tariffs, privatisation and reduced government expenditure. Murray (2006, 286) points 
out that such ―structural adjustment policies have been criticised for a one-size-fits-all 
approach.‖ This is a disturbing accusation when one considers that ―the adaption and 
implementation of an IMF-approved SAP became a prerequisite for obtaining 
financial support.‖ (Simon 2002, 88)  
 
At the same time the economic growth of the previous decade and early 1970s, which 
the centrally-planned economies had enjoyed, began to slow. These countries also 
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started falling quickly behind the technological advances of the capitalist world, and 
had to begin trading with the West, falling rapidly into the similar pattern of ISI 
countries.  
 
―The reform programmes stalled, and the central planners 
struggled with poor living standards, technological 
backwardness and declining growth rates. The glory days of 
socialism, like those of Bretton Woods and of ISI, were 
over.‖ (Frieden 2006, 359) 
 
So how did the development of this historical context assist in the creation of an 
environment conducive to the ‗fall‘ of dependency? The drama of the debt crisis in the 
developing world quite simply afforded the core the opportunity to export, as 
solutions, the ideology and policies of Neoliberalism. The consolidation of power of 
figures such as Reagan in the US, Thatcher in the UK and Chile‘s Pinochet provided 
the perfect impetus to push the belief in the free market and reduce state involvement. 
As this took place, dependency analysts lost the debating space they had enjoyed.  
 
4.4.b Intellectual challenges 
The story of dependency‘s evolution has highlighted the manifold influences and 
pressure points that forced open the theoretically fecund space for dependency to grow 
within. The process of the ‗fall‘ of the approach is not dissimilar. Three categories of 
the major critiques that contributed to the neutralising of dependency‘s findings, 
resulting in the need for a revised approach to development, can be made. These three 
categories are: political, theoretical and economic. 
 
Political: Perhaps the easiest condemnation of the approach was to label it as 
pamphleteering and propaganda. Certainly its rhetoric can be considered idealist, 
notably due to a lack of any substantial policy outcomes, and as such the 
modernisation exponents and free-marketeers were able to depict dependency as 
flimsy and conspiratorial. Preston (1996) makes the comment that this was made all 
the more straightforward by the fact that the initial English introduction came across as 
confusing and polemical.  Due to such a deficiency of pertinent policies, the criticism 
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of the ‗autonomist illusion‘ was levelled. This related to the assumption that, should 
the disassociation of peripheral economies from the world system occur, or indeed a 
revolution take place, then all problems would be solved. However, as Kay (1989) 
points out, there were very few proposals put forward by dependency as to just how 
these solutions would come about. Issues such as economic growth, unemployment 
and income distribution simply had not been comprehensively answered. 
 
―Theirs is the grand historical and total vision which fails to 
perceive and seize the minor but immediate opportunities. It 
is an all or nothing illusion.‖ (Kay 1989, 196) 
 
Further to this, such a supposition reduced the periphery to the role of ‗passive victim‘ 
and ignored its capacity to manoeuvre within the system, while failing to differentiate 
between the developing countries‘ specificities and unique histories. Hout (1993) 
called this dependency‘s biggest flaw as it made locals nothing more than pawns to 
external interests. As such, dependency was frequently denounced as overemphasising 
external factors in the conditioning of developing countries. This came at the expense 
of the examination of the internal dynamics of individual nations and led to concern 
that class relations had subsequently been overlooked. This is commented on in the 
next section.  
 
The greatest challenge to dependency came in the form of the Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs). Indeed Stallings (1992, cited in Sánchez, 2007, 8) went as far as to 
suggest that ―the premier factor leading to the demise is that its overall claim 
reiterating the impossibility of development within the framework of our world 
capitalist system has suffered a severe correction by the facts of the late twentieth 
century.‖ These ‗facts‘ were the rapid growth of peripheral countries such as 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, which seemed to undermine many of the 
contentions put forward by the approach and supported the argument that there is no 
indisputable link between dependence and exploitation. The response to such a 
challenge, initially developed in Cardoso‘s work on associated-dependent 
development, later focused upon the role of the state and suggested that the success of 
the NICs was directly related to export-led growth controlled by the government. 
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Theoretical: Critics of dependency analysis challenge the deterministic predisposition 
that is presented, arguing that such neo-Marxist assertions are simply polemical 
inversions of Adam Smith‘s ideas of free-market progress: the free market creates 
moribund monopolies. While it has been argued that the theory of imperialism is a 
sufficient approach to the question of underdevelopment, orthodox Marxists believe 
that the current global situation is nothing more than an inevitable stage in the process 
towards a socialist uprising. Both these opinions leave the theoretical approach of 
dependency redundant. While a Marxist approach keeps class central to any analysis, 
it has been argued that: 
 
―the entire line of writers in the neo-Marxist tradition has led 
them to displace class relations from the centre of their 
analyses of economic development and underdevelopment. 
And the upshot of these errors is a wholly implausible 
analysis of the present circumstances of the underdeveloped. 
An analysis which is both economistic and heavily skewed to 
the single issue of the deleterious effects of external 
dependency.‖ (Preston 1996, 223) 
 
Kay (1989) similarly expresses concerns that without a sufficient class analysis – or a 
sufficient appreciation of the relations of production – then there can be no 
understanding of internal class struggles and of the revolution that revolutionary 
dependency impatiently calls for. Similar – and further – criticism from writers such as 
Laclau and Brenner are thoroughly outlined by Palma (1978)
15
. 
 
Economic: The deficient class analysis, as Preston commented, is put down to an 
overly economistic approach. The criticism here is that dependency, as already 
touched upon earlier, does not provide evidence of a definite link between dependency 
                                               
15 Palma (1978, 901) presents Laclau‘s suggestion that ―Frank makes no contribution, leaving the 
analysis exactly where it started‖ and cites Brenner‘s argument (1977) that there is a failure ―to take 
into account either the way in which class structures, once established, will in fact determine the course 
of economic development or underdevelopment over an entire epoch, or the way in which these class 
structures themselves emerge: as the outcome of class struggles whose results are incomprehensible in 
terms merely of market forces.‖ 
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and exploitation, while ignoring any potential benefits of foreign exchange within a 
world capitalist system. In fact, as in the work of Frank for example, which was 
subsequently severely criticised by Laclau (1971), the circulatory nature of the world 
system is emphasised to the point of promoting a theory of stagnation for developing 
economies, as any surplus profit is expropriated back to the core: 
 
―The present underdevelopment of Latin America is the result 
of its centuries-long participation in the process of world 
capitalist development.‖ (Frank, 1966) 
 
The marginalisation of the dependency approach in understanding underdevelopment 
and socio-economic inequality has been complex and polarising. The approach, or 
school of thought, struggled with external pressures, partly due to its internal conflict, 
and partly because of the historical events unfolding around it. Responses to the 
collection of political, economic and theoretical criticisms, which will lay the 
foundation for a potentially revitalised dependency approach, shall be discussed in 
Chapter Nine, in the context of dependency‘s relevance to understanding the 
persistence of inequality in the Chilean education system.  
 
 
4.5 Is a revisited dependency approach still relevant despite its criticisms? 
For a revisited dependency approach to be seen as relevant it needs to counter the 
variety of criticisms that have been held up against it. These criticisms can be seen as 
explaining the ‗fall‘ of dependency, and these – and the responses – are outlined in 
Table 4.7. The negative assessments range widely and are discussed in detail in this 
section. 
 
Perhaps the most consistent criticism of dependency has been that it is not a fully 
developed theory of development or underdevelopment and therefore does not 
produce a coherent set of outcomes and policies. What can be seen from the earlier 
section in this chapter is that dependency does not purport to be a self-contained 
theory but rather an approach or an analysis, and this is vital to understanding its 
efficacy. There was also a concern that dependency was essentially an autonomist 
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illusion or, as already cited, an ―all or nothing illusion.‖ (Kay, 1989, 196) A revisited 
dependency approach responds to these claims by stating that it is concerned with an 
analysis of a complex whole, which involves many strands, including economy and 
culture. It investigates micro situations and contexts to establish ‗easier to understand‘ 
macro situations.  
 
It is certainly requisite for the approach to be antagonistic as there are many unfair 
and established structures that are contributing to unacceptable situations of 
inequality. A multi-scalar dependency approach, like this one, can work inside an 
established system to better understand how processes of inequality are created from 
within and then focus on those separate and individual processes such as, for example, 
ethnic groups in education. Therefore it cannot correctly be described as ‗all or 
nothing‘ as it is primarily working to understand situations and contexts. 
Consequently, it is unlikely to be labelled as polemical or idealist anymore as it is – 
although antagonistic – comfortable to work alongside other systems to seek an end to 
unbalanced relationships and the results thereof. The historical context within which 
this revisited approach is being made is utterly different from the Cold War tension 
that the original dependendistas struggled in. Dependency certainly seeks change, and 
demands restructuring of particular elements but it can no longer be branded as 
propaganda or conspiratorial. 
 
As already discussed, this lack of an articulate collection of outcomes, led some 
commentators (for example Sánchez, 2007) to argue that dependency creates no 
specific proposals for any number of economic challenges and consequently lacked 
the necessary measurements for academic rigour. However, there are clear pathways 
to a better appreciation – and response to – the issues of economic inequality, how to 
improve productivity and rates of growth (see Table 4.7). Economic problems clearly 
cannot be solved in isolation and a dependency approach that examines micro and 
macro social relations within a variety of contexts can only assist in creating 
necessarily complex responses. Such an approach also counters the claim that 
Sánchez (2007, 4) repeats: ―Dependentistas did not show how the actual mechanisms 
of dependency worked, so that the parts became lost in the totality.‖ 
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A common disapproval of dependency centred on how it overlooked social relations 
due to being overly-deterministic, economistic or having an over-emphasis on 
external influences. A revisited dependency approach would acknowledge such a 
criticism and place the social relations of dependency at the core of its analysis. It 
would recognise the influence of external influences but creates the necessary 
contextual complex whole by focusing on the internal as well, that being how various 
social relationships within income, ethnicity and rural/urban dwelling groups are 
subject to micro situations of dependency. These relationships are a combination of 
economic, cultural and spatial elements and cannot be labelled deterministic as their 
overlapping nature ensures that the combination of external and internal is too 
dynamic to lead to predictable outcomes.  
 
This criticism of an analytical reliance on external interests has already been taken up 
by a Modes of Production approach, which at the time was a new, or refashioned, 
analysis built on Marx‘s work, presenting the various modes of production ―as a series 
of stages, or a sequence punctuated with periods of transformation, where one mode 
of production turned into the next.‖ (Preston 1996, 227) This analysis turned the focus 
away from such a sequence, arguing that during the transition two modes actually co-
exist and interact in a process that has come to be known as articulation. Articulation 
between different modes within a single nation is unique to that particular context, 
creating a specific national history that allows a better understanding of its 
development.  
 
There are clear similarities here with Cardoso‘s analyses of ‗concrete situations‘ of 
dependency, his idea of a complex whole (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) created from 
the articulation of internal and external interests, and Palma‘s (1978, 911) suggestion 
that, 
 
―The effort of analysis should be orientated towards the 
elaboration of concepts capable of explaining how the general 
trends in capitalist expansion are transformed into specific 
relationships between men, classes and states, how these 
specific relations in turn react upon the general trends of the 
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capitalist system, how internal and external processes of 
political domination reflect one another, both in the 
compatibilities and their contradictions, how the economies 
and polities of Latin America are articulated with those of the 
centre, and how their specific dynamics are thus generated.‖  
 
The analysis is very much concerned with the generation of specific dynamics 
between individuals and groups and their environment, which is constructed from 
both external and internal processes. The modes of production theory argued that the 
appreciation of such articulations was overlooked due to the tendency of the 
dependency approach to overemphasise the external relations established through the 
global exchange system, and this diluted the accuracy of any developmental theory. 
At the time Laclau (1971) went further by attacking Frank‘s thesis of 
underdevelopment, arguing that Frank had confused the capitalist mode of production 
with participation in the global capitalist economy and that capitalism had actually 
preserved pre-capitalist modes of production in the periphery, consequently creating a 
context for articulation between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes. Such a 
relationship supports the case that external dependence is actually modified and 
shaped by the internal structure of a country, which explains the different processes of 
development in similarly structured nations. On a larger scale, it also indicates that the 
external influence of foreign capital does not necessarily result in underdevelopment, 
as the impact of the internal situation can lead to either stagnation or growth.  
 
Dale Johnson (1981, 110) retaliated to the critics who would have seen the modes of 
production analysis replace a dependency approach by saying that it signified little 
more than a reversion to imperialism. He used Cardoso‘s argument that ―Lenin‘s 
thesis of imperialism was valid in its day…but is no longer adequate to explain what 
he has termed ‗development with dependence‘…of parts of the periphery.‖ He goes 
on to dismiss the idea further stating that it ignores the extent to which the relations of 
production in individual nations are shaped by the region‘s articulation with the global 
market. This idea also counters the common criticism that dependency viewed the 
periphery as passive; a deterministic approach meaning that the periphery was nothing 
but a pawn to external interests, leaving them unable to help themselves to move out 
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of conditions of underdevelopment: what Sánchez (2007, 5) describes as a situation 
where ―behaviour disappears.‖ Kay (1989) voices his concern as well with the 
perspective, questioning whether it should incorporate the internal colonialism 
analysis to strengthen its argument. To attain a better understanding of how the 
internal and external cooperate, or not, then social relations need to be central to the 
analysis. 
 
4.5.a Summary 
Table 4.7 collates these criticisms and lays them out as a summary beside the 
responses discussed above. One of the key features of a revisited dependency analysis 
is how social relations can be moved into the centre of the approach. This allows an 
examination of the process that creates disparity within each unique micro 
relationship, looking at the combination of internal and external mechanisms that 
create a complex whole. These relationships overlap and interact, creating a further 
complex whole on a larger, contextual sector (e.g. education). Further contexts can 
then be added to create a picture of disparity on a macro scale. By doing this, the 
concerns that dependency does not produce concrete policy outcomes have been 
eradicated, as the potential for policies to disrupt inequalities at various levels is 
significant as has already been seen. By working at various scales, it is also possible 
to highlight the dynamism of the marginalised groups, which reveals the potential for 
movement and changes over time, therefore invalidating the criticisms that 
dependency remains determinist with passive margins.  
 
The responses in Table 4.7 establish an ongoing relevancy for dependency that 
supports continued analyses into the processes of disparity in other contexts such as 
education both in Chile and beyond. Other contexts and further uses on various scales 
will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
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Table 4.7         Responses to criticism of a dependency approach  
Criticism Response 
Not a fully-developed, self-contained theory of 
development 
Dependency is an approach or an analysis 
Lack of policy outcomes By working at various scales there is potential for 
many policies to be created as a result of analysis, 
creating measurable outcomes  
Needs specific histories / unique situations Analyses of specific situations and contexts 
Autonomist or ‗all or nothing‘ illusion Looks at various contexts and relationships and 
so, although antagonistic, works within other 
systems 
Propaganda / idealist / polemical A different context for a revisited dependency 
approach means these labels are no longer 
applicable  
No specific economic proposals to: 
- improve productivity 
- increase rate of growth 
- improve income inequality 
- diversify / expand exports 
- increase domestic savings 
The context of disparity in education, for 
example, allows for proposals to work on all of 
these features. Economic issues cannot be 
understood in isolation 
Over-emphasised external interests – no 
examination of internal dynamics, overlooked 
class relations 
Social relations of dependency are central to 
analysis, as is the concept of the ‗complex whole‘, 
which combines both internal and external 
interests 
Deterministic / economistic  The focus on social relations is not solely 
economic, and the dynamism and overlapping 
nature of these relationships within various 
contexts cannot be accurately described as 
deterministic  
Reduced the periphery to a passive victim – to 
pawns of external interests 
As with the response to determinism, actors – 
both individuals and groups – have opportunities 
to be very engaged in making changes in their 
environments 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
4.6 Linking dependency and inequality 
Having earlier presented a conceptual model in Chapter Three to better understand the 
process of inequality, it is now viable to link concepts of dependency that relate to 
this.  As discussed in the previous section, dependency remains relevant to 
contemporary issues and it is proposed here that it is a constructive and valuable 
approach to disrupting the mechanisms of disparity.  
 
As inequality is a multi-faceted process, it needs to be simultaneously understood and 
approached on different scales and within different contexts. A dependency approach 
is well equipped for this by analysing specific ‗concrete‘ situations of social relations 
and suggesting ways of dismantling these relationships at both micro and macro 
levels. Even though dependency is often discussed at a global scale many of its 
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features are relevant to understanding inequality in national and local situations. One 
of these features is the process of marginalisation and Kay (1989, 92) describes this at 
a global scale: 
 
―global marginality is made up of several distinct forms of 
marginality and individuals or groups experience different 
combinations or configurations of these forms.‖  
 
The social position of these marginalised groups and individuals has been argued to 
create an unfair integration into social and market participation, which can lead to 
uneven levels of participation. Therefore dependency has the potential to isolate 
mechanisms that drive the process of exclusion and promote policies to reduce them.  
 
Another concept linked to exclusion and marginalisation is that of the internalisation 
of external interests, which Cardoso and Faletto (1979) articulated. This is very useful 
when understanding how the social position of an individual can contribute to 
disparity. Individuals often accept their position in society and a dependency approach 
questions why this is the case and suggests that it may be due to ideas and information, 
usually beneficial to those in power, being internalised and normalised, leading to 
situations of exclusion. Cristóbal Kay (1989, 91) illustrated two interpretations of this 
as ―a lack of integration of certain social groups in society‖ and secondly as the result 
of ―integration into the world capitalist system‖. It was Sunkel, as pointed out by Kay 
(ibid, 99), who insisted that dependency was the proper context for these concepts of 
marginalisation. Sunkel‘s (1972) perspective was global, and he was concerned with 
the consequence of national disintegration as a result of transnational capital ―dividing 
society into two sectors: one which is integrated into the transnational system and one 
which is excluded.‖  
 
A dependency approach is able to analysis the social relations of dependence that 
hinder full participation in society, whether that is in the market, employment or 
education. Although the following comment from Kapan (1974, quoted in Tausch, 
2010, 468) is directed towards a global level, it also highlights dependency‘s ability to 
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unsettle structures and relationships, both economic and non-economic, at any scale 
that play a role in producing disparity: 
 
―the ‗theory of dependence‘ implicitly challenges the 
atomistic, mechanistic, and legalistic conception of 
international relations.‖ 
 
Consequently, a dependency analysis can contribute to the construction of a multi-
dimensional policy approach, ensuring that all the overlapping factors that influence 
socio-economic inequality are considered. The relationship between dependency and 
inequality is crucial to this study and is further examined in later chapters. 
 
 
4.7 Chapter summary  
From its traumatic evolution and riven revolutionary tendencies, through to its 
marginalisation, dependency has never settled. Dependency theory grew from a desire 
to achieve a clearer understanding of the unequal and unjust system that leaves whole 
regions unable to control their own destiny, and which oversees a widening gap that 
shows no sign of abating. However despite such aspirations, and exhaustive analyses, 
the dependency discourse has never managed to produce a coherent and widely 
accepted set of policies. Responding to criticism has absorbed a great deal of energy, 
but this is not to say that dependency‘s advocates have accepted defeat. Johnson‘s 
(1981, 111) comment remains just as relevant today as it was over thirty years ago: 
 
―A noneconomistic approach that is not overdeterministic, that 
makes production relations, class analysis, and development of 
the mode of production central, that adequately poses the 
‗external/internal‘ nexus, is more likely to emerge from the 
efforts of those who work within a theory of underdevelopment 
and dependency than from those from outside it.‖  
 
This chapter suggests that a revisited dependency analysis is able to propose 
appropriate and applicable approaches to the problem of inequality in Chile. Chapters 
108 
 
 
Five and Six will create a framework for such a discussion by tracking socio-economic 
disparity in Chile between 1974 and 2010. Chapter Seven will then focus on 
educational disparity under the Concertación, 1990 – 2010.  
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Section Three__________________________________ 
Section Three builds on the examination of the concept of inequality and places it 
within the case study of Chile, 1964 - 2010. Chile is an appropriate case study due to 
half a century of wide-ranging political responses to the predicament of socio- 
economic disparity. This section begins with an overview of the persistence of 
inequality in Latin America between 1964 and 2010 to provide an historical and 
empirical context. Following this, the main policy orientation of four successive 
political periods in Chile is considered in Chapters Five (1964 - 1989) and Six (1990 - 
2010). The effects of these paradigmatic shifts on levels of inequality (in contexts 
such as income distribution and poverty rates, employment participation, health 
indicators and housing) are discussed at the end of each chapter. Consequently, the 
case study in Chapter Seven, which focuses on the persistence of educational 
inequality in Chile under the Concertación, allows the research to drill deeper into the 
relations of power that perpetuate inequality in Chile and more generally.  
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
From Frei to Pinochet, 1964 – 1989: Different Chiles, same 
inequalities? 
 
This chapter initially reveals the landscape of inequality that shaped Latin America 
between 1964 and 2010 in order to contextualise the Chilean case study, and then 
sharpens its focus to look at the period between 1964 to 1989, during which time three 
different presidents led Chile: Eduardo Frei (1964 – 1970), Salvador Allende (1970 – 
1973) and Augusto Pinochet (1973 – 1990). Each of these pursued very different 
policy directions, ranging from Frei‘s structuralist approach and Allende‘s ‗Road to 
Socialism‘, to Pinochet‘s neoliberal laboratory. This chapter reviews the main policy 
directions of each administration and concludes with an examination of inequality 
trends across the period. 
 
 
5.1 Political economy of inequality in Latin America 1960-2010 
Economically, Latin America in the 1960s was heavily influenced by structuralist 
theorisation that rejected free-trade expansion and highlighted the dangers of an 
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income inelastic demand for primary products and the resultant secular decline in the 
terms of trade. This led, among other things, to an emphasis on inward state-led 
industrialisation. Despite healthy results in terms of per capita output growth in some 
countries, there was growing criticism that the policy of Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) had reached a limit and was having a muted impact on 
unemployment. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some structuralists became 
more radical and dependency analysis subsequently evolved. Such analysis was 
premised on the belief that the solution to inequality internationally and domestically 
was to cut all ties with the neo-colonial core. However, in the midst of the Cold War 
any turn to the left was viewed with great suspicion by the USA. This culminated in a 
series of coups against incumbent left-wing governments, for example in Argentina 
(1966 and 1976), Bolivia (1966), Peru (1968), Ecuador (1972), Chile (1973) and 
Uruguay (1973). 
 
The 1970s brought a wider recognition of the importance of exports for growth, along 
with a greater role for multinational banks in lending capital to Latin American 
governments on the back of high oil prices. However, the debt crisis that followed in 
1982 sunk the region into economic despair. Latin American GDP per capita growth 
contracted in three successive years by 1.8% in 1981, 3.6% in 1982 and 4.7% in 1983. 
In 1982, seventeen Latin American countries suffered economic contractions (Brid 
and Caldentey, 2009). The Bretton Woods institutions were consequently able to lead 
renegotiations of debt repayments, forcing trade liberalisation, privatisation and 
reductions in state expenditure. This became Latin America‘s ‗lost decade‘ and 
inequality increased markedly as a neoliberal model was imposed on the continent. 
The impact of this period on Latin American economies saw the rate of growth of 
actual GDP per capita fall to -0.4% between 1980 and 1990 (ibid, 36) but it also had a 
dramatic bearing on the ideological landscape and power structure of the region: 
 
―The Washington Consensus on market reform was indeed 
the consensus approach among the high-ranking 
policymakers, and although there were always organised 
interests, sectors of the population, and political parties 
(especially from the left) that rejected it, they were fairly 
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marginalised in many nations and could at best exert 
defensive veto power.‖ (Weyland et al 2010, 1) 
 
The 1990s witnessed an end to the Cold War and the restoration of democratic 
administrations, which caused a shift to more centrist policies across the continent. 
However, despite some evidence for an economic recovery in the second half of the 
decade, Latin America continued to suffer from economic fluctuations that aggravated 
inequality. Brid and Caldentey (2009) suggest that these fluctuations occurred on 
average every two years after 1980, and the region‘s instability at that time was further 
highlighted – and exacerbated – by a series of global crises that dogged the region, 
including the Mexican crisis (1994), the Asian crisis (1998), the Brazilian crisis (1999) 
and the Argentinean crisis of 2000-1.   
 
Bárcena (2010) calculates that a boom period was experienced from 2003 to 2007 with 
regional GDP expansion of 5% annually, and per capita growth exceeding 3%. 
Ensuing confidence led to opportunities for fresh policy approaches, and the result was 
the evolution of centre-left governments, which sought to explicitly tackle inequality 
and poverty. Weyland et al (2010, 1) comment of this period that ―the first decade of 
the third millennium has seen a striking move to the left in Latin America.‖ By this 
time, also as a consequence of the end of Cold War politics, left-leaning governments 
led approximately two-thirds of the entire population of the region. 
 
This shift to the centre-left was interrupted by the financial crisis of 2007. In the same 
report it is estimated that Latin American net capital inflows in 2008 decreased by 
US$52.6 billion on their 2007 level, and foreign direct investment (FDI) shrank by 
37% - the sharpest decline in 30 years. The indications are that this period has had a 
negative impact on poverty and inequality, with unemployment rising sharply in many 
countries. Interestingly, Bárcena (2010) sums up her post-crisis reflection with the 
statement that ―it is also universally agreed that the State will have to play a more 
significant and assertive role‖ (26). This sits alongside another ECLAC paper by Brid 
and Caldentey (2009), which suggests the need for a ‗third way‘, combining market 
and state intervention.  
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5.1.a Inequality trends and social changes in Latin America, 1960 - 2010 
As Larrañaga (2009, 6) comments, ―income inequality in Chile is high even by the 
standards of Latin America, the region with the highest levels of inequality in the 
world.‖ It is this trend in income distribution that has done the most to highlight 
Chile‘s plight of disparity. However, ECLAC (2007) reports that there has been 
significant improvement in quality-of-life indicators since the 1960s: life expectancy 
at birth had increased, infant mortality had decreased, and access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation services had improved, as had coverage of all levels of 
education. However, despite such significant progress, the region still continues to fall 
behind the OECD countries, as Table 5.1 illustrates, showing a six-year discrepancy in 
life expectancy, a gap of more than three years in schooling expectations and a GDP 
per capita that is three times less than that in the OECD countries.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Human Development Index of global regions (HDI), 2010 
Region HDI Inequality-
adjusted 
HDI 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years) 
Mean years 
of 
schooling 
(years) 
GDP per 
capita (PPP 
US2008$) 
Arab States 0.588 0.426 69.1 5.7 7, 861 
East Asia & Pacific  0.643 0.505 72.6 7.2 6, 403 
Europe &Central Asia 0.702 0.607 69.5 9.2 11, 462 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.704 0.527 74.0 7.9 10, 642 
South Asia 0.516 0.361 65.1 4.6 3, 417 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.389 0.261 52.7 4.5 2, 050 
OECD 0.879 0.789 80.3 11.4 37, 077 
World 0.624 0.489 69.3 7.4 10, 631 
Source: ( UNDP 2010, 146) 
 
 
The trend in HDI improvement also remains slow by global standards. Table 5.2 
reveals that Latin America has shown the slowest annual growth rate in the world 
over the past decade with the exception of OECD countries, and slower than the 
global average. This is despite countries like Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Haiti all sitting below the global HDI average. (UNDP, 2010) 
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Table 5.2: Human Development Index global trends, 1980- 2010 
Region Average annual HDI growth rate (%) 
Change 
1980-2010 1990-2010 2000-2010 
Arab States 1.32 1.12 1.14 
East Asia & Pacific 1.73 1.61 1.40 
Europe & Central Asia 1.11 0.31 0.80 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.68 0.68 0.64 
South Asia 1.65 1.44 1.61 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.94 0.46 2.10 
OECD 0.51 0.48 0.31 
World 1.05 0.85 0.89 
Source: ( UNDP, 2010, 151) 
 
 
After a significant fall during the 1970s, poverty levels peaked during the ‗lost 
decade‘. It has been estimated that the number of those living in extreme poverty 
increased by 44 million between 1980 and 2008. This sits alongside estimates that 180 
million people are currently living in poverty (Bárcena 2010). However, Kay (2006, 
494) notes that between 1990 and 2002 poverty in Latin America did diminish slightly 
from 48.3% to 44% of the region‘s total population. Examining the inequality of 
poverty levels between urban and rural areas, Kay also notes that although rural 
poverty declined in the 1990s it was at a slow rate, falling from 65.4% in 1990 to 61.8 
in 2002. Comparatively, urban poverty fell from 41.4% to 38.4% during the same 
timeframe (2006, 456).  
 
High unemployment has persisted due to a slow-moving formal sector, placing a 
greater strain on already-inadequate social protection systems and further 
strengthening inequality. Weyland et al (2010, 12) relate this situation to the moderate 
nature of the majority of left-wing governments: 
 
 ―One main reason why the moderate left has acquiesced in 
the fundamental framework of the market system and has 
sought economic reforms inside these confines has been the 
hope to stimulate lasting economic development and thereby 
lay a substantial foundation for social progress – directly by 
boosting employment and income growth among poorer 
sectors, and indirectly by increasing tax revenues.‖ 
 
115 
 
 
OECD indicators in Figure 5.1 illustrate that inequality is particularly marked in some 
countries. In Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru, the Gini 
coefficient stands at over 0.5. The share of national income for the lowest income 
decile is less than 1% in Colombia and Bolivia, and stands at less than 2% for the 
lowest income decile in all of the Latin American countries reported in the table.  
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Inequality in Latin America, 2009 or latest year (Gini coefficient) 
Source: Author, from data taken from OECD (2012) 
 
 
Recent ECLAC figures, however, argue that the Gini index dropped in most countries 
in the region between 2002 and 2008, with only Colombia, the Dominican Republic 
and Guatemala‘s indices increasing (Bárcena 2010, 12). The record, however, is still 
extremely poor, and as Table 5.3 makes clear there has been little progress since the 
1960s in a number of the countries.  
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Table 5.3:  A selection of Latin American countries‘ Gini coefficient in selected 
years, 1960-2005 
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Argentina 43.3 36.0 40.9 34.7 40.8 39.8 44.4 48.1 50.4 50.3 
Bolivia - - 54.7 
(1968) 
- - 51.5 
(1986) 
54.5 52.7 63.3 50.5 
(1998) 
Brazil 52.0 - 63.8 63.5 
(1976) 
48.8 
(1979) 
58.6 
(1983) 
60.4 59.1 58.8 56.6 
(2004) 
Chile 46.2 
(1964) 
46.1 
(1968) 
50.1 47.1 52.6 53.2 55.1 54.5 55.2 54.6 
(2003) 
Ecuador - 63 62.5 - - 44.4 
(1987) 
56.2 
(1988) 
55.6 56 - 
Mexico 53 
(1958) 
55 
(1963) 
57.4 57.4 - 47.1 
(1984) 
52.4 
(1989) 
52 
(1996) 
55.6 49.9 
(2004) 
Peru 64 
(1961) 
- 57.4 59.4 - 42.7 
(1986) 
49.1 
(1991) 
53.3 
(1997) 
49.6 52 
(2003) 
Source: World Income Inequality Database (2008)  
 
 
The income distribution in Argentina, Brazil and Chile worsened from 1960 to 2005, 
with Chile almost increasing its Gini coefficient by ten points. Argentina increased by 
seven points and Brazil by over four. Only Mexico and Peru improved in the same 
period, with Peru reducing its score by a significant twelve points. Bolivia and 
Ecuador also showed improvements in a shorter timeframe.  
 
5.1.b Summary 
Latin America has made respectable progress in economic growth and some quality-
of-life indicators, and yet the gap between those who experience the benefits of this 
development and those who don‘t continues to widen. Aguirre (2008, 11) suggests 
that in Latin America ―household inequality increased in six of seven countries for 
which national data were available for both the beginning and the end of the 1980s.‖ 
Chile is an example of this paradox that stands out particularly given its 
unprecedented and relatively high levels of economic growth. Indeed Aguirre (2008, 
12) continues to observe that ―the deterioration of inequality in Chile seems to have 
been more dramatic and widespread than in most other countries.‖ To better 
understand such an inconsistency, the following section will examine the policies 
initiated by the three administrations that governed Chile between 1964 and 1989 
starting with Eduardo Frei. 
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5.2 Chilean governments and inequality, 1964 - 1989  
The period 1964 to 1989 witnessed an ongoing struggle as the nation experienced the 
pressures of extreme political change. Successive governments implemented very 
different policies that affected a variety of asymmetries, revealing different 
perspectives on the importance and causes of inequality. Frei's presidency (1964 - 
1970) stimulated greater participatory opportunities for marginalised groups in Chile, 
especially the peasantry, but seemed to consequently, and inadvertently, build a 
platform for Allende's socialist government (1970 - 1973) to be elected. Allende's 
ideology polarised the nation and incited fierce international opposition, ultimately 
cutting short the policies that Allende had hoped would dismantle the structures that 
he believed created and sustained inequality. The military coup and subsequent 
dictatorship (1973 - 1989) executed policies that were part of an unprecedented 
neoliberal experiment, and stretched the gap between the ‗haves and the have-nots' 
even wider, reducing social integration and leaving large swathes of the population 
vulnerable. All of this occurred within a continental context of similarly uneven 
development.  
 
 
5.3 Eduardo Frei (1964 - 1970) 
When Eduardo Frei Senior‘s Christian Democrats, ―waging a virulently anti-
Communist campaign…won the elections by a wide margin with 56% of the vote‖ 
(Collins and Lear 1995, 16), they seemed to have a clear mandate for their ‗revolution 
in liberty.‘ However the political environment into which Frei was elected was 
problematic; the Chilean system was clearly divided into left, centre and right-wing 
coalitions, meaning that no president could expect clear cooperation from across the 
spectrum. Indeed the party held themselves up as a third option to capitalism and 
Marxism, with a focused community approach to social and economic problems. The 
situation was further complicated as the Right was able to persuasively argue that Frei 
actually agreed with the more radical left-wing candidate Salvador Allende on most 
policies: fairer income distribution, cheaper housing, open education and independent 
foreign policy, with only the ‗revolution in liberty‘ slogan acting as an electoral point 
of difference.  
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However it has been argued by Valdés (1995) that Frei‘s revolution was more than 
just a political slogan, and that it established a moral differentiation between the 
Christian Democrats and the Marxist Left.  
 
―Frei‘s Revolution in Liberty was imbued with a moral will 
of transformation of social structures which would threaten 
the most deeply rooted value of the right: the sanctity of 
private property. Agrarian reform, state planning, 
‗Chileanisation‘ of the copper mines, or the ‗popular 
promotion‘ plans orientated to the shanty towns; in fact each 
one of the pillars of the Frei programme was not only a task 
resulting from a modernisation imperative, it was also seen as 
a ethical duty. Social structures were unjust and it was a duty 
of the state to render them more equitable. Christian 
Democrat ideals stemmed mainly from the teachings and 
practice of the Chilean Catholic Church.‖ (Valdés 1995, 208) 
 
Such a progressive Christian ideology, which, according to Oppenheim (2007, 15), 
was inspired by the Christian humanitarianism of the French philosopher Jacques 
Maritain, ignored ―the fatalism of traditional Catholicism in favour of a this-world 
approach,‖ and made the party and its policies particularly popular with the middle-
class, intellectuals, and students. Frei‘s approach didn‘t accept the need to forgo 
capitalism in order to achieve justice; nor did he consider that inequality suffered 
through marginalisation was solely an ethical issue. He believed that injustice was 
responsible for the extremist tendencies in the country that were spurring communist 
risings. Valdés (1995, 208-9) wrote, 
 
―At the same time…marginality conspired against national 
development. Injustice and development were antithetical 
terms. A national development programme assumed the need 
for efficiency and technical modernisation and the struggle 
against social injustice. For once modernisation and social 
justice had found common ground; ‗international 
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cooperation‘ and national development converged; ethics and 
economics coincided.‖  
 
The international cooperation Valdés wrote of was found in US President Kennedy‘s 
‗Alliance for Progress‘. Kennedy was keen to, unambiguously as a result of the Cuban 
Revolution, promote moderate social change by financially supporting structural 
reform that remained within the parameters of the capitalist system. Frei was keen to 
uphold such a neo-capitalist structural approach and once in office he ―immediately 
sought to reinvigorate the national-developmentalist trajectory through a period of 
concerted institution building.‖ (Taylor 2006, 19) He emphasised the relationship of 
state intervention with foreign investment, the nationalisation of the copper mines, 
agrarian reforms and inclusion in order to achieve stability. His policies therefore, a 
combination of ‗ethics and economics‘, were an attempt to disrupt the established 
patterns and processes that created and maintained unequal power relations, and thus 
prevented development.  
 
5.3.a. Promoción Popular: unions, land and property 
Frei primarily conceived of the concept of inequality as marginalisation from, and 
lack of participation within, society. He sought a transformation by engaging all 
Chileans in political and social processes, the key to which was his Promoción 
Popular. Frei wanted ―a people that demands that its voice be heard and is respected 
in the dialogue of power…People needed to be subjects and not objects of their 
liberation‖ (Kirkendall 2004, 692). Kirkendall continues, 
 
―One of the major weaknesses of Chilean democracy in 1964, 
according to Frei and his allies, was the lack of incorporation 
of the Chilean peasantry into the larger political process…A 
relatively inclusive political system had been built in part by 
explicitly excluding the peasantry…One of Eduardo Frei‘s 
central concerns as president was to change the marginal 
status of the roughly twenty per cent of the population that 
belonged to the peasantry.‖ (ibid, 691) 
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Frei‘s approach created new opportunities of participation by allowing workers to 
form unions, hold strikes and bargain in collectives, ―which dramatically shifted the 
balance of power in a countryside long dominated by a handful of large estate 
owners.‖ (Collins and Lear 1995, 17) The results were dramatic with union 
membership almost doubling from 270,542 members in 1964 to 533,713 in 1969. The 
number of strikes also almost doubled from 1964 – 1968 (476 to 901), although it 
declined after that. Indeed 18% of the Chilean population belonged to unions. By 
1970, roughly half of the entire rural labour force belonged to a union. (Kirkendall 
2004, 711) Additionally, real rural wages rose by 40% during Frei‘s term; a much 
higher rate than for other sectors in the economy.‖ (McGuire 2001, 1675) 
 
These improvements were ongoing when the government announced its agrarian 
reform programme in 1967. In 1964, 7% of farms had controlled 80% of agricultural 
land and Frei believed that the necessary reform needed to be more than just a 
redistribution of land; instead it needed to be viewed as a ―social and human 
investment‖ (Frei 1965, as cited in Kirkendall, 2004, 693), which would drive a 
greater inclusiveness for the Chilean peasantry. Oppenheim (2007, 24) explains that 
the new laws allowed the expropriation and redistribution of landholdings over 80 
basic hectares, with the landowner having the right of reserve of 80 basics hectares, as 
well as being able to choose which hectares they kept along with livestock and 
machinery. The remainder was to be redistributed for communal use over the 
following three to five years, and after this time a decision would be made to either 
maintain the farm as a cooperative or to divide the land up for individual land-
ownership titles. Frei had hoped that these changes would modernise the agricultural 
sector and ultimately reach 100,000 peasants, but at the end of his term in 1970 only 
one fifth of this overly ambitious figure had been involved, with the reformed sector 
only accounting for 15% of the country‘s agricultural land. This shortfall is likely to 
have been a result of the restrictive political environment that Frei was working 
within, which strong suspicions over such redistribution continuing to be voiced from 
the right.   
 
Despite this, support was galvanised by those living in the squatter settlements around 
the outskirts of Santiago. The Christian Democrats had set a target in 1964 of 
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constructing 360,000 new houses. Despite a new Housing Ministry, the total was 
insufficient and the deficit actually worsened.  
 
―The number of shanty-town dwellings in urban areas rose 
from 35,000 in 1952 to 71,000 in 1960 and to 100,000 in 
1968, and those living in them, from 174,000 to 376,000 and 
499,000, respectively. By the end of the Frei government 
220,000 new houses had been built and 280,000 ‗solutions‘ 
provided.‖ (Hojman 1993, 123) 
 
Hojman goes on to explain that a housing ‗solution, in the context of the Operation 
Plot of Land (Operación Sitio), was a plot to which legal access was granted plus the 
promise of full services in the future in exchange for a payment, plus the commitment 
to build a house gradually. The delivery of such ‗self-help solutions‘ compromised the 
goals of the government and dampened the expectations of the people, while doing 
little to solve what was a very serious problem.  
 
5.3.b. Promoción Popular: education and health care 
These attempts to establish equal opportunity through more widespread land and 
property ownership were only two aspects of a larger structural strategy as social 
service reforms were also put into place, allowing greater access to services. The 
‗Popular Promotion‘ included the Education Reform (Reforma Educacional), which 
placed a strong focus on primary enrolment as well as access to tertiary education. 
Kirkendall (2004, 687) comments ―literacy training was an essential part of Christian 
Democrat efforts to promote agrarian reforms and rural unionisation and incorporate 
the peasantry into the Chilean political system.‖ Indeed, in his presidential message of 
May 1966, Frei established expectations that illiteracy could be eradicated with the 
hope that 100,000 adults could learn how to read and write at 2,600 new local 
community education centres, allowing ―active and creative participation of people in 
the solution of common problems.‖ (ibid, 696) More than 2,500 primary school 
teachers, using new learning techniques that had been introduced by Brazilian 
educator Paulo Friere, were employed in the literacy campaign. The adoption of 
Freire‘s methodology was seen as an effort to inspire a shift in the consciousness of 
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the student, to allow students to see themselves as contributors to, and participants in, 
their own culture. As Kirkendall (ibid, 698) summarises; ―ideally, the newly literate 
would learn to ‗speak their own words‘.‖  
 
The impacts of Frei‘s term can be seen in a 5% increase in spending, doubling the 
population that could read and write by 1970. Indeed in September 1967, on the first 
International Literacy Day, UNESCO listed Chile as one of the five countries doing 
the most to eliminate illiteracy and awarded an honourable mention for the best 
overall literacy programme. (Kirkendall 2010, 74) McGuire (2010, 1675) also 
supplies concrete results, stating that during 1964-70, school enrolment rose from 1.8 
to 2.9 million, while the government doubled its spending on school meals, 
scholarships and loans. All of these would have considerably reduced the inequality 
of opportunity to those residing in rural areas, however Kirkendall (2010, 89) raises 
the further consequences of a growing awareness of dependence and of urban 
migration: 
 
―While many in the Frei administration hoped that education 
would enable the peasants to produce more in an increasingly 
commercialised countryside, campesinos hoped that 
education would make it possible for their children to be 
freed from the burdens of a life spent working in the fields. 
Their children would work in the cities and, it was hoped, in 
an office…The true ‗Revolution in Liberty‘ would involve 
the free choice of so many to join the ongoing migration to 
the cities that was transforming Latin America as a whole.‖  
 
Broadly speaking, the structural changes brought about by the Christian Democrat‘s 
social programmes, such as the literacy campaigns, subsidies, and increased welfare 
services, were designed to achieve the goal of integration of marginalised groups and 
to reduce inequality. However it rather ―contributed to a new and dynamic 
mobilisation of social movements in the cities that looked beyond the services offered 
by the state to a more fundamental and rapid transformation of their marginal 
existence.‖ (Taylor 2006, 22) As ECLA had earlier suspected, this meant retarded 
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rural growth despite an ongoing national reliance on primary products; the 
consequence of which was both increasing internal disparity between rural and urban 
sectors within Chile, but also the widening gap between core and peripheral countries. 
 
The Promoción Popular needed therefore to rapidly expand its drive for participation 
to include health, and in particular to mothers by creating ―centros de madres, where 
women learned about nutrition and child care and were taught handicraft trades to 
augment their incomes‖ (Oppenheim 2007, 25). The administration was also 
responsible for fifty-six new hospitals and an increase in public spending on health 
care by 80%, despite GDP rising only about 30% from 1964 – 1970. Indeed, Frei 
drew up Chile‘s first national health plan, and training programmes were also put in 
place for doctors, including incentives for practice in rural areas (McGuire 2001, 
107). All of these measures contributed to improved accessibility to an improved 
quality of services. At the time the health system was divided between a convoluted 
public sector and the private sector, and so the policies were clearly focused on 
reducing the established disadvantages that existed in the system. The results were 
significant: between 1964 and 1973 maternal mortality fell from 238 to 123 per 
100,000 live births, while the infant mortality rate fell from 104 per 1000 live births in 
1964 (in 1953 it was 105) to 82 in 1970 (ibid. 95).  
 
5.3.c Summary 
Table 5.4 collates the main policies implemented under Frei towards reducing socio-
economic disparity. Ffrench-Davis (2002, 187) considers such an approach to have 
created positive outcomes: 
 
―By 1970, social development in Chile was among the highest 
of all Latin American countries. The level of education, the 
national health system, the system for constructing low-rent 
housing, and…school meals were among the most advanced in 
the region.‖  
 
However, despite these social gains, problems of unequal distribution persisted, and 
these resulted in divisions and a strong swell of support for Allende at the general 
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elections of 1970. Frei was viewed as either too reformist or not reformist enough, 
and ultimately, as popular as he may have been, his policies didn‘t bring as much 
change has had been promised. Schatan (2001, 59) suggests that, ―deeper reforms 
needed to be carried out, but the Christian Democratic Party, in a sort of middle-of-
the-road position, was struggling between the growing demands coming from 
workers, peasants…and the opposition presented by the right-wing political parties.‖ 
Despite this, considerable progress was made in his expressed objective of increasing 
participation throughout Chilean society, especially for the peasantry.  
 
―In terms of its impact on politics, the 1960 – 1970 period 
had awakened great expectations on the part of the poor – 
workers, peasants, and the urban poor – who expected the 
state to enact programmes that would help change their life 
circumstances. In this, they were disappointed…The popular 
expectations, however, were to play an important role for the 
next administration, that of Socialist Allende.‖ (Oppenheim 
2007, 26) 
 
Allende, as will be discussed in the following section, sought to deliver immediately 
on such expectations, moving to further dismantle the structures that he believed 
continued to cause intolerable inequality within Chile. 
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Table 5.4:  Selected policies related to inequality under Frei snr., 1964 – 1970 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Promoción Popular An overall policy theme that aimed to engage all Chileans in political 
and social processes 
Strengthening workers’ 
rights 
Workers supported to form unions, hold strikes and bargain in 
collectives 
Agrarian reform 
programme  
The expropriation and redistribution of landholdings over 80 basic 
hectares, with the landowner having the right of reserve of 80 basics 
hectares; remainder redistributed for communal use over the following 
three to five years, and after this time a decision was made to either 
maintain the farm as a cooperative or to divide the land up for individual 
land-ownership titles 
New Housing Ministry 
and Operación Sitio 
Those without their own property were given a plot with legal access 
plus the promise of full services in the future in exchange for a payment, 
plus the commitment to gradually build a house 
Reforma Educacional A focus on primary enrolment and tertiary education; expectations 
illiteracy could be eradicated with the hope that 100,000 adults could 
learn at 2,600 new local community education centres; more than newly-
employed 2,500 primary school teachers used new learning and literacy 
techniques  
Chile’s first national 
health plan 
An increase in public spending on health care; new training programmes 
for doctors, including incentives for practice in rural areas; centros de 
madres for new mothers and new hospitals built 
Source: Author  
 
 
5.4 Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973)  
The success of Allende‘s fourth bid for the presidency brought him the opportunity to 
bring about La via chilena al socialismo (the Chilean path to Socialism). Allende ran 
his presidential campaign on the ‗Unidad Popular (UP) Programme‘, written by the 
six parties in the left-wing coalition. It promised redistribution towards the poor, 
deeper agrarian reform, and improved social welfare programmes. Allende‘s views on 
inequality were Marxian and the ―revolutionary transformation of society was based 
on changes in ownership of the major means of production: large farms and major 
industrial and financial enterprises‖ (Oppenheim 2007, 43). For Allende this course of 
action was justified by the highly skewed income distribution of the 1960s: 
 
―While the poorest 10% of the population had a 1.5% share 
of total income, the highest 10% income group had a 40.2 
share of income. The ratio between the incomes of both 
groups was 1 to 27.‖ (Larraín and Meller 1991, 180)  
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5.4.a Redistribution of wealth and services 
From the Unidad Popular‟s viewpoint, ―the fruits of Chilean development were 
highly concentrated among a small privileged elite, thereby excluding low-income 
groups from the benefits.‖ (ibid, 180) and this had become self-perpetuating through 
an inequality trap. Larraín and Meller (1991, 181) propose that this trap came about as 
a result of the dominance of the Chilean market by consumption of the wealthy, 
meaning that production was focused on satisfying their demand. Consequently a dual 
productive system developed between a modern high-technology sector, supported by 
foreign investment, to produce these ‗luxury‘ goods, and a stagnant one. ‗Luxury‘ 
goods production was in itself a small market with inefficient processes as it produced 
mostly non-essential goods for high-income groups. ―The small output scale led to a 
higher monopolistic concentration level, which reinforced the skewed initial income 
distribution pattern.‖ (ibid) 
 
Allende was determined to also redistribute wealth. In 1968 the top fifth of the 
Chilean population had captured over half of national income, while the bottom fifth 
had less than 5 percent. Such a situation demanded urgent action and the approach 
was to break loose of the trap by stimulating the economy enough to raise salaries, 
while maintaining, or lowering the prices of basic goods. The government instigated 
distribution policies to ensure that these basic goods were available in all 
neighbourhoods. Committees were established at the neighbourhood level to observe 
local stores, in case they disobeyed official prices and stockpiled scarce goods. 
 
However Allende‘s administration believed that the inequality trap was being 
sustained by an economy that was both monopolistic and externally dependent. 
Collins and Lear (1995) show that in the 1960s 248 firms controlled all of the 
economic sectors and 17% of all enterprises controlled 78% of total assets, while in 
industry 3% of the firms controlled almost 60% of capital. In wholesale trade, 12 
enterprises (0.5% of the total) accounted for 44% of all sales. Additionally, Chile 
suffered from a high reliance on copper, which totalled more than 75% of total 
exports, while foreigners made up a further 20% of exports from remittances. This 
created a strong overseas dependence that was argued to hold Chile back from 
developing fairer internal economic structures and maintained a biased distribution.  
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The path to Socialism, however, appears to have been doomed from the start. 
Attempts to ―expand the government-owned sector to take control of the ‗strategic 
heights‘ of the economy in order to overcome patterns of uneven development that 
[were] viewed as rooted in exploitation by foreign companies, feudalistic structures in 
the countryside and a backward industrial sector‖ (Ibid, 18) were never allowed to 
fully take hold. With a minority status in the Congress, the Unidad Popular was 
forced to negotiate with opposition parties to pass any legislation. It also faced 
problematic internal restrictions in that the coalition that had elected Allende was 
nothing more than a loose collection of independent parties that each maintained its 
own internal structure. The world context within which Allende came to power, 
despite a détente in the Cold War, remained hostile to the Unidad Popular with the 
US in particular expressing strong anti-Allende attitudes. President Nixon reportedly 
declared his intention to make the Chilean economy ‗scream‘ 16 . Such external 
pressures were too strong, and similarly to Frei, Allende was caught in the middle of 
those demanding more revolutionary ardour and those pressing for a stop to the 
reforms.  
 
Allende had claimed from the start that his path was to be peaceful and democratic 
and signed, upon assuming the presidency, a ―Statute of Constitutional Guarantees.‖ 
However his haste to restructure the economy and socialise the means of production 
made many people nervous, and his very first actions, which were to hike up wages 
and freeze prices, did not help. Although these policies led to a short-term 8.6 % 
economic growth and a major decline in inflation (from 34.9% to 22.1%) and 
unemployment (down to 3.8%, which was the lowest in Chilean statistics), they were 
simply not sustainable, and his opponents‘ anxieties were confirmed by a rising 
inflation of 140% the following year. This was made worse by many manufacturers 
refusing to produce at the fixed prices, along with the ensuing rise of black markets in 
basic commodities that led to scarcities. Businesses not only stopped producing but 
also investing, creating a black hole for illegally converted dollars to escape out of the 
                                               
16 Notes taken down by CIA director Richard Helms on Nixon's orders for a plan against Salvador 
Allende. (15 September 1970). Document reproduced as part of George Washington University's 
National Security Archive [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch26-01.htm [Accessed 13 October 2012] 
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country. On top of this, the rents and profits of the expropriated enterprises fell far 
short of what had been expected. However Allende continued with deficit spending, 
again freezing prices while raising salaries, and declared it was to default on 
international debts.  
 
5.4.b Redistribution of land, property and industry 
The construction of affordable housing was another primary goal of the Unidad 
Popular government. It committed itself establishing rent and housing payments that 
were no more than 10% of family income and to a substantial housing programme of 
76,000 houses in 1971, compared to 24,000 for 1970. Ultimately Allende aimed to 
construct 80,000 new houses every year, and he openly acknowledged that the 
housing deficit was increasing all the time. However such a commitment proved 
unrealistic due to the available resources. (Hojman 1993, 124)  
 
Allende continued to expand upon various policies of the previous administration, 
including that of land expropriation and redistribution as a process of equalising 
unequal structures. In the 1960s 2% of the farms had owned 55% of the land and so 
the attempt to establish more equal opportunities meant that peasants took control of 
landed estates. During the first six months of the Unidad Popular‟s term, almost 1.5 
million hectares of land were seized, almost half of what the Christian Democrats had 
previously accomplished. Oppenheim (2007, 49) calculates that by June 1972, 4690 
farms had been appropriated, approximately 9 million hectares of land, and that by the 
end of 1972 virtually all of the land eligible under the 1967 law had been taken. ―By 
the September 1973 coup, over half the country‘s irrigated land had been affected.‖ 
(Collins and Lear 1995, 19) The key challenge for the government following such a 
major redistribution was the organisation of the reformed land. Frei‘s administration 
had favoured the asentamiento, in which the expropriated farms were changed into 
cooperative settlements. Ultimately only a small fraction of the expropriated land was 
actually distributed to peasants through either individual property or cooperatives, and 
most of that occurred during the Frei period. During the Unidad Popular government 
almost all of the land remained in the hands of the state. ―Overall, the agrarian reform 
programme had a significant wealth redistribution effect. Estimates indicate that 
former landowners had a capital loss of between $1.2 and $1.6 billion as of 1973.‖ 
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(Larraín and Meller 1991, 187) Unsurprisingly such processes and policies strained 
existing tensions between landowners and peasants and the socialisation of the means 
of production further exacerbated these.  
 
Allende was focused on dismantling the processes that he believed stimulated and 
maintained inequality. Three US companies essentially controlled copper production, 
which represented 60% of Chilean exports by 1970, and Allende pressed to complete 
the ‗Chileanisation‘ of the copper industry in July 1971, refusing to give any 
compensation to the larger companies, as he believed they had already profited 
enough from Chile. Once the bill to nationalise all mines was passed Allende declared 
a ‗Day of National Dignity‘ for Chile. When Allende came to power the state bank 
(Banco el Estado) controlled close to 50% of all deposits and credits, and more than 
half of the remainder was controlled by three banks (Larraín and Meller 1991, 180). 
The major Chilean banks were also bought up along with large-scale industries with 
the goal of breaking the near-monopolised industrial sector. Previously, any state 
intervention in the economy had been to encourage economic development through 
industrialisation, and had not been in opposition to capitalism, but Allende‘s approach 
was different. His proposal was for a socialised sector of the economy with three 
areas: state-owned enterprises, enterprises partially owned by the state and partly 
privately, and privately owned. This was to permit greater state control of strategic 
industries. In 1970 there were 43 state enterprises, 30 of which were industrial. By 
September 1973, the state controlled 370 enterprises. Collins and Lear (1995, 50) 
suggest that this wasn‘t entirely planned. 
 
―Political pressures, production sabotage by Chilean and 
foreign owners antagonistic to the government, and factory 
takeovers by workers and political activitists, forced the 
Allende administration to use emergency powers to take 
control of many more enterprises than it had originally 
envisioned – certainly beyond what made economic sense 
and management sense.‖ 
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The policies were basically designed to enlarge the state sector and to shift priorities 
away from encouraging industrial development to a more political purpose: ―to 
change economic and, ultimately, political power relations through a transition to 
socialism.‖ (Oppenhiem 2007, 43) 
 
Such a shift was also desired within the education system, where it was to cause a 
similar struggle. Drago and Parades (2011) highlighted that in 1970 test scores in 
Chilean schools were 50% lower than those of students in France and the United 
States. Despite the obvious need for improvement, the national unified educational 
system that was introduced during Allende‘s term, the Educación Nacional Unificada 
(ENU), still proved controversial and polarising. While some aspects of the policy 
were widely applauded and accepted – such as increased scholarships, more schools, a 
decrease in illiteracy, and children‘s day-care facilities – Allende‘s desire to have 
greater control over student selection in private schools caused considerable 
opposition among the elite. It appeared that some were anxious that their children 
would become indoctrinated by Marxist principles. The clear expansionary impact of 
Allende‘s educational policies between 1970 and 1973 can be seen in the rise of 
16.7% of registered students in public primary schools, as compared to 1.8% in 
private schools. This trend is also evident in secondary schools, where public schools 
saw registrations increase by 52.6% and private schools by 18.1% (see Table 5.8). 
 
5.4.c Summary 
By the end of his three years of power, Allende had achieved a great deal in extremely 
complex circumstances, as can be seen in Table 5.5. His three years in power had 
grown increasingly complicated by the U.S. cutting all credit and aid programmes and 
by the polarising rumour mongering. The problem was not simply one of the means 
production, or of property rights, but of the dispersal of fear. Allende‘s government 
had obtained close to 45% of the vote in the March 1973 parliamentary elections, 
despite the chaotic environment. Historically the party in power did not gain seats, but 
the Unidad Popular gained six and had ―achieved this in the face of severe economic 
dislocations, including soaring inflation and scarcity of goods, and in a highly charged 
political atmosphere.‖ (Oppenheim 2007, 69) Such a result indicates that the Socialist 
ideals and policies towards equality that Allende was seeking to implement were not 
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unpopular despite the tough environment. The coup that ended his term, and life, 
however, sought to systematically destroy everything that he had set out to achieve. 
 
 
Table 5.5:  Selected policies related to inequality under Allende, 1970 – 1973 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Wealth redistribution Wages increased and prices frozen; distribution policies to ensure basic 
goods were available in all neighbourhoods; committees established at 
the neighbourhood level to observe local stores, in case they disobeyed 
official prices and stockpiled scarce goods. 
Eradication of 
monopolies 
The major Chilean banks bought up along with large-scale industries 
with the goal of breaking the near-monopolised industrial sector; 
proposal for a socialised sector of the economy with three areas: state-
owned enterprises, enterprises partially owned by the state and partly 
privately, and privately owned.  
Housing Construction of affordable housing; rent and housing payments that were 
no more than 10% of family income established; an aim to construct 
80,000 new houses every year 
Land reform Significantly larger scale agricultural land appropriation 
Educación Nacional 
Unificada 
Increased scholarships; more schools and children‘s day-care facilities; a 
decrease in illiteracy 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
5.5 Augusto Pinochet (1973 – 1990)  
Following the coup, a military junta was immediately established and Pinochet led a 
junta that would, by 1975, apply the most neoliberalised policy framework ever seen, 
which was intended to reverse the reforms of the Allende years. Pinochet‘s ambition 
was to transform Chile utterly, to obliterate any evidence of Allende and of Socialism. 
This was to be achieved through neoliberal policies; through challenging – and 
changing – how the country saw the world around it. The shift from state-centred 
economy to a free market led to a dramatic shift in distribution policies, leaving many 
Chileans vulnerable.  However the military dictatorship continued to argue that should 
these vulnerabilities persist despite state interventions then there were simply due to 
‗God or to merit.‘ (Raczynski 1999, cited in Murray and Kousary 2009, 132)  
 
This study of Pinochet‘s brutal dictatorship is essentially a study of the experiment of 
neoliberalism. Pinochet gave Milton Friedman, and his group, the Chicago Boys, the 
freedom to impose their theories regardless of the cost to ordinary Chileans. From 
1975 Chile was turned into a laboratory for free-market proponents and because 
Pinochet effectively ruled out any opposition, it provides a chance to examine the 
consequences of such policies. The following section continues the Chilean case study, 
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looking at what has frequently been called ‗the miracle of Chile‘, and the stark 
implications of neoliberalism on the realities of inequality.  
 
5.5.a Overview of 1973 - 1990 
From 1973 to 1975 there was little direction in terms of economic policy. A drastic 
currency devaluation and the liberation of commodity prices increased inflation, 
causing unemployment to swell and forcing prices up by 375%. The ―principle of 
subsidiarity of the state‖, that being that no higher-level social institution should carry 
out activities which could be performed by a lower-level institution was 
institutionalised in the Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile issued by 
the junta on March 11, 1974. By 1975 the junta had solicited the advice of the 
Chicago Boys, a collection of economists educated at the University of Chicago, who 
travelled to Chicago often during Frei‘s presidency and who were largely employed at 
Santiago‘s Universidad Católica de Chile. This group was determined to convince 
Chile‘s leadership of the value of neoliberalism.  
 
The push to establish free market ideals became increasingly radical as the initial 
reforms failed to convince, prompting the call for Chile to undergo a ‗shock 
treatment.‘ This entailed the majority of government-owned banks (sixteen) being 
sold off, reduced import tariffs, and constraints on profits being expropriated by 
foreign corporations being scrapped. Oppenheim (2007, 130) is in no doubt of the 
consequences of such an approach, commenting that, ―privatisation of the banks 
facilitated the growing concentration of wealth.‖ Up to 1989 state ownership of 160 
corporations were sold (between 1974 and 1976 CORFO sold 99 firms), as well as 
over 3,000 plants, mines and real estate holdings. Additionally the property 
expropriated by the Allende government was returned and, dismantling the work done 
by Frei and Allende, the counter reform of land ownership was based on more 
efficient, modern farms that produced fruit for export. (Murray, 2002) Oppenheim 
(2007, 140) noted that these changes came at a social cost. ―They created a large rural 
proletariat that no longer lived on farms; rather, they lived in small towns and worked 
part-time mainly during harvest season.‖ This privatisation, especially of many of the 
means of production, meant a greater consolidation of the concentration of wealth and 
power, as only a few private groups could afford to purchase such assets. For 
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example, two months after the introduction of the ‗Seven Modernisations‘ (see 
below), the two largest conglomerates had gained control of 75% of the market. And, 
as these conglomerates were prospering, smaller businesses were struggling in what 
was labelled by neoliberals as ‗Economic Darwinism‘. 
 
Between 1979 and 1982 – a period of solid economic growth – the ‗Seven 
Modernisations‘ were enacted. These drastically transformed welfare institutions: 
―Where possible, market mechanisms were introduced to service provision in order to 
recast socialised provision into atomised and apolitical relationships between 
individuals and private service providers‖ (Taylor 2006, 98).  Subsidies were given to 
private schools, the impact of which is evident in the dramatic fall of 33% in public 
primary school enrolment over the term of Pinochet‘s dictatorship (seen in Table 3.9). 
The national public healthcare system was dismantled out of preference to private 
insurance companies, and new labour policies curbed labour rights. The informal 
market grew quickly during this time, increasing inequality, which had also been 
affected by the decline of social services and a subsequent increase in poverty. 
 
The 1982 Debt Crisis had an immense influence on the development of Chile. 
Pinochet opted to intervene in the private and financial sectors, taking control of 
sinking companies, absorbing the external debts of private business and setting up 
emergency work programmes. One in eight Chilean workers ended up on these 
programmes, working for less than the minimum wage, and unemployment reached 
its low point in 1982 at 41.8% (Montenegro and Pagés, 2004). This exacerbated the 
trend towards increased income inequality that had begun from 1973. Unfortunately 
the crisis did not create a more evenly distributed economy, despite the concept of a 
‗people‘s capitalism‘ being introduced, wherein stocks of companies were publically 
sold. Naturally the majority of Chileans were in no position to buy these stocks and 
the concentration of ownership remained in the conglomerates and multinationals. 
The growing distribution gap was further exacerbated by changes in the tax system, 
which abolished wealth and capital gains taxes in 1975.  
 
In 1985 Pinochet disseminated propaganda of a second miracle in GDP growth. In 
reality, growth was based on the exploitation of a re-employed but poorly paid 
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workforce. As a consequence of nearly two decades of neoliberalism, the ratio of the 
highest to lowest quintile was considerably higher during the Pinochet period than 
under the previous two governments.  A further consequence was the increase in 
poverty; real wages plummeted 62% of their real value between 1970 and 1975. Even 
during the economic recovery of 1986 – 1988, real wages did not go up. In 1989 real 
wages were still only 90.8% of what they had been in 1970. (Oppenheim, 2007, 132) 
 
5.5.b Public Spending: Education, health and pensions 
It is possible to further disaggregate the impacts of Pinochet‘s policies on inequality 
by examining his government‘s approach to public spending, especially on education, 
health and pensions. Ffrench-Davis (2002, 189) calculates that public spending per 
capita on health, education and housing fell by 22% as compared to 1970. After 
declining in the 1970s, there was a limited improvement in funding at the start of the 
next decade but following the crisis, and through until 1989, this deteriorated again. 
Such a change had major implications on the ability of Chileans to enjoy equal 
opportunities. Oppenheim agrees: 
 
―Access to such societal goods as education, health care, and 
social insurance was now dependent on one‘s economic 
resources. The state was not responsible for providing a 
safety net to the poor.‖ (2007, 137) 
 
The Seven Modernisations continued the process of reducing state control and 
funding, making thousands of teachers, health workers and government workers 
unemployed as many of the social ministries were dismantled. This resulted in a 
significant restructuring of the education system through the Organic Constitutional 
Education Law (LOCE; Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza, LOCE). LOCE 
was passed on the day when the military junta passed over power, shifting 
responsibility for public education away from the government into the municipalities. 
Drago and Paredes (2011, 163) suggest that Chile was one of the first countries in the 
world to introduce an educational reform on such a scale and of such a nature. ―State-
run schools were handed over to the country‘s municipalities and were financed with 
subsidies that did not differentiate between pupils attending municipal schools and 
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those attending non- fee private voucher schools.‖ The reform resulted in three types 
of schools: municipal, state-funded schools; privately run, state-funded subsidised 
schools and privately run schools funded by tuition fees. As a result fees across the 
board were also raised. ―The idea of universal access to a social benefit, in this case, 
education, was discarded; instead ability to get an education became contingent on the 
ability to pay.‖ (Oppenheim 2007, 137)  
 
Despite these potential obstacles for fair access to a quality education, there were 
some positive changes during the Pinochet era. The illiteracy rate fell to 10% around 
1973, and to less than 6% in 1989, while enrolment in primary schools, as a 
percentage of the population aged 6 – 14, rose from 65% to almost 100% in 1973, and 
remained at this level until the early 1980s, when it fell to 95%. In secondary schools 
enrolment, as a percentage of 15 – 18 year olds, rose from 10% in 1952 to 51% in 
1973 and 75% in 1989. (Ffrench-Davis 2002, 187) 
 
The health-care system was one of the areas most impacted by the decision to 
strengthen the role of the private sector. State financing of health was slashed during 
the military rule, halved by 1988. Structural changes led to the foundation of a dual 
system; the introduction of competitive private companies called Institución de Salud 
Previsional (ISAPREs) and the existing public National Common Fund (Fondo 
Nacional de Salud or FONASA). The ISAPRES were based on the idea that the 
quality of medical coverage was dependent on the amount contributed. This was 
different to the old system, FONASA, which operated on a set contribution of 6% of 
salary. Those unable to afford the transfer to ISAPREs found that the state-run system 
was under-funded and under-staffed (the number of workers in the National System of 
Health Services dropped by half from 1973 to 1988), as contributors unsurprisingly 
shifted to the ISAPREs. As previously implied, the quality of medical care became 
dependent on the ability to pay. Ffrench-Davis comments that this system has only 
served to intensify inequality: ―Most people in the four poorest quintiles are covered 
by the public health system, and only in the richest quintile do ISAPRES cover a 
higher proportion of people than FONASA.‖ (2002, 202) 
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Evidently, reducing inequality was not a short-term concern for the neoliberal 
administration but, despite the extensive health care cuts, Pinochet ―channelled much 
of what was left to infants, young children, pregnant women and new mothers, using a 
‗poverty map‘ to target the poorest areas of the country‖ (McGuire 2001, 1678). 
McGuire attributes this incongruent policy to a combination of state paternalism, 
protest deterrence and to enhance international reputation. Whatever the reasons, and 
ignoring the disastrous impacts on other areas of health coverage, from 1974-1984, 
infant mortality rates fell, life expectancy at age one rose, and a higher proportion of 
babies were born to more educated mothers. Regrettably however, by the end of 
Pinochet‘s regime in 1989, the infant mortality rate was only barely below the 1985 
rate, as these targeted policies fell away in the increasingly neoliberal fervour. 
 
Similar to the privatisation of health care, the nation‘s pension scheme underwent 
substantial changes to become a dual system. A new fully funded private pension fund 
(the Adminitradoras de Fondos Previsionales, AFPs) began to operate in 1981. This 
replaced the old pay-as-you-go system and eradicated employer contributions for both 
systems. The driving concept behind the transition was that there would no longer be 
any government subsidies, but ultimately the public sector was left with responsibility 
for covering the financing of existing pensions without contributions of the most 
active workers. In 1982 only 40% of the labour force were contributing and although 
this rose to 55% in 1988, the statistics are stark when compared to 60% in 1974. The 
result was the social security deficit growing from 2% of GDP in 1980 to 7% in 1983-
86. ―Essentially the whole reform constituted a massive transfer of funds from the 
public to the private sector.‖ (Huber and Stephens, 2010, 184) 
 
5.5.c Wages, labour rights and housing 
Some of the policies that contributed most to an increasing distribution and social gap 
can be found within Pinochet‘s approach towards employment and housing. While 
neoliberalism was dramatically re-shaping the economy, the common worker was 
suffering. In 1989, at the end of the military regime, average wages were 8% below 
their 1970 level, and the minimum wage had declined at the same rate. In 1989 family 
allowances were reduced to 72% of their 1970 level. Although these trends were not 
unique to Chile (a similar slump was evident throughout Latin America in the 1980s), 
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Ffrench-Davis argues that the government‘s approach was also to blame as ―poverty 
and income distribution are determined essentially by the production process itself.‖ 
(2002, 204) When the process marginalises and excludes participation, when it 
precludes investment in people, it becomes an inequality trap, preventing the 
breakdown of poverty and an ever-growing distribution gap. The importance of 
avoiding such income gaps is emphasised by the reality that access to quality 
education and healthcare in Pinochet‘s Chile became dependent on the ability to pay 
for it as previously noted. 
 
Following the increase in union size and activity under Frei in particular, the military 
junta suspended unions until 1979, when a new labour code was created. The new 
code did authorise legal union activity again but only with limited powers at a local 
level. However ―the labour code was designed to prevent the formation of strong 
unions under the guise of giving workers freedom of choice, as well as to prevent any 
association of political parties with unions. In essence, it was an attempt to atomise 
the union movement.‖ (Oppenheim, 2007, 134) With the termination of employment 
made easier and tribunals eradicated, the labour legislation was heavily in favour of 
owners, concentrating power even more. In such an environment it would have been 
very difficult, and potentially dangerous, to agitate for improved and fairer conditions. 
 
The government enforced a programme of relocation of pobladores, those living in 
marginal settlements, out of the more developed comunas. Starting in 1986, about 
150,000 people were relocated to poorer outlying areas. This was: 
 
 ―a policy of eradication of shanty towns in favour of 
definitive housing, some high-rise, others basic solutions, but 
all in isolated areas in the outskirts of Santiago, far away 
from jobs, long-established and reasonably good schools, 
hospitals and so on.‖ (Hojman 2010,124)  
 
Occasionally the relocated pobladores were compensated with replacement housing, 
but in many cases they had to live with family as guests or allegados. It is estimated 
that out of a population of 12 million Chileans in the late 1980s, an incredible 2.5 
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million were allegados. For those who did receive their own property, Oppenhiem 
illustrates how the new townships essentially established ―legal separation of the rich 
from the poor under the guise of social homogeneity. Greater municipal control over 
public services simply reinforced a growing social isolation and class segregation.‖ 
(2007, 139) One example is the relocation of the shantytown Lo Hermida from the 
more middle-class township of Nuñoa to Penalolén. In 1984 Penalolén‘s per capita 
income was less than 1% that that of Nuñoa. However, it wasn‘t only the incomes that 
defined the difference between the townships; revenues were to stay locally instead of 
being administered centrally. The consequence of this was the richer suburbs quickly 
accumulated much greater resources to devote to social service projects than the 
poorer areas, which were in greater need of investment and basic services, could.  
 
Further examples serve to further highlight the problems. Between 1980 and 1984, 
wealthier areas, such as Santiago Centro, Providencia, and Las Condes, made up 
56.8% of all municipal investment, whereas the poor townships, or comunas, of La 
Granja, Cisterna, Conchalí, and Pudahuel, with 36% of the population, accounted for 
9%. Oppenheim also provides the illustration of the Providencia comuna, with a 
population of 115,500, developing great services through heavy investment between 
1982-87, while La Florida‘s population of 191,800 had to fight for permission to build 
a one-room wooden day-care centre, staffed half the day by local women. (2007, 139) 
These are not isolated instances; Hojman points out that even in the late 1980s only 
50% of the resources being spent in housing subsidies was for the poor. (2010, 125) 
Of course, as time went on the real estate in the wealthier regions continued to 
improve, while the poorer comunas didn‘t follow a similar pattern, further widening 
the wealth gap.  
 
 
5.5.d Summary 
Under Pinochet Chile became a more polarised society, with a greater gap between 
the rich and poor. Access to education and health care was restricted by policies 
(outlined in Table 5.6) that favoured the wealthy, while the inability of the average 
worker to contribute to a pension similarly left many vulnerable. Many lost their 
homes, or were pushed out to isolated townships with little hope of investment to 
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improve facilities, while neighbouring richer comunas developed quickly. The 
unchecked engagement with neoliberal policies created winners and losers, and 
rapidly took apart the work done by his two immediate predecessors to create an 
inclusive and fairer society.  
 
 
Table 5.6:  Selected policies related to inequality under Pinochet, 1973 – 1989  
Policy context Objectives and features 
Education Public spending on education fell; state intervention decreased; 
thousands of teachers made unemployed; administration of public 
schools localised, reducing funding and staff; as a result fees were also 
raised. Ley Órganica Constitucional de Enseñanza, LOCE) shifted 
responsibility for public education away from the government into the 
municipalities. 
Healthcare State financing of health slashed; structural changes led to the foundation 
of a dual system - new private companies called Institución de Salud 
Previsional (ISAPREs) and the existing public National Common Fund 
(Fondo Nacional de Salud or FONASA); ISAPRES  based on the idea 
that the quality of medical coverage was dependent on the amount 
contributed. This was different to the old system, FONASA, which 
operated on a set contribution of 6% of salary. 
Maternal care What was left over after health spending cuts went to infants, young 
children, pregnant women and new mothers, using a ‗poverty map‘ to 
target the poorest areas of the country 
Pensions A new fully funded private pension fund (the Adminitradoras de Fondos 
Previsionales, AFPs) began to operate in 1981 
Labour New labour code created that authorised legal union activity again after 
suspension but only with limited powers at a local level 
Housing relocation Programme of relocation of pobladores out of the more developed 
comunas 
Source: Author 
 
 
5.6 Inequality trends in Chile, 1964 – 1989 
Having contextualised the Chilean case study within Latin America, and tracked the 
various policy shifts between Frei, influenced by Latin American structuralism (1964 
– 1970), socialism under Allende (1970 – 1973) and neoliberalism (1973 – 1999) 
under Pinochet, it is now possible to consider the impacts of these policies on selected 
inequality trends. These trends include: income distribution and poverty rates, 
education, employment participation, health indicators and housing. 
 
5.6.a Income distribution and poverty rates 
Figure 5.2 displays World Bank statistics on Chile‘s Gini coefficient (1966 – 1990), 
revealing that following Pinochet‘s tenure in 1990 the coefficient of 53.9 was 
significantly higher than in 1966 when it was 45.2 under Frei or in 1973 under 
Allende. This trend is supported in the long time-series of the Universidad de Chile 
140 
 
 
Household Survey, which indicates an increasing trend in the Gini coefficient in Chile 
from 1958 to 1982 (cited in Pizzolitto 2005, 12). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Gini Coefficient in Chile, 1966 – 1990 
 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from World Bank World Development Indicators Data Base and Gini coefficient from 
background data, Montenegro, 1998 
 
 
Contrasting the quintiles of the population‘s income distribution also highlights the 
extent of Chile‘s inequality. Table 5.7 demonstrates the tenacious nature of the 
disparity, with the top quintile accounting for 55.4% of all income during the socialist 
period of Allende‘s government. Surprisingly this figure was only slightly higher 
(62%) during Pinochet‘s military government. Torche (cited in Spagnolo et al 2008, 
2) describes these levels as ―twice those of most industrialised countries and 1.5 times 
larger than that of the United States.‖ Improvement is evident in the ratio of the fifth 
quintile over the first, ranging from 23.0 between 1974 and 1989 to a low of 12.2 in 
1992. Collins and Lear (1995, 243) take note of the size of the ratio under Pinochet 
and explain that ―with free-market policies, the rich got richer. They did so mainly at 
the expense of many middle-class Chileans: between 1978 and 1988 the richest 10% 
increased their share of national income from 37 – 47%, while the next 30% saw their 
income shrink from 23 – 18%.‖ Murray and Kousary (2009, 134) cite studies by 
Laban and Larraín (1995) and Romaguera et al (1995) that reveal that the wealthiest 
20% increased their share of national income between 1970 and 1989. Hojman (1996, 
74) wrote that Chile was behind only Brazil in terms of both income distribution 
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inequality and the ratio between the income share of the top and bottom quintiles, and 
that such disparity increased between 1989 and 1992.  
 
 
Table 5.7: Income Distribution in Chile, by quintile, 1965 – 1989 (%) 
Group Frei 
1964 – 1970 
Allende 
1970 - 1973 
Pinochet 
1974 - 1989 
1st quintile 3.2 3.1 2.7 
2nd quintile 7.1 7.5 6.4 
3rd quintile 11.4 10.6 10.6 
4th quintile 19.7 21.5 18.3 
5th quintile 58.6 55.4 62.0 
Ratio of 5th 
quintile over 1st 
quintile 
18.3 17.9 23.0 
Source: The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. Bosworth, Barry P., Rudiger Dornbursch, Raúl Labán (eds), 
1994, R.R. Donnelley and Sons Co.: Harrisonburg, Virginia, pg 220 [―Survey of Household Incomes‖, Department of 
Economics, University of Chile] 
 
 
Murray and Kousary (2009, 133) point out that the setbacks of the dictatorship 
concerning poverty rates were severe: 
 
 ―Under Pinochet, the percentage of Chileans living in 
poverty increased substantially, from 17% in 1973 to 45% in 
1985, and stabilised at 38% in 1987…Following the 
recession and debt crisis of 1982-83, extreme poverty reached 
17.4% in 1985. In 1987 poverty was significantly more 
severe than previously in rural areas…Overall, by 1990 
poverty was significantly higher than it had been in 1969, 
underscoring the reversal in development progress brought 
about by the military and the neoliberal shock policies.‖  
 
Such an observation supports the statistics of a rising income distribution disparity 
during and immediately after Pinochet‘s tenure, indicating the destructive impact of 
the dictatorship‘s extreme neoliberal approach. As will be seen in the following 
sections, this trend is mirrored in the growing social gap in education, health, 
employment and housing.  
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5.6.b Educational disparity 
Collins and Lear (1995, 139) point out that the percentage of students beyond pre-
school age in school in 1973 compared to that in 1986 was virtually identical (53%). 
―Given the historic and nearly worldwide tendency for this percentage to expand, not 
to progress is to go backward.‖ Hojman (1993, 33) digs deeper into the causes of 
barriers at that time, which are still relevant today, and comments that between 1974 
and 1982, the cost of education to parents rose by a factor of 207, due to increases in 
clothing, school items and fees. ―The latter reflects the relative and absolute increase 
in private sector education, in which at least part of the full cost is met by out-of-
pocket payments by parents.‖  
 
However, this was not reflective of the large rise in attendance across the schooling 
system since 1982, as reported by Collins and Lear (1995, 125). In 1986, 265,000 
more Chileans were enrolled in formal education than had been in 1973 and that by 
1987 the average years spent by each Chilean in the classroom had risen to little more 
than eight years, almost double the figure for 1973. They also reported that through 
the 1960s to 1973, government programmes gave greater access to higher education 
to children whose parents had had little schooling. Indeed, by 1973, 9% of those 
enrolled in universities were children of blue-collar workers. Hojman (1993, 93) 
introduces gender inequality into the mix, providing an encouraging account.  
 
―As compared with men, the relative disadvantage of women 
in terms of average schooling seems to have diminished 
substantially. In 1957 average schooling for women was 5.6 
years, against 6.7 for men. By 1987 the respective figures 
were 10.0 years for women and 10.1 for men.‖  
 
Despite this progress for attendance and in closing the gender asymmetry, Collins and 
Lear (1995, 134) argue financial disparities were increased as a result of Pinochet‘s 
policy of decentralising the national school system: 
 
―visibly widened the gaps between the schools in poor and 
rich municipalities. Inequalities among schools have been 
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reinforced along the lines of the socioeconomic differences in 
neighbourhoods and the families whose children attend 
them…Schools in the better-off municipalities are able to 
supplement the government per-student subsidy with 
contributions from other municipal revenues, parents, and 
businesses. Schools in low-income municipalities, on the 
other hand, are unable to count on resources other than 
government per-student subsidy.‖  
 
Table 5.8 clearly illustrates that the educational system became segregated into a 
population-representative class system, further institutionalising inequalities. The 
figures detail the remarkable increase in private school attendance from the beginning 
of Eduardo Frei‘s government in 1964 up to 1990. Compared to public school 
registrations, private schools grew at a much faster rate. While public pre-school 
growth was at 407% for 1964 to 1990, private schools increased by 2046%. Public 
primary school registrations grew by a modest 49%, with private schools increasing 
by 117%. This trend continued with secondary schooling, with public registrations 
doubling and private school showing an increase of 224%. These changes have had a 
major impact on the equality of opportunity for many students. Hojman (1993, 40) 
comments that, ―performance difference between fee-paying private, non-fee-paying 
private and state schools were large: one in 8.3, one in 3.3 and one in 2.7 pupils, 
respectively, failed to reach the minimum standards for admission to university.‖ This 
difference is significant, as are the consequences for the students in terms of 
employment, and subsequently income, opportunities. Therefore the trend of 
increasing attendance at private schools can be considered to have heavily influenced 
the growing social gap in Chile during this timeframe.  
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Table 5.8: Totals of registered students, by type of school / institution, 1964 - 
1990 
 Pre-school Primary Secondary 
 Public Private Public Private Public Private 
1964 22,740 4,901 820,000 355,709 183,873 108,820 
1970 43,322 15,668 1,580,167 464,424 237,871 70,251 
1973 57,608 21,875 1,843,967 472,912 362,878 82,984 
1975 66,406 26,548 1,877,716 421,282 364,740 84,171 
1980 91,501 35,893 1,743,964 442,618 406,374 135,265 
1985 114,163 88,089 1,406,767 655,577 397,011 270,786 
1989 111,477 101,723 1,233,457 754,301 383,150 358,860 
1990 115,187 105,209 1,218,348 772,830 366,985 352,834 
Source: National Statistics Bureau (INE) in Banco Central de Chile, ‗Chile Social and Economic Indicators, 1960 – 2000‘ 
 
 
5.6.c Employment participation 
Establishing employment opportunities was consistently upheld as a priority policy 
between 1964 and 1990, and yet the rates for unemployment remained consistent 
throughout. Montenegro and Pagés (2004, 33) calculate that the employment 
participation rate in 1964, when Frei‘s administration came into power, was 52.9%, 
while in 1989, the final year of Pinochet‘s dictatorship, it had dropped slightly to 
52.0%. This rate was slightly higher for higher-income women according to Hojman 
(1993, 93). In the late 1950s participation was about 25% in the bottom quintile, and 
over 36% in the top quintile. By the late 1980s the rate was the same for the bottom 
quintile but had risen to over 43% in the top one. He explains that, ―this is related to 
educational standards: between 1957 and 1987 participation among women with no 
education at all fell from 38 to 16%, and among women with primary education only 
from 36 to 33%.‖ For women with secondary education, participation rose from 30 to 
35%, with university education from 51 to 60%.  
 
Unemployment rates hovered consistently at high levels (Argentina and Costa Rica 
have been used for comparison in Table 5.9), and, as further examples, both urban and 
informal unemployment rates acted similarly. The large gap between the urban and 
informal rates, while consistent between the three countries, is very wide and 
reinforces the importance of equal access to education as previously discussed. 
Collins and Lear (1995, 74) estimate that unemployment levels actually averaged 20% 
from 1974 to 1987. Murray and Kousary (2009, 134) cite Ffrench-Davis (2005) by 
suggesting that much of this unemployment was the result of thousands of state sector 
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employees being released due to the neoliberal policy of severe public spending cuts. 
This trend was mirrored in rural areas as, 
 
―The incomes of rural small producers and small- and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs fell under the poverty line due to 
these groups‘ abrupt insertion into global markets, decreased 
demand, the lack of credit and the monopolies engendered 
during the regime.‖ (Murray and Kousary 2009, 134) 
 
 
Table 5.9: Unemployment and Informal Sector Employment in Chile, Argentina 
and Costa Rica, 1970 - 2001 (%) 
 Unemployment Urban Unemployment Informal Sector 
Unemployment 
 1970-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-
2001 
1970-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-
2001 
1970-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-
2001 
Chile 10.4 10.6 6.6 11.7 14.4 7.7 36.1 39.4 47.0 
Argentina 2.3 5.3 12.3 2.6 5.8 13.1 24.3 34.5 60.0 
Costa Rica 5.9 6.5 5.3 6.0 6.9 5.4 30.0 33.1 44.2 
Source: Huber, Evelyn and John D Stephens. 2010. ―Successful Social Policy Regimes? Political Economy, Politics, and Social 
Policy in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rice‖ from Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R Scully (eds). 2010. Democratic 
Governance in Latin America. California: Stanford University Press 
 
 
The multidimensional nature of inequality is patently obvious in these findings, 
having already discussed the trends in income disparity and education. Employment 
participation is clearly related to education level, while access to a quality education is 
closely linked to income, and economic participation impacts income levels. The 
static or worsening disparities in all these areas thus closed the loop on inequality 
traps. Regional and gender inequalities subsequently risked becoming embedded in 
society, although there was a reduction in gender asymmetries within educational, and 
consequently, employment participation. These traps can also be tracked in an equal 
access to healthcare resources. 
  
 
5.6.d Health indicators 
Figure 5.3 clearly indicates the sharp reduction in infant mortality rates, with the 1986 
rate over four-times less than 1969. The greatest reduction, dropping from 65.8 to 
33.0, was in the first seven years of Pinochet‘s dictatorship. Clearly technological and 
medical progress over this timeframe occurred irrespective of policy but Collins and 
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Lear (1995, 118) state that, ―the infant mortality rate near the end of Pinochet‘s 
regime (1989) was more than three times higher in Santiago‘s poorest 
neighbourhoods than in the ritziest.‖ Such an observation strongly suggests that those 
who benefitted most from Pinochet‘s policies were the wealthy; those who could 
afford to take advantage of private health insurance.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Infant mortality rates (0-1 age group per 1,000 live births), 1969 – 1986 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from INE (1981), Chile, series estadísticas; Compendio estadístico, several numbers from 
Hojman (1993), pg 58 
 
 
Certainly the Pinochet years can be argued to have created obstacles for a major 
proportion of the population to access quality levels of healthcare. Table 5.10 shows a 
significant drop in vaccinations and available hospital beds, most of which would 
have been in demand because, according to Collins and Lear (1995, 97), ―deteriorated 
living and working conditions made millions of Chileans more vulnerable to health 
crises and therefore more in need of access to health services.‖ The number of 
available vaccinations per one thousand people dropped from 556 in 1964 to 387 in 
1989, and this trend was the same with the number of available hospital beds falling 
from 3.73 per one thousand in 1964 to 3.35 in 1989. A slow increase in services can 
be seen towards the end of Pinochet‘s term, for example in the substantial increase in 
available vaccinations, but regardless of this, there were still considerably fewer 
available hospital beds per thousand people in 1989 than there was in 1964.  
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Table 5.10: Selected health indicators in Chile, 1964 – 1989 
  
Vaccinations Available hospital beds  
Total 
Per 
thousand 
inhabitants 
Total 
Per thousand 
inhabitants 
1964 4,662,490 556 31,262 3.73 
1970 4,530,775 477 35,932 3.78 
1973 4,184,205 418 37,255 3.72 
1975 5,073,050 491 33,772 3.27 
1980 4,000,351 359 37,967 3.41 
1985 3,898,202 324 42,224 3.50 
1989 4,988,700 387 43,184 3.35 
Source: Chile Social and Economic Indicators, 1960 – 2000. Banco Central de Chile, 
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/publications/statistics/integrated/iei03.htm  
 
 
Collins and Lear (1995) believed that such a situation created widespread health 
problems. They calculated that the knock-on effect left 50% of children vulnerable to 
malnutrition and a staggering 60% of the population unable to purchase the minimum 
nutritional intake each day. Again, the mechanisms of inequality traps are evident 
here, as the lack of employment restricts income opportunities, which in turn prevents 
both access to quality health care but also the ability to get sufficient nutrition.   
 
5.6.e Housing 
The housing deficit in Chile grew from 480,000 in 1970 to 900,000 in 1985. As 
previously stated, it is not only in terms of income that inequality can be measured, 
but also through location. Collins and Lear (1995, 157) reveal that 58% of houses 
built in Santiago in 1979 were located in the upscale eastern municipalities, where 
only 12% of the metropolitan population lived. This inequality of location was further 
exacerbated by Pinochet‘s policy to destroy shantytowns, and this served to underline 
the unfairness suffered by the poorest people in the urban centres, as replacement 
accommodation was consistently erected in isolated areas in the outskirts of the cities, 
away from employment and quality resources. Such a lack of resources is indicated in 
Table 5.11, which traces the growth of household access to basic amenities such as 
lighting and running water between 1960 and 1992. Table 5.11 indicates a positive 
trend, with an increasing percentage of housing accessing electric lights (by 21.4%), 
piped water (by 20.7%) and a sewage system (by 24.1%) from 1960 to 1992. 
However, a safe assumption can be made that the ongoing development was 
overwhelmingly for housing in rural and isolated urban areas, meaning that many 
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people suffered a lower quality of life over a prolonged period of time due to their 
location.  
 
 
Table 5.11: Housing Information in Chile, according to the 1960, 1970, 1982 and 
1992 censuses (% of total) 
 1960 1970 1982 1992 
With electric lights 70.7 78.4 86.4 92.1 
With piped water 58.8 66.6 71.5 79.5 
With sewage and septic system 50.4 57.1 66.9 74.5 
Source: INE (1992) Various censuses 
 
 
5.7 Chapter summary 
The complex and multidimensional nature of inequality in Chile is evident in the 
trends examined between 1964 and 1989. Despite the variety of policies employed 
across the political and social fabric of the country, inequalities as understood in the 
contexts of income, poverty, education, employment, health and housing remained 
consistently high. The disparities interacted to create inequality traps that became 
embedded in Chilean society and immune to policies that sought to impact one or two 
particular elements. Consequently any improvements, for example in life expectancy, 
female employment, secondary school attendance, were unable to gain momentum 
leaving the Concertación a nation as divided in 1990 as in any other time in the 
previous thirty years.   
 
Chapter Six examines the shift of ideological policy following the return to 
democracy under the Concertación (1990 – 2010). The policies implemented, both 
explicitly and implicitly towards reducing inequality, are tracked across the four 
administrations of the Concertación, and the impacts of these policies on inequality 
trends are then discussed.  
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Chapter Six 
The return to democracy, 1990 – 2010: A new approach to 
inequality? 
 
This chapter covers the return to democracy in the form of the Concertación between 
1990 and 2010. During this period Chile voted four presidents into power: Patricio 
Aylwin (1990 – 1994), Eduardo Frei, jnr (1994 – 2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000 – 2006) 
and Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010). Each administration – to one extent or another 
– explicitly recognised inequality as a major issue in Chilean society and instigated 
policies of various formats and aims to combat the problem. This chapter introduces 
the approach of the Concertación, followed by a discussion on its theoretical origins 
in the forms of neostructuralism, and then reviews the main policy directions of each 
administration towards disparity, with the exception of education, which is studied 
specifically in the following chapter. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
inequality trends across the period. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: An overview of the Concertación (1990 – 2010) 
Following the 1988 plebiscite and subsequent election the year after, Pinochet was 
defeated and the way was cleared for the return to democracy in the form of a new 
government formed of an alliance of Christian Democrats, Socialists and further 
smaller parties. This coalition, known as the Concertación, talked of change and 
‗politics within limits‘ that would operate within the restrictions of the neoliberal 
project. It was also labelled as ‗continuity with change‘; in other words, there were to 
be neither significant structural changes nor any revolutionary shake-ups. The goal 
was for Chile to be normalised; a fully operating democracy, and this approach was 
heralded as ‗growth with equity‘, the marriage of the market and an equal society. The 
background to this approach was, as Aguirre (2008, 11) comments, the inheritance of 
five years of economic growth, a high rate of inflation and ―a poverty rate and level of 
income inequality that were distressingly high.‖ Although the main thrust partially 
shifted under Lagos (1990 – 1996) and Bachelet (1996 – 2010) to become more 
actively reformist and constitutionally challenging, the Concertación remained 
committed to growth-led poverty reduction policies. As Taylor (2006, 114) 
comments: 
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―While the Concertación…maintained neoliberal and 
technocratic solutions to socio-economic issues in an attempt 
to promote continued capital accumulation, this…occurred 
alongside an emphasis on building social institutions that 
correct market failures and promote social inclusion.‖  
 
Although the Concertación remains a centre-left coalition, the last two Concertación 
presidents, Lagos and Bachelet, ran as Socialist candidates. Their approaches to 
inequality were more explicit during the campaigns than either of their predecessors, 
but that is not to say that either Aylwin or Frei had a one-dimensional approach to 
improving inequality. Despite the prominence placed on repaying the social debt 
through poverty reduction, they also implemented new policies in, among other areas, 
education and health care. Table 6.1 reveals that public social expenditure in both the 
education and health sectors more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, and there 
was also a significant rise in the minimum wage. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Wages, Family Allowance, and Public Social Expenditure in Chile, 
1970 – 2000 (real indices, 1970 = 100) 
 Average 
Wages 
Minimum 
Wages 
Family 
Allowance 
Per Capita Public Social Expenditure 
    Education Health Total 
1970 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1980 89.0 130.0 81.6 88.6 82.3 90.1 
1985 83.2 86.1 54.6 76.0 64.0 90.5 
1989 91.6 91.8 28.4 62.5 69.6 83.7 
1990 93.3 98.0 33.7 58.8 65.3 81.6 
1994 110.7 122.1 43.9 83.9 104.0 107.4 
2000 134.4 170.4 53.7 138.4 138.5 151.0 
Source: Ffrench-Davis, 2002, pg 189 [Instituto Nacional de Estadistica and Jadresic 1990 for wages; Cortazar and Marshall 1980 
for corrected CPI; Cabezas 1988 and Budget Office (since 1986) for social expenditure] 
 
 
It is apparent that there is a consistency here with previous work done by the first Frei 
presidency and Allende in the attempts to equalise educational opportunities and 
access to health. This work was carried on during Lagos‘ tenure, and more explicitly 
during the Bachelet administration, giving greater emphasis to a social strategy that 
wasn‘t concentrated solely on monetary transfers and sustained growth of education 
and health spending.  
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―President Bachelet‘s campaign promised to make real 
headway in diminishing economic and social inequalities by 
focusing on poverty reduction, pension and health-care 
reform, expanded day care, and women‘s rights.‖ 
(Oppenheim 2007, 249) 
 
Bachelet, as Lagos had done before her, viewed inequality as a disabling social 
complexity rather than simply an economic disparity, and constructed social policies 
accordingly. While Aylwin and Frei, restricted by the remnants of Pinochet‘s rule and 
initial general unease toward a left-leaning government, had worked at limiting 
external vulnerability by strengthening public finances and reducing public debt, their 
successors were able to be more progressive. Lagos revolutionised the health care 
system in Chile through the AUGE reform in 2005 and set out to coordinate various 
existing pro-poor programmes by establishing Chile Solidario in 2002. Bachelet 
worked tirelessly to extend social rights, particularly for women, and to overhaul the 
grossly unfair pension system in 2007. As will be discussed later in this chapter, 
Bachelet also placed a great deal of importance on early childhood education. Her 
belief that ‗inequalities begin at the crib‘ drove policies in this area, and established 
education as one of her four governmental priorities.  
 
This is not to infer that the final two Concertación administrations did not invest 
heavily in poverty reduction and monetary transfers to those in need, as both did, but 
their methods in reducing inequality were simply much broader. Table 6.2 tracks the 
public expenditure through the administrations of the Concertación showing 
substantial increases in spend for education, health and housing, with only social 
security expenditure dropping off, but what these figures do not reveal is the extensive 
understanding of inequality that Lagos and Bachelet brought with them. This is 
evident in the introduction of Bachelet‘s „Estoy Contigo. Programa de Gobierno, 
2006 – 2010‘ (‗I am With You, Programme of Government, 2006 – 2010‘): 
 
―Chile continues to be an unacceptably unequal country.  In 
truth, the inequality is made up of many inequalities: between 
men and women, among different ethnic groups, between rich 
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and poor, between small and large businesses, among those 
who have had access to a quality education and those who 
have not had it, among the regions that advance and the 
stragglers that remain.  A raison d‘être of the Concertación 
governments has been to diminish that inequality.  We have 
sought to correct the model of growth, to humanise it and to 
reduce the uncertainty involved with it, trying to create a 
better equilibrium between economic expansion and social 
equity.‖ 
 
Both Lagos and Bachelet, as has already been inferred, saw it as a governmental 
responsibility to dismantle the processes that perpetuated inequality, and to make the 
relationship between a fair society and greater growth potential more explicit.  
 
 
Table 6.2: Social public expenditure in Chile, 1990 – 2008, as percentage of GDP 
 1990 1994 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Education 2.26 2.52 3.84 4.12 3.73 3.16 4.09 
Health 1.76 2.38 2.83 2.99 2.82 2.77 3.35 
Social Security 7.61 7.32 7.90 7.73 6.65 5.82 6.36 
Housing 0.26 0.24 0.36 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.41 
Source: CEPAL Statistics, http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas&idioma=i (last accessed 13 
October 2012) 
 
 
As the theoretical concept that unifies the approaches of the Concertación, the 
following sections discuss the concept of neostructuralism, before examining in 
greater detail the Concertación‘s governance under the presidency of Patricio Aylwin 
(1990 – 1994) and tracking the policies of his three successors: Eduardo Frei (1994 – 
2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000 – 2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010).  
 
 
6.2 Neostructuralism – an introduction 
Having introduced the broad sweep of the Concertación‘s policies, it is useful to now 
discuss its theoretical roots. Leiva (2008, 1) dates the launch of Latin American 
neostructuralism to ECLAC‘s publication of Changing Production Patterns with 
Social Equity in 1990. He claims it has ―gradually replaced neoliberal market 
fundamentalism as the prevailing economic development in the region.‖ 
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Neostructuralism differs from neoliberalism in its hesitance to embrace 
interconnectedness unconditionally, and yet is aware of the growing complexity of 
governance systems and trade networks and of the transformation of power happening 
at a great speed. It is a holistic approach that recognises the need to vigilantly 
coordinate political, institutional and cultural dimensions, explicitly relating economic 
growth to social equality without a reliance on market forces. Leiva‘s (ibid, 3) 
thorough definition is useful here: 
 
―Simultaneously an alternative vision to neoliberal 
dogmatism, a comprehensive development strategy, an 
integrated policy framework, and a grand narrative about the 
path toward modernity that the twenty-first century allegedly 
offers to Latin American Caribbean societies. To reduce it to 
just one of these dimensions is to misrepresent and 
underestimate it.‖ 
 
It introduces the circumspection of ECLA‘s structuralism and the revulsion that 
dependency showed for intentional exploitation. As Gwynne and Kay (2004, 27) 
comment, it is an approach for a new environment: 
 
―Neostructuralism should not be interpreted as caving in to 
Neoliberalism nor as an indication that structuralism was 
wrong but rather as an attempt to come to terms with a new 
reality.‖ 
 
Leiva (2008) goes further, exclaiming that the approach is more than just a 
readjustment to new pressures, but a fundamental rupture from its structuralist roots in 
that it proposes a positive relationship between neoliberal growth and equitable 
development. Neostructuralism can be seen as the offspring of the critical diversity of 
both structuralism and neoliberalism. Its relevance is undeniable, evident as it was in 
the centre-right coalition government in Chile, the Concertación (1990 – 2010). To 
gauge its theoretical location, it is effective to look at how neostructuralism functions 
within the core-periphery paradigm.  
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―The less developed economies are seen not as static systems 
subject to universal, invariable, and repetitive rules, but as 
products of an evolutionary process in which the structural 
characteristics of the economy and society are in constant 
flux and in which there is no assurance that adjustments to 
disequilibrium conditions will be automatic or even 
equilibrating.‖ (Dietz 1995, 17)  
 
This quotation is very informative in that it explicitly marries unique economies and 
societies in a state of evolution and flux, moving development away from fixed global 
structures and pure market influence and into an arena of uncontrolled influence. 
Sunkel (1989) proposes that neostructuralism provides an explanation of the 
development process in less-developed countries. More than that though, it 
contributes to a broader sense of human development, not only focusing on economic 
or political processes. It does not accept that free-market forces are unquestionably 
sufficient or that political structures always deliver; it recognises a hierarchical world 
with blatant asymmetries but still promotes selective integration into the world 
economy with the creation of competitive advantages through a well-designed 
industrial policy. Or as Gywnne and Kay (2004, 28) state: 
 
―The achievement of competitive advantages in certain key 
productive areas in the world market by selective 
liberalisation, integration into the world economy and an 
export-orientated industrial and growth policy.‖  
 
This approach was heralded as ‗growth with equity‘, the marriage of the market and 
an equal society and incorporates the correction of failures by the market by allowing 
the state to intervene at appropriate junctures. For example, when dealing with 
‗externalities‘ such as pollution, the state should be involved, as it should be to ensure 
equal distribution. This would comprise improvements in education, healthcare and 
employment opportunities among others. Leiva (2008) comments that such an 
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approach is ‗seductive‘, as it promises a balance of market growth and social 
cohesion. 
 
There remains a question mark over the true objectives, and indeed the realistic 
restrictions placed on any such objectives, of the approach. If a neostructuralist 
government wishes to reorganise social relations and distribution to achieve equity 
then the class structure set up by the neoliberal recent past needs to be shattered. But 
if those structures are destroyed then so too is the capacity to sustain economic 
growth. These are the limitations such a ‗middle-of-the-road‘ strategy faces.  
 
―Rather ‗growth with equity‘ represents a complex political 
strategy that emerged unevenly from the clash between 
popular pressure to mitigate the inequalities and insecurities 
associated with neoliberal restructuring and the constraints 
imposed by the vastly asymmetrical power relations... ‖ 
(Taylor 2006, 116) 
 
This neostructuralist environment provided the backdrop for the two decades of 
Concertación rule and the following sections track the policies that were put in place 
during that time. 
 
 
6.3 Patricio Aylwin (1990 – 1994) 
Once it became clear that Chile was to return to a democracy, the outgoing 
government set about passing laws that would heavily restrict the powers of any 
future administrations. These laws became known as the ‗leyes de amarre‘ (the 
binding laws) and included the manipulation of positions in the Supreme Court and 
the designation of senators, essentially giving the Right a legislative veto and 
providing a set budget to the military.  
 
―So the Aylwin government took office with a constitution 
much of which it rejected, an electoral system which was not 
of its choice, armed forces over which it had relatively little 
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formal control, a judiciary which had been an unquestioning 
loyal ally of the outgoing government, an entrepreneurial 
class confident in its ability to mobilise the political Right if 
that was necessary, and a hostile media.‖ (Angell 2010, 273-
4)  
 
Another concern for the new government was the very real possibility of the military, 
still with the substantial support of the conservative elites, to attempt to reclaim 
unlawful power. Indeed there were reminders of such a threat in the military might 
was shown in día de enlace
17
 (December 1990) and boinazo
18
 (May 1993) when 
Pinochet coordinated shows of military power and resistance. Both events ultimately 
came to nothing, but the Concertación under Aylwin was mindful of the danger and 
assumed an office confined within strict limitations. Nowhere was this more evident, 
according to Duquette (1998), than in the agreement that Aylwin was forced to make 
with the corporate elite concerning social policy reforms. ―It was political in nature: 
democracy would only be restored if social issues remained second on the agenda.‖ 
(313)  
 
However, despite such restrictions, Aylwin‘s administration was able to develop two 
separate streams of social policy. Frenz (2007) labels these streams as ‗universal‘, for 
example education, health and housing, and ‗specific‘, with priority groups 
highlighted, these being: children, youths, seniors, women, especially household 
heads, the disabled and the indigenous. The universal policies were ―centred on 
guaranteeing an adequate level of services and benefits for all the population in an 
equal opportunity perspective.‖ (Frenz 2007, 8) and the specific policies were to 
ensure that such vulnerable groups were not excluded.  Spending increased and, as 
Frenz indicates, new institutions were established to achieve these goals. Table 6.3 
presents these institutions and their purposes, revealing an extensive new structural 
approach to both broader (‗universal‘) themes of inequality and the integration of 
                                               
17 Pinochet called for the return of every army soldier in the country to their barracks, an order seen as 
a precursor to military action and revolt. Pinochet accused Congress of making false accusations 
against him. 
18 Soldiers were posted outside the army's headquarters in central Santiago in response to an 
announcement that the courts were about to reopen a case against Pinochet's son. 
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specific vulnerable groups. Diaz (2010, 2) summarises this approach, suggesting ―the 
Aylwin government decided to continue the market based model established by the 
Pinochet regime, but to add more social protection to curb the effects of a purely 
neoliberal model.‖ Aylwin also prioritised the elimination of poverty, what he called 
‗repaying the social debt‘, and it is this approach that the rest of this section will focus 
on, especially the elements of poverty reduction, social participation and education.  
 
 
Table 6.3: The New Social Institutions, 1990 – 1994 
Year Institution Purpose 
1990 Ministry of Planning and 
Cooperation (MIDEPLAN) 
Executive organ responsible for coordinating social 
policy, whose mission includes the design and 
application of national and regional social development 
policies, coordination of public sector poverty 
eradication programmes and the execution of policies 
and programmes orientated towards priority social 
groups. 
1990 Solidarity and Social 
Investment Fund (FOSIS) 
To finance plans, programmes, projects, and special 
activities relating to social development, that contribute 
in particular to overcoming poverty 
1991 National Institute for Youth 
(INJUV) 
To implement actions for the social inclusion of young 
men and women to better exercise their rights as citizens 
and improve their quality of life 
1991 National Service for 
Women (SERNAM) 
To design and promote public policies destined to 
achieve equality of opportunities for women 
1993 National Corporation for 
the Development of 
Indigenous Peoples 
(CONADI) 
To promote, coordinate and execute State action for the 
integral development of indigenous people and 
communities, especially economic, social and cultural 
rights and to enable their participation in national life 
1994 National Fund for the 
Disabled (FONADIS) 
To contribute to the social integration and equal 
opportunities of disabled people 
Source: Frenz 2007, 8 
 
 
6.3.a Repaying the social debt: reducing poverty 
In such an environment Aylwin had a tightrope to walk, made even more precarious 
by the fact that the Concertación was a relatively new coalition learning to work 
together. As previously discussed, the core idea was to pay off the social debt incurred 
at the hands of the military regime by encouraging growth with equity and 
diminishing poverty. Restricted to nothing more than a gradualist change of the legal 
and political structures, the administration quickly went about achieving what they 
could in a market-friendly fashion. They re-established a minimum salary and raised 
the minimum wage (increased by 17% in real terms between 1989 and 1991) and 
pushed through the 1990 tax reform, made up of a 4% increase in the tax on 
enterprises and a 2% increase in the national value-added tax. This reform was 
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designed to finance increased social expenditure. As Solimano and Pollack (2006) 
state, 
 
―The Aylwin government raised taxes to fund social 
programmes to reverse the social deterioration of the previous 
years in terms of minimum wages, reduced monetary 
subsidies to the poor and the chronic underfunding of the 
public health and education systems. Additionally, fiscal 
resources were needed to start revamping public 
infrastructure such as ports, roads and highways that had 
deteriorated after years of little public investment.‖ (222) 
 
The main priority was to lessen the high levels of poverty that had developed. Hojman 
(1996, 77) claims that there is agreement between most studies that the levels in Chile 
were at their peak, and inequality at its worst, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. 
Relief came towards the end of the decade and at the start of the 1990s. Duquette 
agrees that, ―underlying the agreement on the social pact was the general recognition 
of a serious problem of impoverishment.‖ (1998, 313) He suggests that the coalition 
were committed to engaging with this issue even before the fall of Pinochet, and that 
poverty had already started to decline before the Concertación came to power. This 
was due to a number of reasons, including the stabilising of the labour market and the 
appreciation of the Chilean peso. Duquette goes on to argue that, ―after controlling for 
appreciation, the impact which growth has in alleviating poverty becomes negligible. 
Economic growth in Chile today plays a key role in helping to reduce poverty, but it 
does this more through appreciation of the peso than by any other means.‖ (ibid, 82) 
This includes taking the damage to exports, and subsequently employment rates, into 
consideration. To support this progress in poverty reduction, Aylwin established the 
National Programme of Poverty Eradication in 1994 in 80 municipal districts with the 
greatest poverty ratios. A few glitches surfaced when launching such a widespread 
programme, for example national coordination and the ability to reach those most in 
need. In consideration of these problems, municipalities were asked to coordinate 
efforts to reach the poorest families and avoid any recriminations of discrimination or 
marginalisation. In addition to this programme, the administration sought to alleviate 
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poverty through improving the housing situation. Collins and Lear estimate that 
400,000 families bought homes with government assistance between 1990 and 1994. 
(1995, 264) 
 
6.3.b Repaying the social debt: social participation  
When the Concertación came to power the Chilean economy was showing signs of 
consistent performance, the government was on the verge of running surpluses 
(following deficits in six of the previous ten years) and poverty was decreasing.  
Indeed the real GDP grew 43% in the period 1990 to 1995 as compared to little over 
4% between 1980 and 1985 and 37% between 1985 and 1990. However, despite this 
growth and increased wages, the issue of income distribution persisted.  
 
―The challenge for the new democracy was to address social 
problems, while maintaining good macroeconomic 
performance. The fact that the Concertación was able to 
effectively achieve this balancing act might be called ‗the 
third Chilean economic miracle‘.‖ (Duquette 1998, 316) 
 
Hojman investigates the ongoing disparity by comparing income distribution between 
1989 and 1992. He highlighted a decline in the shares of the lowest and highest 
quintiles, with the middle-income sectors gaining the most. He concludes that, ―these 
results strongly suggest that although there is evidence that the particular combination 
of democratic politics and neoliberal economics known as ‗the Chilean model‘ was 
good for all Chileans, at least during 1989 – 1992, it was not equally good.‖ (1996, 
82-3) Hojman explains this through a combination of the Concertación‘s social 
spending and neoliberal market mechanisms. Such mechanisms reward those with 
capital such as labour skills, whether through education or specialised training, and 
these people will be paid much more than those deemed to be unskilled. Aylwin also 
moved to protect the workers with Labour Code reforms that allowed stronger unions 
(through legal recognition of the national labour union) and less vulnerable workers 
(by ending the sixty-day strike limit). However, as Collins and Lear (1995, 263) point 
out, the influence of the 1979 neoliberal Labour Code remained strong. Unions 
remained weak during Aylwin‘s tenure, despite thousands being formed, and active 
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membership actually dropped. They noted that José Piñera, author of the 1979 Labour 
Code called it ―a building that could not be burned down.‖  
 
To ensure that any ‗unskilled‘ or vulnerable workers would not be excluded, and 
inequality subsequently exacerbated, Aylwin, under the slogan ‗Investing in People‘, 
set up two new institutions of social policy – the National Fund for Regional 
Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional or FNDR) and the Solidarity 
and Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social or FOSIS). 
These pro-growth, cross-class programmes functioned as independent, semi-private 
agencies that accepted project proposals from autonomous groups that intended to 
engage in small-scale production and projects such as rural housing improvement. 
The idea was to continue decentralisation through the empowerment of regional and 
local level government. Local authorities were to stimulate projects through grants 
and open competition, coordinating regional leadership and management. FOSIS had 
a ―mission of working directly with local groups, communities and NGOs. [It] was 
expected to channel financial help to those groups to insure short-term self-
sufficiency, conditional on measurable achievements within tight deadlines.‖ 
(Duquette 1998, 314) FOSIS and FNDR were also elements of a larger successful 
strategy to establish regional governments. The Regional Administration Law of 
Government implemented a political infrastructure of regional councils (consejos 
regionales) in the thirteen regions of Chile. Oppenheim commented that Aylwin‘s 
―success in democratic decentralisation can be classified as one of his government‘s 
major achievements.‖ (2007, 225) 
 
6.3.c Summary 
When the obstacles and restrictions that Aylwin faced are taken into account, the 
range of policies of the first Concertación administration – as can be seen in Table 6.4 
– is impressive. The ‗leyes de amarre‘ and a sabre-rattling military ensured that a pro-
growth, market-friendly path was followed conscientiously, and yet Aylwin was able 
to start repaying the social debt he believed many Chileans were owed.  
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Table 6.4:  Selected policies related to inequality under Aylwin, 1990 - 1994 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Income  A minimum salary was re-established and the minimum wage raised; 
1990 tax reform, made up of a 4% increase in the tax on enterprises and 
a 2% increase in the national value-added tax; designed to finance 
increased social expenditure 
National Programme of 
Poverty Eradication 
Main priority was to lessen the high levels of poverty that had 
developed; National Programme of Poverty Eradication established in 80 
municipal districts with the greatest poverty ratios. Government 
assistance for families buying housing. 
Labour Labour Code reforms that allowed stronger unions (through legal 
recognition of the national labour union) and less vulnerable workers (by 
ending the sixty-day strike limit) 
 Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional, 
FNDR and Fondo de 
Solidaridad e Inversión 
Social, FOSIS. 
These pro-growth, cross-class programmes functioned as independent, 
semi-private agencies that accepted project proposals from autonomous 
groups that intended to engage in small-scale production and projects 
such as rural housing improvement 
Source: Author 
 
 
Between 1990 and 2000 (the administrations of Aylwin and his successor, Eduardo 
Frei, jnr), there was a significant increase in public expenditures in health (247%) and 
education (274%), and substantial strides in poverty reduction were made, while other 
social expenditures grew quickly, including monetary transfers that complimented 
new programmes such as FOSIS. As discussed in the following section, the new 
President, Frei (jnr), was able, despite similar restrictions and expectations, to build 
on the work that Aylwin had done. 
 
 
6.4 Eduardo Frei, jnr (1994 – 2000) 
In his first presidential speech on 21 May 1994, Frei said that Chile had an historic 
opportunity. He didn‘t explicitly declare that opportunity to be the reduction of 
inequality, or even to lessen poverty; rather he implied that both were possible within 
the continued economic growth of the country. There is little difference here, as has 
already been pointed out, to Aylwin‘s approach, and in many ways this could be true 
of much of Frei‘s presidency. The focus remained on a pro-growth strategy that would 
fund and energise broader societal policies to reduce poverty and inequity. In his 
inaugural speech Frei (1994) outlined the six major tasks his government would 
undertake, and these were (in order): the consolidation of economic development; the 
eradication of extreme poverty; the establishment of a modern system of labour 
relations; the construction of health systems; an effective educational coverage of a 
162 
 
 
rapidly growing society; and finally Chile‘s ongoing international integration. 
Although words and phrases referring to unfairness, inequality and solidarity were 
frequently used in this speech, they remained secondary to the main goals. The 
confirmation of this approach can be seen in the focus of Frei‘s farewell speech six 
years later: 
 
―We have conducted the most prosperous period of the 
Chilean economy in history: 7.2% average real growth per 
year compared to 3.3% per year throughout the twentieth 
century. Thus, we have laid solid foundations for future 
success. We have moved decisively towards a form of equity, 
drastically reducing poverty levels, making the greatest 
improvements and investments of recent decades in health 
and housing, and laying the foundations of the deepest 
reforms of the century in the fields of education, justice and 
infrastructure.‖ (Frei, 1999) 
 
In the same speech Frei spoke of having presided over Chile showing the greatest 
growth rate of national output and the highest per capita purchasing power in Latin 
America, with per capita income more than doubling in nine years. However one of 
the most important achievements was to reduce inflation to a yearly average of 6.4%, 
down from almost 28% in 1990. This ‗vocation‘, as he calls it, ―is one of the fairest 
ways to improve the purchasing powers of families.‖ (1999) Such strong growth and 
monetary policy was certainly behind the ongoing rate of poverty reduction during 
Frei‘s term, dropping to 5.7% in 1996 from 12.9% in 1990 (Table 6.1). Weyland 
(1997, 61) suggests that Frei turned to Aylwin‘s FOSIS fund and chose to build his 
strategy around that, and on top of this he increased the minimum income to almost 
twice the rate of inflation and in 1994 established the ‗National Plan of Poverty 
Eradication‘. This ―integral, decentralised approach‖, as Foxley (2005, 13) called it, 
was to mobilise social support and selected eighty municipal districts, targeting 
extremely poor families. ―The effort was a step in the right direction and it did 
produce some progress in some of the poor areas of the country‖ (ibid) but it 
remained troubled by the lack of resources and coordination.  
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With poverty reduction strategies working well, and the economy growing, Frei was 
able to expand his ―social investments, such as improvements in education, job 
training programmes, and credit support for small enterprises in the informal sector.‖ 
(Weyland, 1997, 61) Early in his government, Frei had spoken of his desire to avoid 
the existence of two Chiles: a modern, wealthy one and a backward, poor one, and so 
his broader approach to lifting people out of poverty explicitly included female heads 
of households, the elderly, and those suffering from disabilities. However his main 
focus was on youth, and with that came a significant commitment to education. This 
politically visual commitment, according to the Minister of Finance at the time, 
Eduardo Aninat, was strongly backed by the government: 
 
―After months of discussion inside the cabinet and with 
experts from the Concertación, the ministries of finance and 
education suggested that President Frei make education 
reforms a priority, and focus on them early in his term. The 
reason was not only that these reforms had important equity 
and efficiency effects but also that they, if well-advertised 
and managed, could provide a rallying point for social and 
political support.‖ (Aninat 2005, 306)  
 
The administration decided to use VAT to finance the strategy. Having grown to 18% 
under Aylwin, the plan had been to reduce it but, following a recommendation from 
the Treasury, it was decided to maintain the level and invest in education.  
 
6.4.a Improved quality of life 
In his final presidential speech, given in 1999, he suggests that it is suspicious if a 
government is over-occupied with macroeconomics. ―Our understanding of Chile and 
its development has taken us on a different path,‖ he says, claiming that they made, 
 
―a huge social investment effort in health, housing, pensions 
and education reforms, historical justice and education, 
respect for the dignity of workers through the safeguarding of 
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their rights, employment opportunities, real increases in 
wages and the minimum wage…‖ (Frei 1999) 
 
Two areas that Frei concentrated on were improving neighbourhoods and the 
continuing issue of access to quality healthcare. These topics certainly contribute to 
growing inequality, and as such can be understood as further examples of a more 
embedded approach to the problem.  
 
The rapidly growing population was creating pressure on urban areas, and resulting in 
overcrowding and generally poor conditions of living for many. It was acknowledged 
early that investment had to be made for the open spaces of these areas, creating green 
areas and proper roads and pavements ―that are mud in the winter and dust in the 
summer.‖ (Frei, 1994) An enhanced social infrastructure was set forward as a goal, 
looking to improve public transport and urban routes, and to build more, better quality 
housing. By the end of the administration, 780,000 additional homes had been built, 
the Chile Commune programme had begun to deliver properties to the municipalities 
for community centres among other uses, and Chile Barrio (Chile Neighbourhood) 
had been implemented. Frenz describes Chile Barrio as, 
 
―the first social programme to adopt an integrated approach 
to resolve a highly visible problem: extreme poverty in 
precarious settlements, tackling not only the evident housing 
problem but also working for social inclusion and insertion in 
the labour market.‖ (2007, iii) 
 
Frenz recognises the programme as a policy innovation aimed at unravelling the 
multidimensional complexities of inequality. Poverty, lack of opportunity, 
marginalisation were all issues that lowered the quality of life for the majority of 
Chileans. Frei‘s final presidential speech in 1999 outlined this broad approach by 
highlighting further achievements. One goal established at the start of the 
administration was to have three out of every four rural houses served by electricity, 
and by 1999 72% were. It was a similar situation for rural houses with access to clean 
drinking water.  
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Chile Barrio was committed to establishing opportunities for everyone to participate 
in the job market. Public investment was increased to stimulate local municipalities to 
create local jobs, while the government issued reassurances that it would put a 
protection system for workers in place. Weyland et al (2010, 62) noted that unions 
and union representatives actively engaged in the new Forum of Productive 
Development (Foro del Desarrollo Productivo), which created agreements on 
projects such as job training programmes. The government also listened to their 
proposals to ―extend collective negotiation effectively to the small-enterprise sector 
and also to agriculture and construction.‖ Improvements extended to the participation 
of women in the labour force with a package of measures that gave authority to the 
Plan for Equal Opportunities for Women, prepared by the SERNAM, the National 
Service for Women (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer).  
 
Of course it would have been impossible to claim an improvement in life quality and 
fairer access to this without new policies in health care. Again the focus was on the 
most vulnerable in society by concentrating resources in particular regions and 
ensuring that there was no geographical advantage throughout the country for access 
to quality care by building new and modernising existing hospitals, guaranteeing 
health cover and increasing surgeries for more diseases, as well as modification to the 
grossly unfair system of FONASA and ISAPRES. Pinochet‘s last budget for health 
had been 470 billion pesos, Frei says in 1999, while his final budget of that year stood 
at a 120% increase.  
 
Table 6.5:  Selected policies related to inequality under Frei jnr., 1994 - 2000 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Chile Commune and 
Chile Barrio 
Chile Commune programme delivered properties to the municipalities 
for community centres; Chile Barrio was the first social programme to 
adopt an integrated approach to resolve extreme poverty, working for 
social inclusion and insertion in the labour market 
Rural homes One goal established at the start of the administration was to have three 
out of every four rural houses connected to electric; similar goal for rural 
houses with access to clean drinking water 
Servicio Nacional de la 
Mujer 
Improvements extended to the participation of women in the labour force 
with a package of measures that gave authority to the Plan for Equal 
Opportunities for Women 
Healthcare Focus was on the most vulnerable in society by concentrating resources 
in particular regions; new and modernised existing hospitals; guaranteed 
health cover and increased access to surgery for more diseases; 
modification to FONASA and ISAPRES 
Source: Author  
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6.4.b Summary 
Frei‘s commentary on his own administration separates out some of the short-term 
and long-term goals: ―Several seeds planted with dedication and effort, especially in 
justice and education, during these years, will bear abundant fruits.‖ (Frei, 1999) 
Following on from Aylwin, this government continued to deliver pro-growth policies 
that allowed investment in areas such as education, healthcare and employment. For 
example, in a time of economic uncertainty due to the 1997 Asian crisis, Frei 
continued to grow social expenditure, especially in education, where he saw the future 
of equal opportunity in Chile. However Frei‘s strategy broadened further the approach 
to ‗repaying the social debt‘ by making policies at a neighbourhood scale more 
explicit, such as in Chile Barrio, which included creating local employment and 
improving local (rural and urban) infrastructure. Murray and Kousary (2009, 138) 
reflect however that, despite progress in poverty reduction, inequality increased in 
1995: ―For example, while the average Chilean family augmented its per capita 
income by 5 per cent between 1994 and 1995, the poorest 10 per cent saw its income 
fall by 4.3 per cent.‖ Despite progress in many areas, Frei‘s rhetoric and image 
remained one of a technocratic leader, highlighted in the highly structured nature of 
MIDEPLAN and his work on education, and his successor Lagos was quick to appear 
less elitist. 
 
Despite both Aylwin and Frei committing themselves to poverty reduction through 
pro-growth strategies, there were still ―concomitant failures to address the crises of 
socioeconomic and cultural polarisation, and growing alienation and disaffection 
among the young and poor in particular.‖ (Barton and Murray, 2002, 334) Barton and 
Murray (ibid, 335) continue: 
 
―Overall, the 1990s was a decade of polarised experiences 
and sharpened social differentiation within the Chilean 
population. Against a benchmark of the Christian Democrat 
administration of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964 – 70), socio-
economic conditions for most Chileans have improved very 
little. Political extremism led to declining fortunes for most, 
and democracy so far has achieved little in terms of 
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improving the situation for the majority of Chileans. Great 
expectations weigh on the shoulders of Ricardo Lagos and 
the Concertación.‖  
 
The following section considers the policies that Lagos implemented in the 
Concertación‘s third administration. 
 
 
6.5 Ricardo Lagos (2000 – 2006) 
In their article, ‗The End of Transition? Chile 1990 – 2000‘, Barton and Murray (ibid) 
argue that the 1990s in Chile was not a productive decade for social progress. 
Oppenheim (2007) agrees that Lagos‘ administration started in unsettled times. There 
had been a marked decline in support for the Concertación during the election due to 
frustration around slow progress, persistent inequalities, and an elitist style of 
governance. This resulted in Lagos changing his campaign slogan from ‗Crecer con 
Equidad‘ (‗Grow with Equity‘) to ‗Chile mucho mejor‘ (‗A much better Chile‘), 
presumably to refocus how the administration‘s strengths were perceived. As 
Oppenheim noted, 
 
―Concertación governments directed their energy toward 
making the government work and resolving specific public 
policy issues. Consequently, the focus of attention had shifted 
to the institutions of the state and away from grassroots 
initiatives.‖ (245) 
 
So despite strong economic growth and heralded progress on poverty reduction, 
Lagos led the Concertación into a third term needing to make quick and visible 
progress in social policy. He was also under pressure from the extreme Left and the 
Church to establish a social agenda that would counteract the ongoing structural 
deficiencies of the free market approach. The goals he set for the first hundred days in 
office included a new social policy for families living in extreme poverty and 
MIDEPLAN‘s Social Division was charged with accountability for the strategy. Frenz 
(2007, 25) outlines its evolution, starting with ideas that tended towards being 
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―integral and multi-sectoral, articulating existing government benefits and services in 
a social network, focused on the family as the centre of innovation.‖  
 
6.5.a Programa Puente (The Bridge Progamme) and Chile Solidario 
Programa Puente was started as a pilot programme in January 2002 to connect 14,000 
families suffering from extreme poverty to their rights. It was a methodological shift 
for the Concertación, implementing a new rights-based approach to social 
intervention, based on the poorest families being excluded from social networks and 
established social programmes. The underlying acceptance was that these families 
were unable to achieve the necessary conditions to raise their quality of life and attain 
equal opportunities, and hence the purpose of the programme was to personalise an 
approach to provide appropriate support and benefits for various unique situations. 
This included, for example, socio-psychological support to assist with the complex 
and multidimensional nature of inequality.  
 
At the same time, DIPRES (Dirección de Presupuesto), the Budget Management 
Office, had been in discussions with a World Bank team concerning the concept of a 
social protection system that would make social spending more efficient within a 
coherent overall approach. These ideas, together with the promise of the Programa 
Puente pilot programme, combined to support the larger programme of Chile 
Solidario. This programme, according to Kousary, ―was developed as a first step in 
the establishment of a universal system of social protection for the poorest 5% of 
households.‖ (2008, 139) The objective of Chile Solidario has been described as: 
 
―to establish a progressive social protection system based on 
rights, focused on families and people in extreme poverty in 
order to promote their inclusion in social networks and access 
to better living conditions, as a strategy to overcome 
indigence.‖ (Frenz 2007, 5) 
 
Whereas before, as can be seen in the two previous governments, any approach to 
inequality was largely focused on poverty reduction with monetary transfers to social 
policies across a range of areas, such as health care, education or housing, Chile 
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Solidario was to create a coherent governmental strategy. It was decentralised, 
inclusive and integrated and was to connect families to a network of support and 
benefits. The goals set up within the programme included a ‗graduation‘ after five 
years, should the family have met its obligations as observed by local officials, 
although there was an option for voluntary withdrawal. In 2006 almost 270,000 
families had participated in the programme, with 60% of families completing the 
fifty-three conditions necessary for ‗graduation‘. Additionally, 76% completed 
conditions to improve their housing situation. 
 
6.5.b Chile Emprende  
Working alongside Chile Solidario, Lagos moved to establish another programme 
called Chile Emprende in the 2005 budget. It was an attempt to seek equality in 
economic opportunities, to open markets to the poor by improving income levels and 
employment options and conditions through integration.  With such an emphasis 
having been placed on Chile Solidario‘s goals of ‗graduating‘ and integration, it was 
vital that the community would be in a position to absorb new workers and 
businesses. The programme was orientated towards micro and small businesses and 
was to promote the development of these businesses within a common strategy. 
Regional cooperation bodies were installed to coordinate public benefits and services, 
and support the public-private agreement to encourage new employment and 
commercial opportunities for those coming out of poverty. Overall, as defined by 
Frenz, ―it encompasses three key social aspirations: more opportunities, more 
employment, and more participation.‖ (2007, 40) Frenz calculates that by 2007 Chile 
Emprende had established public-private development councils that covered all the 
regions of the country. Most of the territories were rural and covered almost half the 
country and around one-third of the population. 
 
6.5.c Plan of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees (AUGE) 
In his final presidential speech, 21 May 2005, Lagos emphasised his government‘s 
achievements in health, saying, 
 
―To work towards a greater equality between all Chileans 
also means to produce better conditions in the scope of 
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healthcare... The opportunities of access to quality care were, 
in 1990, very unequally distributed. There was a system of 
quality for those who could pay, and one public system 
without resources for the great majority…We initiated a 
health reform of immense proportions. A reform centred in 
the people and in their health needs. A reform that guarantees 
universal and equal access.‖ 
 
To Lagos there could be no reduction in inequality, no growth with equality, without 
equal opportunities to a universal quality healthcare. The run-down and under-
resourced public health system that the Concertación had inherited from Pinochet was 
segmented and, having openly declared from the start of his tenure that guaranteeing 
the right to health for all was a fundamental objective, Lagos constructed reforms that 
set about achieving enduring advances. Despite considerable increases in government 
investment, the structure of the system continued to produce a context that was 
conducive to discrimination and disparity. As Tsai and Ji (2009, 1) observe, ―the 
continued structural segmentation of Chile‘s health care system resulted in low-
income, high-risk and therefore high-cost populations served by the FONASA system, 
while the wealthier, low-risk populations were insured by private sources.‖ 
 
Lagos‘ commitment to reform took the form of a legislative package of various laws 
that was submitted to parliament. This included the Plan of Universal Access with 
Explicit Guarantees (Plan de Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas) or AUGE. 
This was a list of 56 priority health conditions that were guaranteed to be covered 
through a protection fund that both FONASA and ISAPREs were obliged to cover, 
plus a 0.5% increase in VAT. The reforms committed to setting maximum waiting 
times, set prices and also guaranteed access to private facilities if public ones were 
unavailable. Treatment was made free of charge for FONASA members with low 
incomes and for those without insurance. This approach, conceived by Lagos, 
together with a committee made up of the Medical Doctors Professional Association, 
health workers unions, and private health providers, was based on policy intervention 
rather than just investment. Lagos believed that such a strategy would impact a greater 
number of people, from a greater range of socioeconomic areas. This is a very 
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different tactic than those employed by earlier Concertación administrations, attacking 
the structure of the health system more, and focusing the approach on the worst-off 
groups. Tsai and Ji (2009, 1) agree, commenting, 
 
―The committee realised that these challenges would only be 
met by a substantial guarantee of basic services across the 
public and private schemes, reining in the free market with 
effective state regulation to provide equitable health care.‖  
 
Unsurprisingly, such a significant change created opposition. Huber and Stephens 
(2010, 195) remarks that Lagos quickly came up against policy legacies and hostile 
power distributions. ―The private sector in health care had been given a key role under 
Pinochet and strenuously opposed the distributive elements of the reform, as did the 
political right.‖ Parliament formed a context of further opposition and the right 
continued to strongly resist any infringements on the private sector. It took two years 
of discussions before AUGE became operational in July 2005, although only with 25 
conditions that were covered. The compromise was that this was to increase to the 
original total within two years, and this target was achieved in July 2007. 
 
The introduction of AUGE is a clear example of neostructural policy at work, as it 
maintained a public-private relationship (with FONASA and ISAPREs) but at the 
same time established a rights-based context and an explicit social guarantee. This 
defined what Tsai and Ji (2009) referred to as the principles of access, quality, 
opportunity and financial treatment.  
 
6.5.d Summary 
Lagos came to the end of his administration with extremely high popularity levels. He 
had created coherent policies and accessible programmes (see Table 6.6) that were 
more concerned with intervention than solely investment. Chile Solidario 
individualised disadvantage and focused on the family as a way to integrate people 
into society and into networks of benefits, while AUGE went beyond financial 
commitment to creating a rights-based social guarantee. Indeed, his successes came 
despite a decrease in social public investment health (-0.06% of GDP) and education 
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(-0.68% of GDP) between 2000 and 2006, as can be seen in Table 6.2. Critics could 
point to the fact that there was no significant improvement in the Gini coefficient 
during Lagos‘ government and that the country‘s poorest quintile did not improve 
their share of wealth, but it could be argued that this is unsurprising due to an 
expected lag-time effect. Regardless, there appears to have been a very strong sense 
of progress under Lagos; an understanding that perhaps the rules had been changed 
once again, and this time in favour of the disadvantaged, and it was on such progress 
that his successor, Michelle Bachelet, could seek to establish a more united Chile. 
 
 
Table 6.6:  Selected policies related to inequality under Lagos, 2000 - 2006 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Programa Puente Pilot programme to connect 14,000 families suffering from extreme 
poverty to their rights; a new rights-based approach to social 
intervention, based on the poorest families being excluded from social 
networks and established social programmes 
Chile Solidario The establishment of a universal system of social protection for the 
poorest 5% of households; promote inclusion in social networks and 
access to better living conditions; decentralised, inclusive and integrated 
and was to connect families to a network of support and benefits.  
Chile Emprende An attempt to seek equality in economic opportunities, to open markets 
to the poor by improving income levels and employment options and 
conditions through integration; orientated towards micro and small 
businesses and was to promote the development of these businesses 
within a common strategy; most of the territories were rural 
Plan de Acceso Universal 
con Garantias Explícitas 
A list of 56 priority health conditions that were guaranteed to be covered 
through a protection fund that both FONASA and ISAPREs were 
obliged to cover; treatment was made free of charge for FONASA 
members with low incomes and for those without insurance 
Source: Author 
 
 
6.6 Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010) 
The Chile that Michelle Bachelet inherited was considerably more settled and 
prosperous than the environments her predecessors had encountered. Her own story as 
Chile‘s first female president – her father‘s torture at the hands of the Pinochet 
regime, her divorce and her agnosticism – also contributed to making her election 
unique. Furthermore, Bachelet‘s coming to power can also be considered distinctive 
because of its explicit focus on reducing inequality. In setting out her governmental 
programme, ‗I am with you‘ („Estoy Contigo‟), she reveals her understanding of what 
inequality is and, by doing so, constructs her government‘s strategy.  
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―My unique governmental promise is to help with all my 
strength and ability to create a society in which no one can 
say, ‗I can‘t‘, or even, ‗I wasn‘t allowed.‘‖ (2005) 
 
Her perspective of capability demonstrated a leader who had a fresh approach, not one 
of isolated solutions through social policies but one that built on the work of the 
previous Concertación administrations, particularly that of Lagos. Lagos had begun to 
build a coherent strategy to reduce inequality through programmes such as Chile 
Solidario, and Bachelet was intent on developing these ideas further. She wanted to 
create a social contract that removed all barriers of discrimination and prejudice, one 
that integrated the contribution of the whole population and put an end to 
marginalisation. It was, as she said in her first presidential speech, both an ethical 
imperative and an opportunity: 
 
―A united Chile admits many inequalities and exclusions of 
which we need to take charge of – discrimination against the 
disabled, the elderly, immigrants, sexual minorities, the 
poorest. Often, as a product of our prejudices, the country 
wastes the talents of so many people.‖ (Bachelet 2006) 
 
It was an opportunity to invest in these talents, an opportunity not only for the country 
to grow its competitiveness, but also, just as pragmatically, to establish social 
cohesion by avoiding polarisation, mistrust and confrontation. Throughout the four 
years of the presidency, Bachelet constantly referred to reducing inequality and 
poverty (the stated goal for 2010 was zero poverty), and to providing security and a 
better quality of life. These goals were to be achieved a new dedication to social 
participation via a citizen‘s government („gobierno ciudadano‟). This signalled a 
move to formalise processes of citizen participation in legislation, and emphasised 
Bachelet‘s belief in the importance of involvement from individuals. 
 
However Patricio Navia (2008) wasn‘t convinced. He argued that this concept was 
both unpopular within Bachelet‘s own administration and confusing to the country. 
He noted that, despite the strong rhetoric during the election, Bachelet‘s measures in 
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her first one hundred days did not include any references to participatory democracy 
or citizen‘s democracy: 
 
―Bachelet did not have a fully developed plan to introduce 
bottom-up democratic mechanisms. Although during the 
campaign she did express a preference for mechanisms like 
referenda and plebiscites, her government did not follow 
through on such ideas.‖ (126) 
 
Any plans she may have had to establish a citizens‘ government later into her tenure 
were dealt a blow by the student protests between April and June 2006
19
. The protests 
seemed make the public uneasy public about the idea of popular participation and the 
government‘s opponents found it easy to create associations between popular 
participation and general lawlessness as a result of such street protests. 
 
Despite this, Bachelet was able to set about coordinating what has been called her 
‗social safety net initiative‘, which was to establish basic guarantees and rights to all. 
The success of this concept was vital to the Concertación for, as Navia explains, ―A 
social market economy needed an adequate safety net to give meaning to the claim 
that Chile‘s neo-liberalism had a human face under the Concertación.‖ (2008, 121) 
The safety net was cast wide across the country and included gender equality (a goal 
that Bachelet herself normalised through her presidency), the institutionalisation of 
universal health care, and what Bachelet termed the ‗four transformations‘ of pension 
reforms, educational advancements, innovation and entrepreneurship, and of a higher 
quality of life in safer neighbourhoods. It was through these four transformations that 
inequality levels and processes were to be impacted the most; processes that would be 
allowed a greater impact were Bachelet to alter the binomial election system 
entrenched since Pinochet‘s time. As Siavelis (2008, 203) says,  
 
                                               
19 The student protests, also known as The March of the Penguins because of the style of the students' 
uniforms, were a series of protests carried out by high school students across Chile that peaked on May 
30 with 790,000 students participating. Amongst the students' demands were: free bus passes; the 
waiving of the university admissions test fee, and the abolition of the Organic Constitutional Law on 
Teaching (LOCE). 
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―The election system is not simply a curious institutional 
artefact of the regime; it has profound consequences for the 
quality of democracy and maintenance of the tacit social pact 
in Chile.‖  
 
As her predecessors had set out to accomplish, Bachelet sought to dismantle a system 
that allowed the right for a party to win 50% of the seats when it only polled a little 
over one-third of the votes. The binomial electoral systems assigns two seats per 
district, thus ensuring strategic coalition building, and provides a lock on power for 
the two major coalitions in the country, creating disincentives for voters and 
restrictions on the ruling party in pushing through legislation. By the time Bachelet 
left office, she had been unable to achieve her goals of change. 
 
6.6.a The Four Transformations  
One of the first issues that Bachelet pledged to tackle was the grossly unfair pension 
system that remained from the Pinochet era. Established in 1981, the Pension Fund 
Administration (AFP; Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones) system was a 
contribution system that required workers to contribute 10% of their income to an 
individual account managed by one of a series of private pension administrators. 
However as Huber and Stephens (2010, 184) points out this system failed to meet any 
of its promises and objectives. High unemployment, low wages, and the informal 
market meant that many, particularly those who were disadvantaged, were unable to 
contribute sufficiently to the fund and hence were either dependent on a subsidised 
minimum pension or on social assistance pensions. Not only did this leave many of 
Chile‘s elderly vulnerable, but it also meant that the state was paying out for pensions 
without contributions from the middle and high earners. The Pinochet system was 
also voluntary, with only 10% of self-employed enrolled, and this meant that Chile 
was ―foregoing a major source of financial support for the pension system.‖ (ibid, 
185) Bachelet moved quickly to reform this system with an emphasis on non-
contributory and subsidised minimum pensions.  While she established an advisory 
group to tackle the reforms, a 10% increase was introduced for those on the minimum 
pensions.  
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The second of Bachelet‘s ‗Four Transformations‘ was focused on education and will 
be discussed in the following chapter. The government‘s focus on innovation and 
entrepreneurship, the third transformation, hinged largely on a commitment of 1% of 
GDP to be invested into research and development. This was Bachelet‘s strategy to 
promote and sustain national growth, maintaining a neo-liberal approach to the 
global market. The inequality goal was to integrate small and medium businesses 
into a coordinated regional development programme by supporting their growth 
through lower borrowing costs and a simplified tax system. This was to allow fairer 
competition and subsequently allow individuals to fulfil their potential in a growing 
economy through an equality of opportunity.  
 
Finally, there was to be a fourth transformation focused upon the quality of life 
within communities. In her programme of government (2005), Bachelet wrote: 
 
―Economic progress and political progress do not mean a lot 
if they do not improve the conditions in which people live. 
The success of development is measured by the capacity of 
people to feel safe in their neighbourhood, to live with 
dignity in their house, to be carried by transport promptly to 
work…‖ 
 
This extensive, and complex, goal committed the government to building more 
quality housing, establishing more green, open and safe areas, and supplying a 
greater number of well-trained police. Twelve measures against delinquency were 
introduced, including policies to investigate the causes of persistent anti-social 
behaviour, and reintegration programmes. Indeed Bachelet (2005) went on to say that 
she was not only building houses, but building neighbourhoods, promising that by 
2014 there wouldn‘t be a single Chilean family without somewhere to live.  
 
The Transantiago transport system
20
 was designed to fulfil many of the 
infrastructural goals set out by Bachelet. However, additionally there were to be 
substantial improvements made to improve the existing public transport system, 
                                               
20 Transantiago is Santiago’s public transport system, which was introduced on 10 February 2007. The 
system combines local bus lines, main bus lines and the metro network.  
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including the rural network. The government was determined to promote the idea 
that there weren‘t any second-class citizens in Chile.  Unfortunately, the launch of 
Transantiago in 2007 was reported in the right-wing media as chaotic and 
uncoordinated. Bachelet‘s handling of the situation was heavily criticised, and those 
were most disadvantaged were those from the lower socio-economic areas situated 
far from the city. (Nickl, 2009) 
 
6.6.b Employment 
The economic crisis of 1999 and 2000 saw a dramatic increase to a 9.8% 
unemployment rate, which had fallen at a very slow rate to 8% by 2008. Siavelis adds 
that in 2006 the proportion of informal workers in Chile made up just under one third 
of the labour force, while there was a low participation rate of between 53-55%, 
largely a consequence of low female participation. (2009, 4) The levels of union 
representation were also dwindling; in 2006, only 45% of the total labour force had 
open-ended contracts, while 18.9% had no contract at all, and the method of sub-
contracting was common, leaving many workers even more vulnerable. 
 
―They are the workers with the lowest wages; they do not pay 
social security contributions; they generally receive no 
vocational training whatsoever; they have the shortest tenures 
and rotate frequently between low quality jobs; they cannot 
unionise; they can obviously be hired and fired at will; and 
they are not entitled to severance pay or unemployment 
insurance.‖ (Ibid, 7) 
 
These were serious issues that significantly contributed to the persistence of 
inequality, and Bachelet would have been eager to be seen as quickly addressing 
them. 
 
She promised ‗more and better jobs‘ and, just as importantly, dignified, decent work. 
Siavelis (2009), however, notes that her rhetoric did not lead to any new policies in 
the early days of her government, and argues that her approach was simply an 
extension of previous policy. This included extended unemployment insurance 
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coverage, more flexible and part-time work to encourage the participation of women 
and youth, and a push to increase the numbers of unions.  
 
Potentially however, this ‗business as usual‘ attitude only added to the frustration that 
led to the occurrence of a national union demonstration in August 2007. The 
demonstration was initiated by both the government‘s refusal to increase the 
minimum wage from 144,000 pesos per month, and by Archbishop Goic‘s demands 
for the establishment of an ethical salary of at least 250,000 pesos per month. In 
response to these demands, Bachelet set up an advisory commission, asked to 
examine employment and inequality. This was called the Commission for 
Employment and Equality (Comisión de Trabajo y Equidad). Some of the proposals 
that emerged from the council were published in the 2008 report, ‗Towards a Fair 
Chile: Job, Wages, Competitiveness and Social Equity‖ (Consejo Asesor Presidencial 
de Trabajo y Equidad 2008), and these included: an income subsidy and a transfer 
focused on low-income households with children, a training programme for those 
with less access to education to reduce opportunity gaps among workers, and the 
subsidising of hiring young people from the poorest households. However despite 
these recommendations, the slow decrease of unemployment rates, and the continued 
growth of wages, Siavelis (2009, 9) believes that the positive progress is, 
 
“wiped out in the public consciousness by the high levels of 
inequality which cause the widespread perception that no 
matter how hard the poor or even the not-so-poor work, most 
of the country‘s wealth accrues to the rich.‖  
 
 
6.6.c Summary 
Bachelet‘s historically-high 79% approval rating when she left office is evidence 
enough of the great strides she made in constructing a social safety net and reducing 
inequality. Bachelet made the discussion of disadvantage a public issue, evident in her 
policies, which can be seen in Table 6.7. She built on Lagos‘ coherent policy 
approach to seek nationwide momentum for security and participation and her 
vigilance throughout the 2008 global economic meltdown earned her great respect. 
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Her vision of a safety net was comprehensive and included gender equality, universal 
health care, pension reforms, educational advancements, entrepreneurship, and safer 
neighbourhoods. The Commission for Employment and Equality (Comisión de 
Trabajo y Equidad) illustrated Bachelet‘s initiative and dedication to ensuring that the 
government‘s methods were inclusive and far-reaching. It considered training 
programmes and ways of involving young people in the workforce. Her 
achievements, however, may never be fully appreciated as Sebastián Piñera was voted 
into power in 2010, ending the Concertación‘s two decades of tenure.  
 
 
Table 6.7:  Selected policies related to inequality under Bachelet, 1996 - 2010 
Policy context Objectives and features 
Pension Emphasis on non-contributory and subsidised minimum pensions; an 
advisory group to tackle the reforms; a 10% increase for those on 
minimum pensions. 
Living environment More quality housing, establishing more green, open and safe areas, and 
supplying a greater number of well-trained police; twelve measures 
against delinquency were introduced, including policies to investigate 
the causes of persistent anti-social behaviour, and reintegration 
programmes.   
Comisión de Trabajo y 
Equidad 
A new Commission for Employment and Equality proposed: an income 
subsidy and a transfer focused on low-income households with children; 
a training programme for those with less access to education to reduce 
opportunity gaps among workers; and the subsidising of hiring young 
people from the poorest households. 
Source: Author 
 
 
6.7 Inequality trends, 1990 – 2010 
Having established the end of the dictatorship in 1989 as a baseline, it is now possible 
to reflect on the impacts of the Concertación‘s policies up to 2010. This section will 
discuss trends in areas such as: income distribution and poverty rates, employment 
participation, health indicators and housing. 
 
6.7.a Income distribution and poverty rates 
Following the volatile period that preceded 1990, the Concertación oversaw a 
relatively stable period of income distribution, as can be seen in Figure 6.1. This is of 
particular interest to Cuesta (2009, 11) who remarks that, ―Chile‘s experience of high 
economic growth and high-income inequality during the 1990s contrasts with the 
other countries in Latin America (low growth, high inequality), East Asia (high 
growth, low inequality), and Eastern Europe (low growth, low inequality).‖ Figure 6.1 
shows that the twenty-year period of the Concertación‘s governance oversaw the 
180 
 
 
highest levels of income inequality in the timeframe of this thesis. Even at its lowest 
point in 2006, the Gini coefficient was higher than at any other point. Such statistics 
indicate that, despite the range of overtly pro-equality measures implemented by a 
series of centre-left governments, little or no progress was made in reducing the 
severe disparity of income distribution.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Gini Coefficient of Inequality in Chile, 1992 – 2009 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from CASEN 2009, Distribución del ingreso, 13 
 
 
This consistency of Figure 6.1 is mirrored in Table 6.8, which demonstrates a similar 
tendency in income distribution between 1990 and 2009. The bottom quintile‘s share 
of income distribution peaked at 1992 at 4.6% and fell to its lowest point in 2009 at 
3.6%, but the movement was consistently small over the two decades. This lack of 
movement is also evident in the top quintile shifting from 56.0% in 1990 to 55.8% in 
2009, with a peak of 57.8 in 2000. The ratio of these two quintiles consequently 
moved very little, from 13.0 in 1990 to 15.5 in 2009. The middle-income quintiles 
barely shifted at all. The doggedness of income distribution in Chile is very clearly 
seen here; despite the breadth of policies implemented in order to reduce the gap 
between social groups, the size of the disparity between the wealthy and poor in terms 
of income has actually worsened.  
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Table 6.8: Income distribution in Chile, by quintile, 1990 – 2009 (%) 
Quintile 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 
1 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.6 
2 8.2 8.5 8.2 8.2 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.7 8.3 
3 12.3 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.9 12.1 12.6 12.7 
4 18.1 18.4 18.5 19.1 19.3 18.3 19.1 19.8 19.6 
5 56.9 56.3 56.9 56.7 57.4 57.8 56.5 54.6 55.8 
Ratio of 5th 
quintile over 1st 
quintile 
13.0 12.2 13.2 13.8 15.5 14.5 14.5 13.3 15.5 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on CASEN (MIDEPLAN), Pobreza y distribución en Chile, 1996 (Santiago: MIDEPLAN, 
1997), p. 9 and CASEN (MIDEPLAN), Población según línea de pobreza, 2003 (Santiago: CASEN, 2004), p. 16 and CASEN 
(MIDEPLAN), Distribución del Ingreso, 2009 (Santiago: CASEN, 2009), 5 
 
 
Pizzolitto (2005, 12-15) presents a comprehensive literature review of inequality in 
Chile that acknowledges the stabilisation of income inequality levels over the 
Concertación‘s tenure. Spagnolo et al (2008, 13) disaggregate this unequal 
distribution of income further. They argue that trends between 1990 and 2006 in 
income inequality, ―whether between sectors, regions, or occupational groups, were 
high and relatively stable.‖ Essentially, the argument is that inequality in Chile is even 
more embedded than it seems on the surface.  
 
However, a positive trend is evident in the CASEN figures (2009, 3) with the overall 
decline of the total poor standing at 61% in 20 years, from 38.6% of the total 
population in 1990 to 15.1% in 2009. This indicates a return to a comparable level of 
the early 1970s. These statistics sit comfortably beside the findings of Murray and 
Kousary (2009, 140) that; ―During the three democratic governments immediately 
following the Pinochet regime, the incidence and severity of poverty decreased 
substantially…The total proportion of people in poverty (extreme and moderate) 
measured by the headcount fell from 38.6 per cent in 1990 to 18.8 per cent in 2003.‖ 
Additionally, Table 6.9 shows the percentage of households living under the poverty 
line more than halved between 1990 and 2003 (from 33.3% to 15.4%), as did the 
percentage of the Chilean population (from 38.6% to 18.8%). Nevertheless, the levels 
of poverty experienced within the country remain high, even taking into account this 
recent progress. The percentage of people currently living in poverty remains 
comparable to the period before Pinochet took power. The 2009 CASEN figures put 
the percentage of people living below the poverty and indigence lines as 15.1%, while 
in 1970, just as Allende had come into government, it was 17%.  
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Table 6.9: Households and population below the poverty line in Chile, 1990 - 
2003 (%) 
Year Households Population 
1990 33.3 38.6 
1996 19.7 23.2 
2000 16.6 20.6 
2003 15.4 18.8 
Source: ECLAC, 2004 from Solimano and Pollack 2006, 234 
 
 
Agostini et al (2009, 1036) indicate that such poverty remains a potent force within 
ethnic minority groups in Chile. Using World Bank (2002) data, they suggest, ―on 
average, indigenous households in Chile are reported to earn less than half the income 
of non-indigenous households, and 65% of indigenous people rank in the lowest two 
quintiles of the income distribution.‖ An underlying factor of such data is that a high 
proportion of these households are located in rural areas. Figure 6.2 reveals that from 
1990 to 2003 that a higher percentage of people living in rural areas suffered from 
poverty than those living in urban areas. However, between 2006 and 2009 this 
changed, and such a change is consistent with the comparison between national 
poverty rates and rural poverty. Such progress can be expected to also have positive 
implications for the indigenous families living in rural areas. By disaggregating the 
concepts of poverty and income disparity to these smaller scales, such as rural/urban 
and indigenous/non-indigenous, it is possible to better understand the complex nature 
of national disparity and poverty. While elements of some uneven relationships may 
be improving, as can be seen in Figure 6.2, other unequal aspects may be persisting, 
such as the income of indigenous households.  
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Figure 6.2: Population living in poverty by urban and rural area, in Chile, 1990 - 
2009 (% of population in each geographical area) 
 
 
Source: ECLAC, 2011 
 
 
Schatan (2001, 67) suggests that similar trends of inequality impact on the difference 
of incomes between genders. ―The average income of working women is about 40% 
lower than that corresponding to men; for salaried workers the relationship improves 
somewhat, with women receiving, on the average, 20% less than men.‖ Schatan links 
these disparities to location, suggesting that the ratios between genders vary 
significantly between different geographical areas. Unfortunately he doesn‘t 
disaggregate this further into rural or urban differences. 
 
6.7.b Employment participation 
In 1989 the employment participation rate stood at 52.0%; the consequent changes 
during the Concertación‘s four terms can be seen in Figure 6.3, a rise of 5.5% 
between 1990 and 2008, which is slightly higher than the average growth for Latin 
America. Table 6.8 also shows both the labour participation rate for men and women, 
and also compares Chile to the Latin American average (which is the figure in the 
parentheses) for 1980 to 2008. Not only are there notable gaps between Chile‘s levels 
and those of the countries around it, but also a persistent disparity between men and 
women. This gap peaked in 1990 with a difference of 45% and was still high in 2008 
at 26.5%. The Latin American employment gender gap in 2008 was similar at 27%, 
having been 39% in 1990. 
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Figure 6.3: Labour participation rate in Chile, 1980 - 2008 (% of population aged 
15+) 
 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from  World Bank, 2010 
 
 
The latest figures from CASEN (2009) show improvement with 52.7% of women 
participating in the labour force having completed secondary schooling, and 76.6% 
for those with a university education. Such disadvantages confirm the consequences 
of gender and educational inequalities and this is further substantiated in Table 6.13, 
which shows that female unemployment rates have been consistently higher than 
male, urban and national rates since 1990.  
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Figure 6.3: Urban unemployment rates by gender in Chile, 1990 - 2009 (average 
annual rate) 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from CASEN, 2011 
 
 
The gap between the genders in terms of average annual rates was larger in 2009 (3.1) 
than it was in 1990 (1.7), and the gap between female rates and national rates was also 
larger in 2009 than at the start of the Concertación‘s tenure.  
 
An additional element of this discussion is formal and informal employment. 
Generally those employed in the informal sector will earn a lower wage and be more 
vulnerable in terms of contracts and insurance. Solimano and Pollack (2006, 235) 
disaggregate this further, listing six main differences: 
1. The average product of formal workers is almost four times greater than of 
informal workers (explaining the difference in wages) 
2. 87% of formal workers have a contract, only 50% of informal workers have 
one 
3. Informal working conditions are harsher, with longer working hours and less 
safety 
4. Informal workers are less educated (9.6 years of education) than formal 
workers (12.2 years) 
5. Poverty levels are higher among informal workers 
6. Women are concentrated in the informal sector, with lower salaries 
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Table 6.10 shows that those living in the bottom income level quintile are over ten 
times more likely to work in the informal sector. The unavoidable inference is that 
those in the lower income sectors can be expected to be vulnerable, less educated and 
female. When such a supposition is placed alongside statistics where monthly income 
is drastically reduced dependent on years of education, the mechanisms of inequality 
traps are revealed.  
 
 
Table 6.10 Population working in the Chilean informal sector by income level, 
2000 (%) 
 Income quintile  
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Informal 36 28.8 16.7 13.1 3.2 16.4 
Formal 64 71.2 83.3 86.9 96.8 83.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Infante and Sunkel (2004) from Solimano and Pollack (2006, 236) 
 
 
6.7.c Health indicators 
Despite the achievement of the national infant mortality rate plummeting from 104 
per 1000 live births in 1964 (in 1953 it was 105) to 8.3 in 2007, (McGuire, 2010, 94 
and Banco Central de Chile, 2010, 52) Chile continues to suffer from highly uneven 
healthcare across its population. Diaz (2010, 2) explains ―Chile‘s Fondo Nacional de 
Salud (FONASA) provides poorer sectors of society with access to cheap healthcare, 
which is inferior to private healthcare plans. Long lines, flawed standard medical care, 
and gross inefficiencies all characterise this system.‖ Such is the problem that 
establishing equal access to health provisions became a main concern in both Lagos‘ 
and Bachelet‘s governments. On the flipside, McGuire (2010, 94) comments that 
between 1960 and 2005:  
 
―Chile raised life expectancy and reduced infant mortality 
more, in percentage terms, than any other Latin American 
country. Indeed Chile ranked in the top 5% of countries in the 
world. In this period, Chile‘s infant mortality rate went from 
being higher than Brazil‘s to less than half the Brazilian rate. 
In 2005 the infant mortality rate was only second to Cuba‘s in 
Latin America and only slightly higher than the US.‖  
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However Agostini et al (2009, 1038) produced figures that claim life expectancy in 
2006 for non-indigenous people was 77 years, but for the populations of ethnic 
minority groups, such as the Mapuche, Aymara and Chilote for example, it was 65 
years. An underlying issue of such statistics is the reality of access to public or private 
healthcare. José Pablo Arellano (as quoted in Collins and Lear, 1995, 105) comments, 
―Now there are more funds for the health of the high-income groups, while the other 
85% of Chileans pay more and receive less.‖ He believes the burden is not equally 
distributed. ―Middle-class and even poorer Chileans have seen dramatic increases in 
what they must pay for health insurance and services, while many higher-income 
Chileans are likely to be paying less.‖ This statement emphasises the importance of 
the figures in Table 6.11. Only 16.3% of the population were able to afford private 
health insurance in 2009; a decrease from 20.2 in 2000. There has been a 7% increase 
over the same timeframe in the purchase of public health insurance. 
 
 
Table 6.11: Population percentage share by type of health insurance, Chile, 2000 - 
2009  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Public  66.4 65.2 65.6 66.5 67.4 68.0 69.5 70.4 72.7 73.5 
Private  20.2 18.9 18.0 17.1 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.6 16.5 16.3 
Source: Banco Central de Chile, Statistical Synthesis of Chile 
 
 
Such data is substantiated by the information shown in Table 6.12. 31.3% of private 
health insurance was purchased by the highest earning decile in 2006, with 54.2% 
coming from the top quintile. The lowest quintile accounted for less than 4%.  
 
 
Table 6.12: Population distribution by health insurance system and decile, Chile, 
2006 (%) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Public 13.0 14.1 13.1 12.3 10.8 10.4 9.1 7.9 5.9 3.4 
Private 1.9 1.9 2.9 3.6 4.8 7.0 10.3 13.5 22.9 31.3 
Source: CASEN 2006, Salud, 3 
 
 
6.7.d Housing 
Uneven access to quality, such as the Chilean housing system has long suffered from, 
creates a complex issue that cannot be understood simply by looking at availability of 
housing and ownership. It requires considerable discussion concerning resources, 
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community-building and financial support, as can be seen in ECLAC‘s (2010, 123) 
comment: 
 
―Territorial and social inequalities are dialectically 
interwoven. In other words, differences among subnational 
territories in terms of income, poverty, productivity, access to 
well-being and natural-resources endowment contribute to the 
aggregate contrasts in these indicators at the national level. 
For this reason, narrowing the gaps among territories is vital 
if equality is to be improved.‖ 
 
While some regions and communities have suffered with financial stagnancy and 
social backwardness, others have flourished due to the development of infrastructure 
and services. Although a growing regional gap has been has led to ongoing 
governmental action throughout the last half-century, the results have been varied at 
best.  
 
ECLAC (2010, 134) worries that the trend of pushing the lower socio-economic 
groups away from the established and developed urban communities has continued 
throughout the 1990s, arguing that,  
 
―This urban layout intensifies segregation, as the 
concentration of informal or less profitable economic 
activities in areas inhabited by low-income families generally 
pushes land prices down. This reduces or limits municipal 
income from property taxes, business licences and municipal 
permits, which in turn affects the funding capacity for 
investment projects and for building and maintaining 
infrastructure and public services. This deterioration of public 
spaces leads to problems of access to services, a lack of 
places for socialisation and a decline in public safety, not to 
mention problems of institutional disaffiliation as young 
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people drop out of the education system and the labour 
market.‖ 
 
These consequences of marginalisation are diverse. Not only are there structural 
consequences in terms of municipal income and support, but such economic 
constraints create additional impacts around quality of life and opportunities for 
participation in education and employment. This can create strangleholds, preventing 
individuals achieving objectives and contributing fully to society. ECLAC (2010, 
135) continues, 
 
―As differences grow in the coverage and quality of 
infrastructure and social services, so inequalities deepen in 
terms of quality of life and access to opportunities…In 
particular, there are fewer possibilities for social mobility in a 
city where the daily reality of the least well-off is marked by 
poverty and precarious working conditions.‖  
 
The naturalisation of disparities is a dangerous part of the process of inequality, as 
situations can become embedded in how regions and districts, populations and 
communities are supported, funded and viewed. This can become the unavoidable 
geography of inequality, and there is potential here for future research in mapping the 
concentration and intensity of various types of inequalities at regional levels in Chile. 
ECLAC (2010, 135) are in no doubt of the importance of location in establishing 
opportunities for communities, households and individuals, 
 
―The geographical location of a household affects 
opportunities, as a result of the impact that social interaction 
has upon the individual behaviours and outcomes…This is 
the territorial basis for the vicious circle that reproduces 
poverty and disadvantage in the cities that are home to over 
three quarters of the populations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.‖  
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From these extracts it is hard not to engage with the notion that territorial 
disadvantage plays a key role in the persistence of inequality within Chile by creating 
an inequality trap of resourcing, opportunity and quality of life that reinforces various 
types of unevenness. Sadly, this situation has remained consistent over the previous 
half-century. Recent work by Agostini and Brown (2007) on spatial inequality in 
Chile has endeavoured to combine survey and census data to obtain geographically-
disaggregated statistics of inequality in Chile. The results indicate certain 
consistencies, such as homes that have female heads of household suffer from lower 
per capita incomes than households headed by males. Interestingly though, they also 
reveal significant disparities in income distribution, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient: ―Gini coefficients range from 0.409 in Pumanque county (Region VI) to 
0.627 in San Fabián  county (Region VIII).‖ (Ibid, 12) 
 
 
6.8 Chapter summary 
Despite the continuity of the same coalition remaining in power for two decades, the 
Concertación was by no means static in terms of its approach to inequality. Its 
strategy was neostructuralist, seeking to synchronise a reduction in inequality with a 
growing economy, and empowering government to dynamically involve itself in 
solving the shortfalls of the free market. However, within this consistent approach all 
four administrations – to some extent – emphasised different elements of inequality. 
Access to decent employment and quality healthcare, gender equality, a fairer social 
welfare, better housing in safer communities, and poverty reduction were all at one 
time key elements of government social policy. Although the results of Bachelet‘s 
more explicit and aggressive approach to inequality won‘t be fully revealed, as they 
will be absorbed into Piñera‘s tenure, the impact of twenty years of Concertación 
policy on reducing inequality has been less than expected. As Murray and Kousary 
(2009, 1) state, ―notwithstanding undeniable progress, there remain significant 
challenges in terms of reducing relative poverty, social exclusion, isolation and 
vulnerability underpinned by persistently high levels of inequality, a stratified social 
protection system and a dual labour market.‖ Chile has recovered well from the 
destructive military regime under Pinochet and has started to make progress within 
many disparities, but still it remains one of the most unequal countries on the planet. 
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In an attempt to gain a better understanding of why this might be, the next chapter 
focuses solely on education under the Concertación as a case study, concentrating on 
the different policies of each administration and the trends of inequality in terms of 
attendance, achievement and quality. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Chilean Winter: Educational inequality under the 
Concertación, 1990 - 2010 
 
This chapter considers the situation of educational disparity in Chile, specifically 
looking at the four Concertación governments between 1990 and 2010. The context 
for such a discussion is the Chilean Winter, a series of student demonstrations that 
have highlighted the inequality that persists within the sector. The chapter outlines a 
selection of the significant educational policies implemented by the four 
administrations and presents a collection of data that demonstrates persistently high 
levels of inequality of various types. The implications of such an uneven situation for 
Chilean society are then discussed.    
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
With the thesis already having reviewed the ongoing socio-economic inequality 
suffered in Chile over almost half a century, the Chilean Winter affords an opportunity 
to see the impacts of such disparity ‗in action‘ and to start an investigation into why 
recent policies have failed to arrest it. Carnoy and McEwen (2003, 25) propose that up 
to 1973, Chile‘s educational system was envied across the continent and ―was one of 
the most developed in Latin America‖ – and so it is valid to explore what has changed. 
One crucial change is that, according to the OECD (2011b), Chile now has the most 
privatised education system in the world. The origins of this can be traced directly 
back to Pinochet‘s Organic Constitutional Education Law (LOCE; Ley Orgánica 
Constitucional de Enseñanza). This law deregulated and decentralised education, 
transferring the administration of public schools to the country's 345 municipalities 
and, by allowing the creation of state-subsidised private (voucher) schools, it promoted 
profit as the key driver in the system. It was within such an environment that the 
Concertación sought to equalise opportunities for all students. However, as the rest of 
this chapter will illustrate, it has been an ongoing struggle.  
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7.2 The Chilean Winter 
The current demonstrations started in May 2011, however the direct origins of the 
restlessness can be traced back to 2006, when a protest movement called Los 
Pinguinos (―the Penguins‖), named after the blue-and-white uniforms of the 
protesting students, took to the streets. The dispute at that time was over the unfair 
funding system and poor quality of education, issues that are still yet to be resolved. 
However the current protestors have, seemingly triggered by a government initiative 
to increase funding of private universities, added considerably to these demands. The 
demands were presented in the Acuerdo Social por la Educación Chilena (‗Social 
Agreement for Chilean Education‘), which included the separate petitions made by 
both the protesting university and secondary school students.  
 
The university students, represented by the Confederation of Chilean Student 
Federations (CONFECH), have called for free public education in order to eliminate 
segregation as a result of socio-economic status. Among other demands, there are 
proposals for increased state funding for public universities (and the elimination of 
funding to for-profit schools) and for fairer access, with less weight given to the 
Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU
21
) test. The PSU test is argued to favour the 
students in the better resourced schools. To combat the barriers faced by indigenous 
students, the social agreement also suggests the establishment of an intercultural 
university. The demands of secondary school students include: a return to a central 
administration for all secondary and primary schools with an increase in public 
investment; no new voucher schools and the voucher system to be valid only for non-
profit schools.  
 
Despite this emphasis from the students, the protests should no longer be considered to 
be solely about education. The initial student demonstrations came after separate 
unrest concerning gas prices and the HidroAysén
22
 dam project. Following this, 
striking workers from El Teniente mine, demanding salary increases, joined the protest 
                                               
21 PSU is an acronym for University Selection Test (Prueba de Selección Universitaria) and is the 
admission system for students wishing to study at a tertiary level in Chile. It is made up of two 
compulsory exams, one in Mathematics and one in Language, with two additional specific exams. 
22 The HidroAysén project involves five dams to tap the Baker and Pascua rivers in Patagonia for 
hydroelectricity to generate 2.75 gigawatts of power. 
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march in July 2011 and in August the Workers' United Centre of Chile called a two-
day strike.  The beginning of 2012 saw student protests break out in Calama, Puerto 
Arenas and Puerto Aysén. The latter unrest however was also concerned with local 
issues, such as the misuse of natural resources and a lack of political representation. 
One of the student leaders, Camila Vallejo, recognised the increasingly broad 
implications of the demonstrations when she said, ―We resolved the problem of the 
dictatorship but we have not resolved the models and structures that the dictatorship 
left in place.‖ (Vallejo, 2012) 
 
The protests have consistently assembled crowds of between 100,000 and – in some 
estimates – up to one million and ―by the end of 2011, polls put public opinion support 
for the student movement at an astounding 79%‖ (Adimark GfK, 2011, cited in 
Valenzuela, 2012, 299). To better understand how the situation grew to such a point 
where the education system – and other sectors – have been so effectively disrupted by 
the ongoing demonstrations, it is useful to look at the policies that were explicitly put 
in place by the Concertación to create a fair system.  
 
 
7.3 A selection of educational policies from the Concertación, 1990 – 2010 
The four Concertación presidencies that spanned two decades planned and 
implemented a series of far-reaching and varied education policies. The following two 
sections will discuss some of the major strategies put into practice and the impacts 
they had.  
 
7.3.a Improvement of Equality and Quality in Education 
The day after his inauguration on 11 March 1990, Patricio Aylwin started to – as he 
phrased it – repay the social debt by putting the ‗900 School Programme‘ (P-900) into 
operation. The programme aimed, through positive discrimination, to improve the 
learning opportunities of children in free elementary schools, located in rural and 
extreme urban poverty areas. It was part of a national project called Improvement of 
Equality and Quality in Education (Mejoramiento de Equidad y Calidad de la 
Educación MECE). The programme itself selected 10% of schools with the greatest 
needs to support students‘ learning of basic cultural skills: reading, writing, and 
195 
 
 
mathematics. Extra support was also provided for struggling students in later grades. 
It emphasised the combined role of the government and the community in providing 
the best education, underlining the phrase, ‗education is everyone‘s business.‘ In 1992 
the programme had grown to almost 1500 participating schools, with 235,183 
students and 7000 teachers, and continued to function until 2003.  
 
However, in 1993, a new stipulation was made to existing state funding. Some 
subsidised schools were permitted to charge parents for a percentage of the tuition, 
while subsidised private schools and some public schools were allowed to receive 
donations. This resulted in, according to Drago and Pareda, 2011, 163-4): 
 
―a steep rise in private school enrolment…a steep reduction in 
dropout rates and a steady increase in enrolment rates. The 
scores on the System for Measuring the Quality of Education 
(SIMCE) tests, however, indicate that the quality of education 
remains quite limited and that striking differences between the 
performance of students in different socio-economic sectors 
continue to pose a major challenge.‖  
 
The same authors consider the possibility that the change ultimately stimulated an 
exodus of middle-class students from public schools to private subsidised ones, which 
led to the inevitable result of municipal schools – who must accept all students – 
enrolling a higher percentage of students from lower socio-economic sectors. This is 
argued to reduce the average scores of the schools.  
 
7.3.b The National Commission of Modernisation for Education  
With considerable political momentum for educational change, the scale of 
transformation suggested for the Chilean school system under the Concertación‘s 
second president, Eduardo Frei, jnr., was hardly surprising. The National Commission 
of Modernisation for Education (Comisión Nacional de Modernización para la 
Educación), was established early in the administration in 1996, and looked to offer a 
diagnosis of the complete system. The priority of the reforms was to increase the 
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quality and fairness of Chile's education system, and Frei was unequivocal in how 
important he understood the reforms to be: 
 
―Education is for us one of the critical tasks that we face as a 
nation. Improving quality is a moral, democratic and 
economic development.  If we aspire to be a developed 
nation, we cannot continue with a system that discriminates 
the educational opportunities of the future, neglecting the 
children of poor families to a destination without real 
opportunities for progress.‖  (Frei, 1994)  
 
The reforms concerned extending school hours, increasing support for teachers, and 
improving the general management of the education system, which would include 
improvements to school buildings and resources. Aninat (2005) wrote at length about 
both the social and educational benefits of the reforms, in particular noting that the 
extension of the school day would provide assistance for low-income households, 
where both parents are likely to work outside the home. The number of weeks of 
classes grew from 37 to 40 a year, primary schools increased from 30 to 38 
pedagogical hours a week, while secondary schools increased from 36 to 42 
pedagogical hours. Consequently, students who received all their schooling under the 
new system would have received an extra two years of classes by the time they 
completed. There was also the Montegrande Project, which supported successful 
secondary schools from the subsidised education system. The program also targeted 
high-achieving secondary students, preferably from poor or middle-class 
backgrounds. The results, according to Foxley (2005, 8) were encouraging: ―after a 
few years, the two thousand schools in the programme had an improvement of 12% in 
the reading and math skill scores, vis a vis a 9% in the rest of municipal schools, a 
modest but positive result.‖ Further material from Foxley (2004, as cited in Murray, & 
Kousary, 2009, 138) reveals ―the whole process was accompanied by wage increases 
for teachers, more than doubling their salaries in real terms in ten years.‖ 
Furthermore, an incentive system, the National Performance Evaluation System, was 
also put in place in 1996 to recognise and support and encourage best teaching 
practice.  
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7.3.c Chile Solidario 
Frei‘s successor, Ricardo Lagos, a former Minister of Education, also believed 
universal access to a quality education was integral to social progress and national 
growth. Significant investments were made, new programmes were established, such 
as Chile Qualifies (Chile Califica) for adults without formal qualifications, and the 
full school day (jornada escolar completa) was introduced.  During Lagos‘ 
administration almost three thousand new schools were constructed, compulsory 
education was raised to twelve years, and thousands of extra textbooks and meals 
were distributed. However the broad and inclusive social approach of Lagos‘ 
administration is best understood in the Bridge Programme (Programa Puente) and 
Chile Solidario project, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
The benefits that Chile Solidario provided included cash transfers to parents who, 
among other requirements, ensured their children were attending school. Borzutzky 
(2009, 8) reveals that the results were significant, with the number of children aged 4-
5 who enrolled in pre-school increasing by 4 – 6% as a result of participation in the 
programme. Enrolment of children aged 6- 15 also improved by 7 – 9%. The number 
of illiterate adults enrolled in literacy programmes also increased appreciably, with a 
larger number having been enrolled in the rural areas. 
 
However Sepúlvida (2006) proposes that there were ongoing issues with how Lagos 
approached reducing inequality in the education system. He notes that in the last year 
of the Lagos administration there were cuts in government spending, leaving students 
responsible for more of their own school fees. There was also an increase in the cost 
of the PSU exam and the use of the discount student transportation pass was 
restricted. Sepúlveda also suggests that Lagos contributed to the establishment of 
privatisation in higher education by linking student loans to the banks in 2005. 
 
7.3.d ‘Chile Grows With You’  
The second of Michelle Bachelet‘s ‗Four Transformations‘ was linked to education, 
building off her comment that ‗inequalities begin at the crib.‘ The proposal was to 
build more pre-schools and schools of higher quality for the older children. Frenz 
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(2007) quoted Bachelet from her speech at the Installation of the Presidential 
Commission on Infancy, 30 March 2006 as saying: 
 
―My goal at the end of my government is to have instituted a 
Protection System for Children destined to equate 
development opportunities for Chilean children in their first 
eight years of life, independently of their social status, 
gender, geographic origin, the structure of their home or have 
any other potential factor.‖ (45) 
 
The Commission set up a programme called ‗Chile Grows With You‘ (‗Chile Crece 
Contigo‘), which was an integrated social protection system for early child 
development, aimed at eliminating socioeconomic differences that prevent maximum 
development potential across all social levels. In September 2009 the ‗Chile Grows 
with You‘ law was signed to ensure that wide-ranging support was available to 
vulnerable children up to the age of six, providing the necessary tools for 
development. It established a social welfare system of protection, based on rights, 
called the ‗Intersectoral Social Protection System‘, which was made up of integrated 
benefits and subsystems, such as ‗Chile Solidario‘ and "Chile Grows with You". 
 
Bachelet also announced goals of building hundreds of nurseries to both meet the 
children‘s needs and to allow the mothers to return to work. Her goal was that by 
2010 all children aged between one and three years of age in the poorest 40% of the 
population would be in pre-school care. However, despite these large-scale goals, 
Bachelet was caught out early in her presidency by the scale of previously dormant 
dissatisfaction with the education system, particularly at another Pinochet hangover in 
the form of the Organic Constitutional Education Law (LOCE; Ley Orgánica 
Constitucional de Enseñanza), when hundreds of thousands of students took to the 
streets in protest. As a result of these protests Bachelet was forced to respond by 
agreeing to pay 80% of the cost of entrance exams and transportation, as well as 
promising to spend $200 million in improvements over the following year. In August 
2009, as a result of the commission that resulted from these protests, Bachelet 
implemented the General Education Law (LGE). This law included provisions such as 
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ending the ability of schools to select students up to the ninth grade. However it has 
been criticised for not doing enough to prevent educational disparity, as it does not 
address the issues of education as a consumer good. 
 
 
7.3.e Summary 
Table 7.1 outlines a selection of the educational policies implemented by the four 
Concertación administrations between 1990 and 2010. Education was clearly a major 
component of the political approach with important and comprehensive programmes 
being established. The policies unquestionably improved access for all students to 
education by constructing more schools, especially in rural and lower socio-economic 
urban regions, and ensuring there was more support available for teachers and parents. 
However Burton (2012, 46) comments that, despite the return to democracy in this 
period, the governments still approached the market-orientated education system with 
a largely top-down approach. Subsequently one criticism that has been made of the 
Concertación is that they never fully confronted Pinochet‘s LOCE. Sepúlvida (2006) 
claims that, ―instead, they continued to chip away at public education every year, 
transferring more public money to private hands, and passing the cost on to the 
families of students loans from the government.‖ Having drawn attention to these 
different perspectives on the success of the policies, the next section considers the 
impacts by looking at a selection of data concerned with disparity in education.  
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Table 7.1: Selected educational policies under the Concertación, 1990 - 2010 
Policy context Objectives and features 
900 School Programme 
(P-900) and 
Mejoramiento de Equidad 
y Calidad de la 
Educación, MECE  
The ‗900 School Programme‘ (P-900); the programme aimed to improve 
the learning opportunities of children in free elementary schools, located 
in rural and extreme urban poverty areas; part of a national project called 
Improvement of Equality and Quality in Education (Mejoramiento de 
Equidad y Calidad de la Educación MECE). The programme itself 
selected 10% of schools with the greatest needs to support students‘ 
learning of basic cultural skills: reading, writing, and mathematics 
Comision Nacional de 
Modernizacion para la 
Educacion and the 
Montegrande Project 
To increase the quality and fairness of Chile's education system; 
extended school hours, increased support for teachers, and improvements 
for the general management of the education system, which would 
include improvements to school buildings and resources. The 
Montegrande Project supported successful secondary schools from the 
subsidised education system 
Chile Calefica and 
‘jornada escolar 
completa’ 
Chile Calefica was to support adults without formal qualifications and 
the ‗full school day‘ project was also introduced; three thousand new 
schools were constructed; compulsory education was raised to twelve 
years; thousands of extra textbooks and meals were distributed. 
Chile Crece Contigo An integrated social protection system for early child development and 
aimed at eliminating socioeconomic differences that prevent maximum 
development potential across all social levels. Needs in education and 
socioeconomic circumstances; hundreds of nurseries to be built to both 
meet the children‘s needs and to allow the mothers to return to work; as a 
result of the 2006 protests 80% of the cost of entrance exams and 
transportation were paid  
Source: Author 
 
 
 
7.4 Educational inequalities in Chile, 1990 - 2010 
To discuss levels of inequality within education, it is important to consider a selection 
of variables. This section discusses inequality in terms of access (attendance and years 
of schooling) and outcomes (test scores and expected income).  
 
7.4.a Access to education 
Regarding attendance levels, these have increased across all levels of education since 
1990 but nowhere more significantly than in higher education. Beyer (as quoted in 
Gibney, 2012) states that, "in 1990, once democracy came back, we had 240,000 
students in higher education. This year (2012) we will have almost 1.1 million, from a 
population of 17 million." However, an important question is whether such an increase 
in overall attendance has been equally distributed throughout society. 
 
Figure 7.1 shows that the overall net pre-school attendance rate for children aged 0 – 5 
rose from 15.9% to 37.4%, an improvement of 235%. In the lowest income quintile 
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households more than doubled from 12.4% to 32.3% between 1990 and 2009. For the 
highest income quintile the rise was from 27.2% to 52.6%, an increase of 93%.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Attendance of Pre-Primary School, net, by income quintile per capita, 
%, Chile, (1990, 1996, 2003, 2009) 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from CASEN 2009, Educación, 10 
 
 
Nevertheless the percentage of tertiary students coming from working-class 
households remained low, as can be seen in Table 7.2, with a net attendance of 16.4% 
from the lowest decile in 2009 as compared with 59.5% in the richest decile. However 
there was significant growth in attendance levels in particular for the lowest five 
deciles; each of them more than tripling their 1990 attendance by 2009. The five 
wealthiest deciles also recorded appreciably improved levels.  
 
 
Table 7.2: Attendance at Higher Education, net, by income decile per capita, 
Chile, % (1990, 1996, 2003, 2009) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
1990 3.8 3.0 4.4 6.5 7.9 10.3 11.2 21.8 24.5 40.3 11.9 
1998 5.6 6.6 9.1 9.6 15.3 17.5 22.7 33.7 45.6 60.7 20.9 
2003 8.3 11.5 11.7 17.9 21.9 23.9 28.9 42.2 51.4 65.4 26.1 
2006 12.3 14.6 14.6 19.6 20.9 26.9 31.2 39.6 47.4 59.5 27.4 
2009 16.4 16.6 19.5 22.4 25.1 26.0 29.2 38.6 49.4 61.5 29.1 
Source: CASEN 2009, Educación, 22 
 
 
Despite this, there still remains an obvious disparity in terms of opportunity of access. 
―The quality of primary and secondary education still depends on socioeconomic 
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status.‖ (Diaz 2010, 2) This is evident in a series of statements made by Felipe Salazar 
(2011, pers. comm) during an interview about the tertiary system in Chile: ―Second-
tier universities are for rich people – they don‘t need a great PSU score.‖  He noted 
that these universities (he was referring to newer, private universities, which are not 
part of the ‗traditional23‘ group) are expensive, sometimes double the price of other 
universities, and are difficult to get to without a car; ―literally at the top of the hill,‖ in 
Santiago‘s higher-altitude, wealthier districts, for students coming from lower socio-
economic locations. 
 
Gibney (2012) confirms that expense is an important element of disparity. She notes 
that tuition fees grew by an average of about 3% each year in real terms, which 
prompted the introduction of a state-guaranteed bank loan scheme in 2006. However, 
this contributed to increasing student debt at an average of US$40,000 that created 
repayments that are not proportional to income. Table 7.3 indicates that economic 
segregation and increasing debt is not specific to higher education. It shows student 
enrolment in the various types of school based on their socio-economic status. With 
80.8% of the private schools‘ registers coming from the richest decile and only 6% 
coming from the lowest seven deciles, the composition of quality private education is 
fundamentally economically homogenous. The population of the private-voucher 
schools, some of which also demand a fee, is composed of 36% of students from the 
bottom five deciles. This suggests that it is likely that some families entered into debt 
for their children‘s education.  
 
 
  
                                               
23 Traditional universities (universidades tradicionales) refers to the group of universities founded 
before the 1980s, and includes ‗offshoot‘ universities from traditional ones. Another collective name is 
the Universities of the Rectors' Council of Chilean Universities (Universidades del Consejo de 
Rectores). 
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Table 7.3: Enrolment in school sector by family SES decile (percent distribution), 
Chile 2002. 
Household SES 
decile* 
Public Private-voucher Private fee-paying 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
14.5 
14.7 
13.1 
12.8 
11.3 
10.9 
8.4 
7.0 
5.3 
1.9 
5.7 
5.4 
7.5 
7.9 
9.9 
10.5 
13.7 
15.1 
15.8 
8.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.9 
3.9 
13.1 
80.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Mizala and Torche, 2012.  
*Family SES obtained from a facto analysis of mother‘s years of schooling, father‘s years of schooling and total family income. 
 
 
However, it is not only the issue of socio-economic status that creates disparity in 
access to education; it is also necessary to consider gender, indigenous students and 
spatial segregation. Between 2003 and 2009 the average schooling for females rose 
from 10.0 years to 10.3 years. (CASEN, 2009, Mujeres, 11) In the longer period of 
1990 to 2009, the net attendance rate of females in higher education rose from 11.8% 
to 30.0%. This increase is similar to the trend of males in higher education, which rose 
from 13.9% to 30.0% in the same period. 2006 marked the first time that more females 
attended higher education than males. (CASEN, 2009, Educación, 23) However, this 
positive trend is not mirrored in the progress made by ethnic minority groups in Chile. 
Statistics gathered by Agostini et al (2009, 1038) show that in 2003 37.7% of the 
indigenous population had failed to complete primary school (it was 24.4% for the 
non-indigenous population), and only 2% had completed university (6.9% for non-
indigenous). From a statistical point of view this figure likely fluctuates due to self-
identification in the census, and may therefore influence the results, but the disparities 
remain significant: ―Educational attainment among working adults in the indigenous 
population averages 7.3 years compared to 9.5 years for non-indigenous working 
adults.‖ (ibid) 
 
A further barrier to equal access is location. Table 7.4 clearly shows that students 
residing in rural areas receive a considerably shorter education than their counterparts 
living in urban centres. In 2009 students from urban areas of Chile received an average 
of 10.8 years of schooling, while students from rural homes could expect 7.8 years. 
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This gap in schooling has shown no signs of significant improvement over the full two 
decades of Concertación administrations: in 1990 the gap was 3.5 years.  
 
 
Table 7.4: Average years of schooling of the population, 18 years old and over, 
by area of residence, Chile, 1990 - 2009 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Urban 9.6 9.6 9.7 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.7 10.6 10.8 
Rural 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.8 
Total 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.5 9.7 9.9 10.2 10.2 10.4 
Source: CASEN 2009, Educación, 3 
 
 
 
7.4b Educational outcomes 
The disparities in access to education, as discussed in the previous section, are 
worthwhile discussing in relation to educational outcomes. Torche (2005, 5) highlights 
the importance of such a connection: 
 
―Educational inequality is still substantial in Chile. 
Differences in attainment by income level are noticeable even 
at the primary completion level in Chilean society. Whereas 
99.1 percent of children in the wealthiest income quintile 
completed the primary level in 2000, only 71.9 percent of 
children in the poorest quintile did so. Socioeconomic 
differences are wider at the secondary level, with 30 percent 
of the children in the poorest quintile completing secondary 
school, compared to 95 percent of the children in the 
wealthiest quintile. Disparities magnify at the tertiary level, 
with only 3.1 of the poorest youngsters, but 48.2 percent of 
the wealthiest ones, completing tertiary education.‖ 
 
Such levels of inequality are also evident in the OECD (2010) results for its 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The report focused on 
social background and equity in learning opportunities. Amongst the findings were 
that: the performance gap between students in Chilean city schools and those in rural 
schools is significant; Chile shows below OECD-average student performance in 
reading and an above-average strength in the relationship between socio-economic 
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background and performance; and Chile suffers from below OECD-average levels of 
both academic and social inclusion
24
. Research from Mizala and Torche (2012, 2) 
further investigates the link between a student‘s socio-economic status (SES), or that 
of their family, and academic achievement. They write: 
 
―The association between the school‘s aggregate family SES 
of the student body and achievement is twice as strong in the 
private-voucher sector, resulting in pronounced 
socioeconomic stratification (i.e. educational achievement of 
private-voucher sector depends more on the aggregate SES of 
the school than an individual‘s family‘s SES)‖  
 
Their work shows that there is a profound socio-economic stratification in the Chilean 
education system. This is unmistakably evident in the results shown in Table 7.5, 
where it is shown that achievement in a national standardised test (mathematics and 
language) varies significantly across the various types of school. Private fee-paying 
schools achieve results that are considerably higher than for schools from both the 
public and private-voucher sector.  
 
 
Table 7.5: SIMCE test scores across school sector, Chile 2002 
Mean test scores Public Private-voucher Private fee-
paying 
All schools 
Math 235 254 298 247 
Language 239 259 300 251 
Source: Mizala and Torche, 2012. (4) Authors‘ calculations, based on SIMCE standardised test and SIMCE parental 
questionnaire, 4
th
 grade students, 2002. 
 
 
The full range of consequences of this gap is difficult to measure, but one unequivocal 
result is presented in Figure 7.2 in terms of average income. It shows that higher-
achieving students, understood as students who continue on to higher levels of 
education, can expect considerably higher incomes.  
 
 
  
                                               
24 ―This signals a school system in which students of similar socio-economic background and academic 
performance generally attend the same school.‖ (OECD, 2010, 86)  
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Figure 7.2: Average monthly income from work, years of schooling, Chile (pesos, 
November 2009) 
 
Source: Author, from data taken from CASEN 2009, Educación, 6 
 
 
A student receiving 8 years of schooling (close to the rural average in 2009) could 
expect 270,708 pesos a month, while 11 years of schooling (similar to what an urban-
dwelling student could expect) would be paid 311,227 pesos. This gap widens 
appreciably with every extra years of schooling completed. Figure 7.2 highlights the 
significant difference of opportunity available to individuals depending on the years 
of schooling they have completed. However an individual may not always be able to 
choose whether they continue their education or not, or indeed may not have equal 
chances to achieve the necessary results to continue.  
 
Drago and Paredes (2011, 162-3) consolidate and analysis similar data as presented in 
the previous tables by collating a range of other opinions. They agree that the crucial 
issue is the significant difference between the scores of students in the different types 
of schools, which are of course strongly correlated with household income. They 
indicate that the difference between the scores on standardised tests of students in 
different schools contributes to the significant change in enrolments at the various 
types of schools: 
 
―As a percentage of the total, the 80% public school enrolment 
rate registered in 1980 had dropped to less than 45% by 2010 
and that this steep reduction could be the result, at least in part, 
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of the declining quality of the education being provided by the 
country‘s municipalities... ‖  
 
This shift of student enrolment is just one consequence; the following section outlines 
a variety of other social outcomes that have impacted Chile as a result of educational 
disparity. 
 
 
7.5 Implications of educational disparity 
The importance of education to social inequality can be seen in the work of Contreras 
and Gallegos (2011, 34). They suggest: ―education plays the greatest role in 
determining inequality…Schooling makes a particularly significant contribution to 
inequality.‖ Ostensibly then, the unyielding income disparity that Chile suffers from, 
and the ongoing ethnic, class and residential segregations that thwart greater 
development, may be understood as inextricably linked to education. At the core of the 
Chilean Winter demonstrations is the belief that greater equality of access to, and 
outcomes from, the education system is integral to any broader solution. The social 
impacts of such high levels of educational inequality can be clustered into three 
groups: growth, social disintegration and inequality traps. A discussion of these 
impacts is helpful to conclude this case study of education.  
 
7.5.a Growth  
In 2011 President Piñera outlined his aim for Chile to become Latin America‘s first 
developed country:  
 
―First of all, we need to grow at least 6 percent per year in 
order to reach $25,000 by 2020, which is roughly the average 
per capita income of most OECD countries. We need to create 
one million jobs to defeat underdevelopment and end poverty.‖ 
(as quoted in Henkoff and Attwood, 2011) 
 
For this to happen it can be argued that Chile first needs to ensure it draws as much 
value as possible from its investment in education. An over-reliance on copper leaves 
208 
 
 
the economy vulnerable and so – in order to develop other robust, high-value sectors – 
it is important that education is inclusive and of a high quality.  Ffrench-Davis (2010, 
3) agrees and argues that disparities in educational types and outcomes hold back a 
nation‘s economic development. For an economy to grow ―the top priority is to 
improve the performance of the labour market, creating better job opportunities for 
mid- and low income workers; generating ‗decent jobs‘, with rising real incomes.‖ In 
order to increase productivity and opportunities, he suggests making a structural 
change of greater investment in human capital, particularly education and labour 
training to prepare people for more effective participation. This is an opinion echoed 
by the United Nations (1995, 22): ―In sum, greater education and opportunities for 
training and skill development in order to reduce inequality and foster broader 
competitiveness in the labour market.‖ Such improvements in education and training, 
according to Carlson (2000) are increasingly necessary for investment, trade and 
competitive job markets.  
 
7.5.b Social disintegration 
The student demonstrations have continued for over a year and, with the previously 
mentioned additional unrest from unions and miners, it can be suggested that Chile is 
suffering from symptoms of social disintegration. With the Chilean education system 
so heavily privatised, it is useful to consider the notion of social disintegration as a 
result of market forces. Han (2011, 9) discusses Tomás Moulian‘s 1997 seminal work, 
Chile Today: Anatomy of a Myth (Chile Actual: Anatomía de un mito) and highlights 
the impacts of a consumer society on values and aspirations. He suggests that the 
market has replaced the idea of community and that ―political rights are now 
construed by the state as consumer rights‖. He writes of how Moulian labels the credit 
economy as responsible for the ―individualisation of social relations.‖  
 
This disintegration of community is plainly visible in education, as there is 
considerable opportunity for an education system to create and sustain a variety of 
disparities. As Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 76) state, ―Education also represents a 
medium though which the worst forms of social stratification and segmentation are 
created.‖ These social divisions, as previously discussed in this chapter, can be seen 
within, for example, gender, ethnic and socio-economic relationships, and can occur 
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in the education contexts of, among others, the school environment, curriculum and 
access. Such a series of fractured contextual relationships can lead to a breakdown in 
social cohesion, which is highlighted in the ECLAC publication, Time For Equality: 
Closing gaps, opening trails (2010, 41). It reasons that without social cohesion there 
is no sense of community, which can lead to conflict and undermine sustainable 
progress.  
 
This highlights the destructive elements of inequality, often leading to an individual 
internalising their position in relation to others. The result is the perpetuation of a 
context in which individuals are prevented from an equality of opportunity either 
through discrimination or through their own lack of self-belief. Performance at school 
can be related to the expectations set up by society. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 164) 
support this opinion by using French sociologist Bourdieu‘s label of ‗symbolic 
violence‘. They argue, ―another way in which inequality directly affects educational 
achievement is through its impact on the aspirations, norms and values of people who 
find themselves lower down the social hierarchy.‖ (ibid, 115)  
 
The process of segregation can be observed through a disaggregation of relationships, 
which demonstrates the need for a, 
 
―greater autonomy and respect for…personal identity in the 
educational process, free from discrimination based on 
gender, race, ethnicity or social status. The right to fair 
treatment and respect in school should include a gender 
approach and an intercultural perspective as well.‖ (ECLAC, 
2006, 7) 
 
Gender inequality in schools, as an example, can be reproduced due to stereotypes 
carried in textbooks, school activities and curriculums. Furthermore UNESCO (2010, 
56) suggests that the learning environment ―should be sensitive to the specific needs 
of girls‖, which incorporates elements such as the proximity of the school to home 
and separate bathrooms for each gender. Similarly, intercultural education was found 
to require recognition and respect for students of various ethnic and cultural 
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backgrounds in order to avoid the reproduction of ―historical patterns of 
discrimination based on ethnicity and cultural differences‖ (ibid, 49).  
 
The importance of establishing equality in education extends beyond socio-economic 
segregation and reproduction to issues of exclusion and marginalisation. Kay‘s 
excellent overview of these concepts (1989) discusses three dimensions in the process 
of social exclusion as economic, political and cultural, and the kernel of subordinated 
participation in these processes and practices can be argued to lie in education. Such 
connections can compound the vulnerability of individuals and groups, which Greig 
(2007, 27) believes ―further fuels processes of impoverishment and inequality.‖ This 
links to the concept of inequality traps, and of how educational disparity fuels them, 
and is considered in the following section. 
 
7.5.c Inequality Traps 
One of the greatest repercussions of educational inequality is the perpetuation of 
further disparities across a range of socio-economic contexts. The cycle of 
disadvantage can be discussed in terms of intergenerational reproduction and social 
mobility.  Chile suffers from high levels of inequality and low levels of social 
mobility and part of the reason for this, according to Torche (2008) is that educational 
attainment. The United Nations (2005, 21) understands the mechanics of the cycle as 
follows:  
 
 ―Because such disparities are typically transmitted from 
generation to generation, access to educational and 
employment opportunities is to a certain degree inherited, 
with segments of the population systematically suffering 
exclusion.‖  
 
And Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 105) agree, using Teachman‘s (2005) research to 
argue that the greatest influence on a child‘s achievements in school is family 
background, and if this background is situated in a higher socio-economic 
environment than the child is more likely to achieve highly: 
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 ―Children do better if their parents have higher incomes and 
more education themselves, and they do better if they come 
from homes where they have a place to study…and where 
education is valued‖  
 
The analysis of Mizala and Torche (2012, 11) supports this, showing that 
characteristics such as school size, teachers‘ experience, rural location, the faith of the 
school, or additional school fees have a small influence on achievement once the 
socio-economic composition of the student body has been taken into account. Earlier 
work from Torche (2008, 3) argues that the main intergenerational barriers in the 
social structure are located in the pattern of social mobility. She comments, ―research 
suggests…an important factor mediating intergenerational association is educational 
attainment.‖ There are a couple of dimensions of this observation, the most relevant to 
this article being both the association between social background and education 
attainment and the influence of education attainment on class position. These 
dimensions indicate that inequalities, within both access to quality education and the 
opportunities to achieve highly, have major impacts on an individual‘s potential social 
mobility, as ―where there are greater inequalities of outcome, equal opportunity is a 
significantly more distant prospect.‖ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, 169) Such a 
commentary is supported by the findings of the OECD (2010, 14) PISA report. 
―Among OECD countries, a student from a more socio-economic advantaged 
background…outperforms a students from an average background by…about one 
year‘s worth of education in reading.‖ Such a significant statistic demonstrates how 
influential education, and the apparent quality of education, is to individuals 
becoming locked into a class system. ―A class is defined as much by its being-
perceived as by its being, by its consumption … as much as by its position in the 
relations of production (Bourdieu, 1984, 483). The resulting aspirations for achieving 
social status can lead to, as previously discussed, social disintegration if they are not 
realised.  
 
The impacts of traps can be seen in the work of Contreras at al (2012, 114). They 
write,  
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―Not surprisingly, the regions with the best results in the 
opportunity index for high school graduation also have the 
highest positions in the opportunity index for access to 
preschool. Conversely, those with the worst results in 
graduation from secondary school also have the lowest index 
for access to preschool.‖ 
 
Such findings serve to further emphasise the reproductive qualities of educational 
disparities and highlight the importance of disrupting the process at an early stage. 
 
 
7.6 Chapter summary 
At the time of writing (October 2012) the stalemate over education reform continues. 
The demonstrations have succeeded in showing that the Chilean education system has 
failed to provide a system that offers the same quality and opportunities to every 
student, regardless of social status, ethnicity or residence. This is despite two decades 
of a ‗growth with equity‘ strategy under the Concertación that produced a series of 
policies to deal with social disparities in the education system. It is argued that such 
persistent inequalities prevent Chile from obtaining the levels of social development 
that it seeks, regardless of its steady, if unremarkable, economic growth. Indeed, such 
high levels of disparity within schools potentially hold back growth.  
 
This Chapter has discussed the failures of the Concertación‘s neostructural policies to 
reduce inequalities within the Chilean education system and proposed that there is an 
array of contributing factors to the establishment and perpetuation of socio-economic 
disparity. For Chile to continue its development, an overhaul of its quasi-market of an 
education system would appear necessary. Whether that might be through a revised 
dependency policy approach will be discussed in the next section, but what is certainly 
required are structural changes, both economic and social, where strategies of 
inclusivity and unfair social relationships are brought in from the margins and put at 
the centre of development. 
 
Section Four will explore the relevance of a revisited dependency approach to the 
problems of inequality in the Chilean education system as discussed in this chapter. 
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Finally, a broader consideration will be made as to the application of a refreshed 
approach to socio-economic inequality.  
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Section Four___________________________________ 
 
Section Four builds off the research in the previous section regarding the persistence 
of inequality despite the Concertación‘s range of policies. Using the link established 
between the processes of inequality and dependency in Chapter Four, it proposes that 
a dependency analysis is able to contribute to finding solutions to these issues, both 
for broader socio-economic disparities and for education.  
 
 
Chapter Eight 
A dependency analysis of educational disparity, 1990 - 2010 
 
This chapter conducts a dependency analysis of the situation outlined in the previous 
chapter. It considers the core question of this research: can a revisited dependency 
approach be used to create a better understanding of how inequality operates and 
persists? A combination of research is used in this discussion: interviews during 
fieldwork in Chile, the study of Chilean socio-economic inequality, 1964 – 2010 
(Chapters Five and Six), the case study of the Chilean education system, 1990 – 2010, 
presented in Chapter Seven, and the studies of inequality and dependency in Chapters 
Three and Four respectively.  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The concept of social inequality, as suggested throughout this thesis, is complex. 
There is no singular starting point or source to eradicate and no one clear consequence 
to address. Evidently, this makes both theoretical and policy-focused approaches 
extremely difficult to construct and execute. Having already discussed in the previous 
section the ineffective attempts of Chilean governments to disrupt, restrict and control 
the different elements of socio-economic disparity, this chapter presents a dependency 
analysis of the situation of inequality in the Chilean education system. Gwynne and 
Kay (2004, 137) support such research: 
 
―The time is ripe for the re-incorporation of a number of 
the ideas of dependency and structuralist thinking which… 
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remain relevant. Such ideas must be altered to reflect 
changing global realities and past weaknesses.‖  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next two sections outline the 
rationale for a dependency analysis before establishing a framework for the study by 
using the process model introduced in Chapter Three. Following this, the study of 
educational inequality is carried out, ultimately proposing the mechanisms that drive 
the process. The subsequent section discusses how the failures of Concertación‘s 
policies to identify and disrupt these mechanisms. The final section links to the 
concluding chapter.  
 
 
8.2 The rationale of a dependency analysis of educational disparity, 1990 – 2010 
This section explores the possibility that the best way to understand and disrupt the 
process of an inequality trap is to approach it from a dependency perspective. Gwynne 
and Kay (2004, 147) comment, ―Dependency theorists…want to understand the socio-
economic and political roots of under-development and the difficulty in overcoming 
it‖ and this is what a revisited dependency approach in this case seeks to achieve. The 
same authors suggest that dependency prescribes ―effective political participation for 
lower classes, and the politics of class alliances‖ (ibid) and these elements remain 
integral to the objectives of the analysis. The following paragraphs outline some of 
the broad reasons as to why a dependency approach is applicable to this case. 
 
In the context of the unique example of Chilean education over the last two decades, a 
dependency analysis may be understood as a critique of the Concertación‘s failure to 
reduce inequality in education. This provides a ‗concrete‘ situation within which 
policies and various social relationships can be analysed. The approach is applicable 
as it views inequality, just like dependency, as a process – not a condition. 
Consequently, despite the lack of social mobility in such a highly stratified society as 
Chile, a dependency approach views the participants of the process as dynamic and 
therefore contests any charge of determinism. This is why an understanding of 
disparity as a process, not a condition, is crucial as it focuses on the movement from a 
position to participation in an integrative manner.  
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There are various processes that individuals, groups and communities follow, and 
these create different social relationships and various conditions of in/equality within 
a range of contexts. In the case of Chilean education, these relationships are 
frequently uneven and benefit some at the expense of others. These can be called 
social relations of dependency. Just as the social relations of production are 
involuntary, so too are the social relations of dependency and, equally, they are 
conditioned (but not necessarily determined) by the mode of production, i.e. 
capitalism. As the education system in Chile operates as a quasi-market, it is 
important that these social relations of dependency are therefore central to any 
understanding of the process of disparity.  
 
Uneven relationships can be found within, for example, income groups and ethnic 
groups, and within these groups there are also other unequal associations, such as 
gender and spatial segregation. A significant failure of the Concertación was not to 
put these relationships at the centre of its policymaking. Kay (1989, 181) was alert to 
the importance of this when he wrote: ―By focusing on market and exchange 
relations, such a circulationist position neglects the analysis of social relations of 
production and consequently the configuration of class and their characteristics.‖ A 
dependency approach highlights these relations as unique situations that have their 
own mechanisms and history, and recognises the need to analyse each one 
individually. By doing so, it becomes apparent that the ‗complex whole‘ that Cardoso 
and Faletta (1979) spoke of not only considers the external and internal concerns of a 
nation, but also of communities within that nation, and of groups and individuals 
within those communities.  
 
Therefore for the processes of disparity to be disrupted any new approach needs to be 
antagonistic to the current environment. For a dependency approach to do this in a 
modern Chilean context requires it to act as a critic of neostructural and neoliberal 
policies. As suggested, this requires a discussion as to why the Concertación‘s 
policies were unable to prevent ongoing educational inequality. Prior to this however, 
a framework for the analysis needs to be established. This will help identify what the 
mechanisms were that drove the process of educational inequality in the following 
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section. It is proposed that the best framework for a dependency analysis of 
educational inequality is the conceptual process model (position-participation-
possibility) introduced in Chapter Three. Figure 8.1 shows the two stages of the 
process model, and the integration between them, that are relevant to the study.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Adapted conceptual model of the process of socio-economic inequality 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
8.3 A dependency analysis of educational disparity, 1990 - 2010 
This section uses dependency concepts to identify the mechanisms that drove the 
process of educational disparity between 1990 and 2010. The aim is to create a better 
understanding of how these mechanisms worked together to operate the process of 
inequality. By doing so it prepares a contextual and theoretical framework to examine 
the failure of policies to disrupt the process in the final section of this chapter.  
 
8.3.a Position 
Araujo and Martuccelli (2011, 164) suggest that, in Chile, individuals must create 
their own responses to structural failures. What they label as ‗positional stability‘ is 
no longer only transmitted by ancestry or surname, nor by class or wage; but it now 
requires personal and social strategies to define it. ―Consequently, positional 
inconsistency is a structural phenomenon of prime importance in contemporary 
Chilean society.‖ This inconsistency is influenced by the variable nature of social 
relations and this section considers the importance of ensuring that these relations, 
such as between socio-economic status, gender and ethnicity, are at the core of any 
analysis of inequality. 
 
8.3.a(i) Marginalisation of social relations 
Social relations can be grouped within the context of, in this case, education. The 
overlapping nature of these relationships requires an acknowledgment of a ‗matrix of 
Process 
Position 
 
Uneven integration 
(power and prejudice barriers) 
Participation 
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social relations‘ and such a matrix can be used to identify ‗micro-dependencies‘ 
within particular social relations. If they remain peripheral to the analysis, it becomes 
more difficult to understand an individual‘s social position and ultimately to stimulate 
social mobility and participation. For example, when looked at in the context of 
education, it can be argued that uneven social relations seriously influence the levels 
of access and outcomes, as can be seen in the data from Chapter Seven.  
 
Field-work interviews, focused on socio-economic status within an educational 
context, asked whether an individual‘s social position, as decided by income, creates 
relationships of social dependency and consequently prevents a fair integration into 
social participation. Ernesto Treviño (2011, pers. comm), the Director of the Centro 
de Politicas Comparadas de Educación, Universidad Diego Portales, believes that it 
does, suggesting that the causes of disparity in the Chilean education system are 
socio-economic and are reinforced by Chilean society and policies. He says, 
―Segregation in institutions is caused by social capital – split into groups that rarely 
mix,‖ and ―The education system mirrors structural inequality – a meritocratic 
discourse.‖ He maintains that social disadvantage is due to prejudice. Such prejudice 
is one of the barriers that individuals meet while attempting to participate fully and 
equally in society.  
 
The dependency notions of the ‗monopolisation of the mind‘ and the ‗internalisation 
of the external‘ (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) are relevant here to showing how 
students construct their own expectations and society‘s expectations of them. This is 
evident in the work of Carnoy and McEwen (2003, 14): 
 
―Lower income parents might not be as likely to choose 
higher-performing schools with higher social status student 
bodies even when their children might qualify for these 
schools or they could afford to pay the somewhat higher costs 
associated with them. Their self-perception as not 
―belonging‖ in these better public or private schools could 
explain why the utility functions apparently vary by parents‘ 
education. Less-educated parents‘ perceptions of their 
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position in the social structure may prevent them from 
making choices to send their children to higher status 
schools.‖ 
 
However, Carnoy and McEwen (2003, 16) point out, ―higher status schools are no 
better at producing high achievement scores for a child of a given socio-economic 
background than public schools. They are better at attracting higher scoring students.‖ 
Given the highly stratified Chilean system the poorer results of students in public 
schools might be attributed to a peer effect; ―when less gifted students are grouped 
together, they are less likely to do well scholastically‖. (Drago and Pareda, 2011, 165) 
This simply means that higher status schools, almost exclusively located in higher-
income neighbourhoods, are able to build ‗cultural capital‘ and raise academic 
expectations. 
 
Consequently, such inequality is strikingly apparent in the process of accessing 
schools, which is overwhelmingly determined by an individual‘s residential situation, 
but also in: the quality of learning received due to funding; teachers‘ salaries and the 
internalisation of low expectations; and consequently in highly unbalanced outcomes 
for the students. These factors were evident during the visit to the Centro Politécnico 
Particular San Ramón school, where it was suggested that almost one third of the 
female students became pregnant during their schooling; and that 80% of the students‘ 
mothers are maids and 90% go on to work in manual service jobs after graduating. 
Such statistics indicate a certain cycle of opportunity and behaviour. Torche (2005, 
316) comments on the dangers of such a cycle: 
 
―The effect of parental resources and conditions when 
growing up on individual educational attainment – is a key 
component of the intergenerational reproduction of inequality 
in contemporary societies.‖ 
 
If, as Treviño (2011, pers. comm) says, ―Segregation in institutions is caused by social 
capital – students are split into groups that rarely mix,‖ then such a cycle can easily 
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become normalised and it would hardly be surprising if students were to accept their 
position and status in society based on what school they attend.  
 
The need to highlight positional inequality (e.g. income and class) as an influential 
factor of ongoing disparity can be seen in comments made by Rocio Venegas (2011, 
pers. comm), the Secretary of Communications for the Student Federation at 
Universidad de Valparaíso. When referring to the methods of Pinochet, she said in an 
interview: ―Break education, break the people,‖ and suggested that the significant 
difference in the quality between public and private schooling perpetuated this 
concept. Those with a weaker education, or a perceived weaker education, usually 
enter into lower-paid employment and Vanae Sinclair (2011, pers. comm) questions 
this as a fair process. She asks: ―Is it better for the poor to have a worse education 
because the mode of production still requires workers?‖ Although this might be 
considered a simplistic view, it does highlight how education can influence how an 
individual may perceive their role in society – and, by inference, how someone from a 
lower socio-economic community may see themselves, accept their social position, 
and subsequently contribute to static levels of social mobility.  
 
Another example of the importance of social relations can be seen in the impediment 
of spatial segregation. Felipe Salazar (2011, pers. comm), also from the Centro de 
Politicas Comparadas de Educación, notes that spatial segregation, especially in 
Santiago, contributes significantly to the creation of disparity. Treviño (2011, 
pers.comm) agrees, noting that rural children have a clear disadvantage when it comes 
to the quality of education: in terms of mobility to attend higher education, isolation 
plays an important role. 
 
There is an obvious relationship between location, income and ethnicity as many 
Mapuche live in rural poverty or in urban destitution in the poorest areas of Santiago 
and Mapuche students are often the poorest students. Ethnic groups in Chile, which 
account for close to 10% of the population, such as the largest ethnic population of the 
Mapuche, also suffer from an asymmetric integration into the national educational 
system. Indeed, it can be argued that they are inserted into an alien system; a system 
not based on important aspects of Mapuche identity, such as oral tradition and the 
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Mapudungun language. This is what Elisa Loncon (2011, pers. comm), from the 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile, calls ‗Indian knowledge.‘ (Loncón, 2011). The 
impact of learning the knowledge of another culture in another language cannot be 
underestimated and recalls the work of Said discussed earlier in this thesis, and 
Evans‘ (1979) neo-colonial idea of ‗the monopolisation of the mind‘. González (2011, 
pers. comm), the Director of the School of Pedagogy in the Universidad de la 
Frontera, Temuco, suggested that: ―There is an impact on cultural identity – a process 
of ‗whitewashing‘ for the students. They have to learn a culture but lose their own.‖ 
The result, as argued in this dependency analysis, is an uneven relationship that denies 
many students the equal opportunities to succeed, even before they can fully 
participate.  
 
However, the imbalances are also sustained by cultural circumstances. For example, 
there are gender disparities also present in the inter-ethnic context. Loncón (ibid) 
believes that it is more difficult for women than men to achieve a quality education, as 
they tend to be more dedicated to keeping the traditional community alive and 
consequently stay at home to look after their families, while men tend to migrate to 
urban areas more in search of work. 
 
The existence of enduring dependency is evident in a number of interviews with 
Chilean academics concerning ethnic inequity. Guillermo Williamson (2011, pers. 
comm), the Director of the Department of Education at the Universidad de la 
Frontera, Temuco, suggests that social mobility is very difficult without intervention 
and claims that ―for capitalism to work everyone needs to start at the same point.‖ 
Alejandro Herrera (2011, pers. comm), from the same university, agrees, stating, 
―Mapuche are disadvantaged because they are Mapuche. As simple as that.‖ 
 
In summary, to truly understand how inequality operates within an educational, or 
any, context, it is imperative to understand the individual or group as existing within a 
matrix of social relations. These overlapping relations can create various and disparate 
‗micro-dependencies‘, or social relations of dependency. It is impossible to conduct a 
worthwhile analysis without positioning these relations as central to the approach, as 
to do otherwise would be akin to starting the analysis at the halfway mark.  
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8.3.b Integration 
A dependency analysis requires a robust discussion of marginalisation. Certain groups 
in Chile struggle to integrate themselves fully into society, which – in the case of 
education – results in groups such as those with low-incomes, Mapuche and rural-
based not fully participating.  Singer (1973, 312, as cited in Kay, 1989, 119) suggests 
that there is a need to better understand the relationship between marginalisation and 
dependency: 
 
―Although there are significant causal relations between 
dependence and marginality, these relations can be better 
studied and analysed at a more concrete level, in which 
dependence ceases to be the principal source of social 
determination so as to become one of many factors which 
influence development, urbanisation and marginality in 
societies like the Latin American.‖  
 
Examples of uneven insertion demonstrate some of the issues of educational 
inequality in Chile, such as the insertion of Mapuche culture and language into a 
‗national knowledge‘ curriculum; the marginalisation of class issues; and the social 
relations of production, all of which are related to the commodification of education. 
These elements have all led to segregation and, as Matías Reeves (2011, pers. comm), 
the Social Director from Educación 2020, a citizen movement that seeks to improve 
the quality and equity of Chilean education,  pointed out during his interview, ―The 
biggest problem with Chile‘s education system is with segregation.‖ This segregation 
means that integration can be a vulnerable process, especially with the barriers of 
established social stratification, restricted social mobility, and entrenched dependent 
relationships, such as rural and urban, which Kay (ibid, 96) calls sectoral 
disequilibria. An individual‘s ethnicity in Chile can also appreciably influence the 
level of educational participation they can achieve. During interviews with Loncon 
(2011, pers. comm), Erazo (2011, pers. comm) and Yéssica González (2011, pers. 
comm) all three remarked that Mapuche students‘ participation was held back due to 
cultural reasons. In other words Mapuche students were being unfairly integrated into 
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an alien system – what Treviño (2011, pers. comm) called ―desk colonialisation.‖ 
Erazo and Loncon discussed the notions of ‗national knowledge‘ and ‗Indian 
knowledge‘, suggesting that Mapuche students were stranded between the two as a 
considerable distance separated the schools‘ codes and the local indigenous culture. 
Loncon concluded that, ―There is discrimination inside the schools and the 
curriculum.‖  
 
A dependency approach points to negative consequences of uneven integration, 
viewing the process as one in the same thing as marginalisation. As Kay (ibid, 101) 
says, marginality is ―a particular manner of social integration and participation rather 
than non-integration and non-participation.‖ This also recalls the dependency concept 
of disarticulation, as individuals and communities within Chile, having been 
integrated into the education system in varying fashions, are not connected to each 
other to form a fully functioning society. Some groups, for example the Mapuche, are 
being assimilated into ‗foreign‘ knowledge, some income groups find themselves on a 
direct path to the top universities in the country, while some students are unable to 
access that path and have no choice but to engage with low-income work. Meller 
(2011b, pers. comm) finds the blame for this in the commodification of education: 
―the market has failed – it has invaded universities.‖ 
 
The Chilean education system under the Concertación presents a concrete situation to 
explore the role of marginalisation in creating disparity. Kay (ibid) suggests 
―marginality is a characteristic of dependent societies and a sign of its 
disarticulation,‖ and the disruption of such disarticulation would need to come 
through preventing both exclusion and unfair integration. No individual in Chile is 
excluded from having an education but many are excluded from a high quality of 
education. Such exclusion is at the same time an unfair integration, as the higher 
quality of education in Chile then the greater the likelihood of tertiary education and a 
career with greater earning potential. According to Sunkel (1973, 142) such a study of 
marginality can be understood in terms of: 
 
 ―the different forms of racial, social, cultural, political and 
other types of discrimination which may lead to a loss of 
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accessibility to the means of production and transfer 
necessary for obtaining, maintaining or increasing a 
reasonable and stable income…In order to grasp the 
phenomenon of marginality in all its complexity, it must be 
related to the process of underdevelopment, of which it is an 
essential part, as much as the phenomenon of dependency, 
with which, therefore, it must also be related.‖  
 
It terms of how a dependency analysis might operate in this respect, there is a 
significant overlap with social position and participation levels. Preventing 
vulnerability by reducing levels of segregation is crucial to successful integration and 
consequently full social engagement. A dependency analysis would look at whether all 
socio-economic groups were being offered a consistent level of quality of teaching and 
access to resources in both urban and rural schools; an appropriate level of indigenous 
content and language in the school curriculum to allow for high levels of engagement 
and relevance; and a university system that was socially responsible in opportunities to 
gain admittance. This responsibility extends to regulations on content, research output 
and consistent graduation criteria. By examining these aspects of integration a 
dependency approach would be looking to disrupt intergenerational social relations of 
dependency by ensuring equal opportunities for success at a secondary and – if 
applicable to the student – a tertiary level by preventing marginalisation. Once again, 
this methodology extends across the ‗micro‘ level of relations between incomes, ethnic 
and spatial groups.  
 
8.3.c Participation 
The process of an individual‘s insertion into the education system has a significant 
influence on the levels of participation and quality they can expect. Participants are 
exposed to structures and processes that, should they already be at a disadvantage, can 
further prevent full and meaningful involvement. As Sunkel (1973, 135) states: ―An 
adequate analytical framework for the study of underdevelopment and development 
must rest of the notions of process, structure and system.‖ Two such structures and 
processes that have contributed to the disparity present in the Chilean education 
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system are the commodification of education and structural heterogeneity in the 
country‘s production system. These two concepts are discussed below.  
 
8.3.c(i) Commodification of education 
In the case of Chile the dual system of public and private provision has meant that the 
societal inequalities have been mirrored in education, leaving those already 
disadvantaged because of their societal ‗position‘ unable to use their schooling to 
access a higher quality of participation. By making education a commodity it means 
the quasi market is driven by profit, not human development and it is the poor and 
marginalised that miss out. Chilean education has varying qualities to which access is 
determined by the ability to pay. Therefore Chile‘s highly-stratified society was 
mirrored – and subsequently perpetuated – in education.  
 
This stratification works on two levels, both of which exacerbate situations of 
dependency: firstly, the school a student attends has a significant influence on further 
study and career opportunities; and secondly, if a lower socio-economic status family 
wishes to spend the extra money – on top of any government subsidy – to put their 
child through private, or more likely government subsidised, education then there is a 
very real risk of high levels of debt.  
 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 105) explain this debt trap: ―Children do better if their 
parents have higher incomes and more education themselves, and they do better if 
they come from homes…where education is valued.‖ As a result of this, families are 
understandably tempted to spend more money to send their children to private 
schools. This type of debt trap, although on a different scale than what many 
dependency theorists discussed, sits very much with a dependency discourse and 
relates closely to the concept of consumption patterns that Furtado spoke of (as 
explored in Kay, 1989, 132). The debt trap in Chile is concentrated in the lower-
middle class and the middle class. Patricio Meller (2011b, pers. comm) said, ―the 
middle class is being hit the hardest through consumerism…and the resultant debt‖ 
and Sunkel (2011, pers. comm) agreed: ―The boom of education connected to the 
market voucher system has led to debt. The middle class is immersed in 
consumerism.‖  
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Education has been absorbed into a society that has a middle class ‗immersed in 
consumerism‘ and the result is debt for families and consequently a large proportion of 
a class that is unable to enjoy social mobility. As Bromley (1987) says, ―Surely this 
‗loss of control‘ is the most classic manifestation of dependency.‖ (quoted in Kay, 
1989, 185). What can be taken from this discussion is that the consumption patterns 
evident on a global scale are being mirrored within national economies. It was Sunkel 
(1973, 152-3) who commented – thirty-nine years ago – that it was a fundamental fact 
that ―Inequality is the result of the internationalised consumption sector of high 
incomes.‖ This pattern has been allowed to repeat on the national scale in education. 
 
One of education‘s primary goals is to give people more opportunities, not reduce 
them and there is a strong argument that this is what is happening in Chile as a result 
of consumerism. Marketing of education is contributing to a rapidly developing 
consumer culture. According to Udo Jacobsen (2011, pers. comm), an academic from 
the Universidad de Valparaíso: ―students tend to decide through marketing.‖ He 
claims that, ―There are no more citizens, only consumers. Even the students are 
thinking like consumers; not students, not citizens.‖  
 
Matías Reeves (2011, pers. comm) commented in an interview that the Sistema de 
Medición de Calidad de la Educación (SIMCE) results shows a huge difference 
between wealthy schools and poorer schools. This comment clearly indicates that 
there is a division in the levels of quality participation. Reeves (ibid) suggests, ―Public 
schools can be good but marketing makes the private-voucher schools look better.‖ 
This statement highlights one of the major issues of a public / private education 
system, that being how private schools can advertise, creating a sense of a higher 
quality ‗product‘, which then feeds into the notion of emulative consumption – that 
everyday life becomes a exhibition of the ability to buy the best quality. This is very 
much part of the process of creating inequality through levels of participation, as 
essentially students (and their families) are purchasing a quality of education. As 
Jonathon Barton (2011, pers. comm) says, ―Free choice? Aren‘t you buying education 
based on your income?‖ 
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It would appear from these comments that the education system is perpetuating the 
process of social inequality. The system appears to legitimise this disparity through 
the integration of graduates into the workforce. This is achieved through a 
hierarchical division of labour in Chile, where various qualities of education prepare 
and ‗rank‘ graduates for different levels of labour and subsequent salary. 
Qualifications have become one of the most important means for social participation 
at high levels and the pathways to achieve these qualifications are not evenly 
meritocratic. The Chilean education system has ostensibly reproduced massive 
differences in wealth by reducing competition for the most desirable employment.  
 
Danae Sinclair (2011, pers. comm), a medical student and member of Izquierda 
Autonoma, a leftist movement of students mainly from the University of Chile and the 
Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso, added to the notion of a process of 
inequality being driven by unfair integration. She commented that, ―Segregation 
means that people don‘t care about the public system as they‘ll never use it.‖ This is a 
particularly interesting remark and highlights how full participation can be prevented 
by attitudes created by ‗every-person-for-themselves‘ individualism. Why should the 
wealthier members of society care about a system they don‘t use?  As Treviño (2011, 
pers. comm) says, ―The fees create socio-economic segregation – the perfect system 
of classification; perfect price discrimination.‖ 
 
Consumption patterns feed inequality and create a trap. ―The idea that inequality 
ratchets up the competitive pressure to consume is not just speculation. It has 
observable effects.‖ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, 227) This is evident in the example 
of how some private universities in Chile do not ask for PSU grades for admission: 
―Just pay and show up. This is dangerous as students are ill-prepared and it can be 
very expensive if you cannot get a job.‖ (Reeves, 2011, pers. comm) The lack of 
regulation of the employment market means that university students, heavily in debt 
from high fees, enter an extremely competitive market where – quite often dependent 
on social status and networks – they may be unable to find quality work.  
 
Arguments have developed on both sides of the philosophical debate as to whether the 
commodification of education is beneficial or detrimental for students. For those who 
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support opening education up to market drivers, the argument is that state intervention 
is regressive and the natural self-interest of humans should be employed for the 
common good through market mechanisms, most importantly choice. Scullion (2011) 
adds to this that governments turn to markets because they believe that growth and 
expansion are essential if the economy is to remain globally competitive. Conversely, 
there is the line of reasoning that market outcomes tend to be fundamentally unfair and 
that the allocation of resources should not therefore be reliant on them. Le Grand 
(2003a, 101) looks at both of these perspectives and comments that it is not so much a 
dialogue about equality and the extent of choice, but rather the equality of choice. 
 
―To accept the argument that there is a strong relationship 
between equity and choice does not imply accepting any 
particular view concerning the extent of the choices that 
people actually face; the relationship between equity and 
choice is a matter of value, the extent of choice a matter of 
fact…A society with less inequality in choice sets will be one 
with less inequity; the challenge for policy is to move in the 
direction of greater equality of choices, and hence greater 
equity, without too serious a compromise of other values‖.  
 
However, the reality can be markedly different from the theory. As Le Grand (2003b, 
117) says, ―those market pressures are quite intense." The results of such market 
pressures in education are league tables, performance-related pay scales, service-
orientation, ‗creaming‘ of the best students (where private schools select the most 
academically able students), and a profit-driven focus on ‗lower-cost‘ students (e.g. 
those with higher grades, better attendance records and lower drop-out or failure rates). 
Drago and Pareda (2011, 165) use the work of Carnoy to challenge the notion that 
competition has a positive effect and instead suggest that it only benefits higher-
income students because, ―if schools are in competition with one another, they will try 
to select for the top students‖. Muñoz (2011) agrees that the consequences of such 
market behaviour are not equal. The 2011 UNESCO report, The right to education: a 
comparative viewpoint. Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Finland, which he authored, 
revealed that schools with good exam results experienced a reduction of pupils coming 
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from poor backgrounds, while those with weak results experienced the opposite. 
Muñoz (2011) commented in a media interview that: 
 
―The system which characterises Chilean education is geared 
to privatisation processes which tend to segmentation, 
exclusion, discrimination and highly selective mechanisms.‖  
 
He continues to propose that ―there are no doubts that the admission tests establish 
criteria and differentiation effects which in practice lead to selectivity and probably to 
stigmatisation‖, while the scholarships system in Chile, which ―protects and benefits 
private initiative,‖ prevents education being appreciated as a public asset. (ibid)  
 
There is an observable knock-on effect here, which has already been touched on in the 
earlier comments concerning cycles of disadvantage. The social stratification that is 
strengthened in such a system cannot be regulated or improved by straightforward 
monetary transfers, as this will not succeed in eliminating either economic or social 
barriers. As Le Grand (2003a, 92) comments, ―it is clear that the cost of college fees, 
or the existence of racial discrimination, are factors beyond individual control.‖ 
Individuals have extraneous restrictions, obstacles and responsibilities, which are tied 
up with social status and if the schooling system is deliberately set up in such a 
market-driven manner for successful schools to attract wealthier students then such 
disadvantages will remain. As Muñoz (2011) argues, Chilean parents are given a great 
deal of responsibility of ensuring quality education for their children and if those 
parents are already caught in an inequality trap it can be hard for the children to escape 
a similar pattern. 
 
There are also the behavioural effects of consumerism and marketisation, such as the 
‗customer is always right‘, which sit uncomfortably in an educational setting. Scullion 
(2011) argues that these effects in higher education are incongruent for student 
learners as they cannot be allowed to ―be lord of all they survey‖ regardless of the 
scale of their investment. Research by Stillerman (2004) discusses further effects of 
the commodification of education, looking more at parental behaviour. He suggests 
that, ―consumption may be a means to cement personal ties; and consumption is one 
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way that social classes police their boundaries with other groups.‖ (74) This would 
support the notion that market forces in the schooling system make a significant 
contribution to further social stratification, and is backed up by Carnoy and McEwen‘s 
(2009, 19) statement: ―Chile‘s experience also suggests that vouchers increase 
inequality in the social system, mainly through peer effects.‖  
 
All of these points indicate that a system in which retail patterns are paralleled, debt 
traps are entered into, and profit creates a lack of responsibility for the quality of 
schooling, is failing the majority of Chilean students. It is placing them into a highly 
stratified system that impacts their ability to participate in society on an equal footing, 
creating social relations of dependency that will pass along generations. Part of the 
reason for this inter-generational situation is that poor education links to the causes of 
an established structural heterogeneity in Chile. 
 
8.3.c(ii) Structural heterogeneity 
ECLAC‘s (2010) comment below demonstrates the significance of the concept of 
structural heterogeneity to understanding Chilean educational inequality: 
 
―Structural heterogeneity largely explains acute social 
inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, because gaps 
in productivity reflect, as well as reinforce, gaps in 
capabilities, in the incorporation of technical progress, in 
bargaining power, in access to social safety nets and in 
options for upward occupational mobility throughout working 
life.‖ (86) 
 
Chile‘s structural heterogeneity plays a major role in the quality of education 
individuals have access to. The disparity of salary and employment opportunity is 
significant and this situation influences what type of school is affordable and suitable 
in a privatised system. In an interview on this topic Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (2011, 
pers. comm) commented that there had been socio-economic progress between 1990 
and 2010 – but nowhere near enough: ―The Concertación tripled wages but it wasn‘t 
enough. There has been progress but…you need to have income integration and 
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education creates that.‖ The vicious circle of job vulnerability and poor quality 
education was emphasised by Ffrench-Davis when he said, ―A strong factor is the 
origin of students‘ background – the wages and productivity‖ and subsequently 
proposed that investment in education is a long-term solution to macro-economic 
issues. He suggested that education creates income integration and recommended that 
the four administrations should have looked to ―the middle and bottom [because] 
education and labour training and a secure macro-economy, and developed small and 
medium firms, equal growth and equity.‖  
 
Infante and Sunkel (2009, 145) point out that a high level of societal inclusion though 
work creates, ―better primary distribution of income at source.‖ Ffrench-Davis (2010) 
shares a similar view, that the generation of productive employment, what he calls 
decent jobs with rising real incomes, is the main channel through which economic and 
social progress is transmitted. Such statements take on added significance due to the 
recent changes Chile has undergone on the global scale. According to the OECD 
(2011a, 28), Chile has experienced ―significant structural changes, driven by closer 
integration into the global economy and…rapid technological progress‖ since the 
1980s. These changes, the report argues, have rewarded highly skilled workers more 
than low-skilled ones and thus impacted income distribution. This is primarily due to 
two factors: the integration of trade and financial markets has created a greater demand 
for highly-skilled workers and, secondly, technological advances have also favoured 
skilled labour. This creates a complicated landscape for students to navigate in order to 
successfully cross the educational quality gaps between public and private schools. 
 
These gaps, influenced significantly by income disparity, can be viewed as barriers to 
individuals and groups wanting to remove themselves from the cycle of disadvantage, 
leaving them socially immobile and unable to access higher quality education. 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 163) reason that, 
 
 ―social mobility is lower and geographical segregation 
greater in more unequal societies. It is as if greater inequality 
makes the social structure of society more rigid and 
movement up and down the social ladder more difficult.‖  
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This would appear to be the case in Chile. Research conducted by Torche (2008,1) 
argued that evidence about the main influencers of mobility was inconclusive. 
However ―the most likely candidate to affect fluidity rates is the level of cross 
sectional inequality, under the assumption that a more unequal distribution of 
resources will determine differential access to opportunity across generations.‖ This is 
most certainly true of access to different qualities of education. In the case of Chile, 
Torche (ibid, 3) suggested that that the barriers to mobility were closely related to the 
structure of economic inequality and this explained the high concentration at the top of 
the income distribution but less disparities among the lower and middle classes.  
 
―This corresponds to the Chilean pattern of intergenerational 
and intragenerational mobility, characterised by high barriers 
to and from the wealthiest income group (largely composed 
of college-educated professionals) but significant fluidity 
among middle and lower classes.‖ 
 
Therefore a failure at a macro-economic and macro-social scale to address a 
productive system that perpetuates socio-economic disparity, and consequently social 
immobility, can be argued to have contributed to the unbroken cycle of inequality 
within the education system.  
 
Dependency theorists used the notion of an enclave economy to define an industry that 
was controlled by foreign capital and therefore unprofitable for the host country. It 
was argued that the foreign companies often exploited workers and manipulated the 
local systems to maximise their gain. In these cases the enclave economies contributed 
to a country‘s structural heterogeneity by restricting wage growth and – as often 
unions were suppressed – job security. The education system can be argued to have 
played a similar role in Chile on a different scale, channelling certain socio-economic 
groups into particular schools of different qualities. This establishes a restrictive 
pattern wherein the graduates from these schools are equally unlikely to attain high 
grades and hence experience – and contribute to – social mobility through career 
opportunities. Torche (2005, 20) agrees: 
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―In general, students of private-paid schools fared better than 
did those who attended private-voucher schools, who, in turn, 
had higher attainment than those who attended public 
schools… Naturally, this does not mean that the voucher 
sector that emerged after the privatisation reform created 
educational inequality, but it does mean that this sector 
became a relevant arena in which inequality was actualised 
and reproduced.‖ 
 
Members of the wealthier class exclusively own private schools and, as these schools 
operate on unregulated fees, salary-systems and investment, a gap continues to 
develop between the quality of private and public education, as well as between the 
types of employment that can be expected by graduates, and so the cycle is 
perpetuated. This situation is enhanced by the action of ‗creaming‘. Such a practice 
isn‘t permitted but is ―common and they get away with it‖, according to Felipe Salazar 
(2011, pers. comm). He explains that a law was put in place in 2009/10 to ban entrance 
tests for students going into Grade 1-6 but not from Grade 7. Torche (2005, 8) 
suggested that there were two characteristics of the Chilean voucher system that 
perpetuated the practice of particular schools ‗stealing‘ the better students: ―voucher 
schools were established in more-affluent areas of the country, where business was 
more profitable. Second, they could select students according to their own criteria, in 
contrast to public schools, which were forced by law to accept all students who 
registered.‖ The comparisons between the education system and enclave economies 
inspires the term ‗education enclave‘, which is a good description of the role 
dependency suggests it plays. 
 
The relationship between the idea of an education enclave is strongly linked to another 
dependency concept, that of sub-imperialism. This situation has been partly created by 
the local market taking advantage of the lack of investment into the public education 
system to establish a commodity that is of a much higher quality and therefore 
exclusive to those that can afford it. With such influence held by private business, it 
creates a void of responsibility for the quality of education across all the classes and in 
234 
 
 
all parts of the country. Romero (2011, pers. comm) suggests that this is due to, 
―neoliberalism creating a lack of governance; a lack of responsibility.‖ Salazar (2011, 
pers. comm) is very clear about how dangerous he thinks this is:  
 
―How does profit-making create inequality? There are one 
million university students and 10% are in good universities, 
while the other 90% are in poor institutions where they learn 
nothing but get charged top dollar, being told they will get 
great jobs but don‘t. Poor people pay a lot of money for poor 
services and are then at a disadvantage in a difficult work 
environment.‖ 
 
The ongoing process of internal colonialism can also be considered in an ethnic 
context. Kay (1989, 85) cites Stavenhagen (1986, 89) concerning the usefulness of 
internal colonialism in understanding disparities in ethnic contexts: ―Ethnic demands 
may be couched in more cultural or economic, rather than in political or territorial 
terms.‖ In the case of Chilean education, it can be argued that many indigenous 
students find themselves at a disadvantage due, among others, to discrimination 
through the mechanisms of linguistic, private education and rural dwelling. The level 
of this discrimination was emphasised by Herrera (2011, pers. comm) when he said, 
―90% of Mapuche children cannot speak their own language – their parents don‘t 
teach it to avoid discrimination.‖ Loncón (2011, pers. comm) touches on the origin of 
this discrimination pointing out that, ―Chileans claim not to discriminate but without a 
knowledge of the indigenous, how can they not?‖ This internal pattern of exclusion 
sits within a dependency approach and displays once again how established structures 
within Chile prevent full participation in the education system, and consequently in 
employment. It is this segregation, based on position, integration, educational 
privatisation and structural heterogeneity, which dependency describes so well, and by 
doing so reveals the various mechanisms by which full and equal participation is 
denied.  
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8.3.d Summary 
Using the framework of the process model in Figure 8.1, this dependency analysis 
scrutinised the situation of educational disparity in Chile. It focused on two stages of 
the process: position and participation and the integration between them. It is 
acknowledged that the process is ostensibly an inequality trap, with social position 
influencing social participatory levels and vice-versa. However, it is valuable to 
maintain the distinct stages so as to achieve a better understanding of the discrete 
mechanisms of the process. These mechanisms can be seen in Figure 8.2
25
.  
 
For ‗position‘ the analysis proposed that social relations should be central to any 
policy or theoretical approach. It emphasised that ‗micro-dependencies‘ need to be 
understood within a matrix of social relations in which various social elements, such 
as income or ethnicity, overlap. The analysis concentrated on the concepts of the 
monopolisation of the mind and the ‗internalisation of the external‘ to better 
understand how social dependency operates. The process of integration was discussed 
in terms of marginalisation and disarticulation to indicate how an individual or group 
may engage with society at an immediate disadvantage. Regarding the stage of 
participation, the commodification of the education system and the continuation of 
structural heterogeneity are presented as mechanisms of the process of disparity. It 
also suggested that the low levels of social mobility in Chile contribute to the 
persistence of disparity. These were explored using dependency concepts such as debt 
traps and consumption patterns. Further ideas such as educational enclaves and 
comparable processes to internal colonisation within the education sector were also 
discussed.  
 
Overall, this analysis has established a comprehensive theoretical and contextual 
framework for a discussion on why the Concertación‘s policies failed to address 
disparity in education. This is undertaken in the following section. 
 
 
  
                                               
25
 The mechanisms overlap and could potentially be positioned in different stages of the process but it 
is argued here that they have the most influence where they have been placed. 
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Figure 8.2:     Outline of a dependency analysis of educational disparity, 1990 - 2010 
Process Mechanism Relevant dependency concept 
Position Marginalisation of social relations Monopolisation of the mind 
‗Internalisation of the external‘ 
Integration  Exclusion / marginalisation 
Disarticulation   
Participation Commodification of education Debt trap 
Consumption patterns 
Enclaves 
Internal colonisation Structural heterogeneity 
Source: Author 
 
 
8.4 A discussion on the Concertación’s failure to prevent educational disparity 
This section reflects on the mechanisms outlined in the previous section to achieve a 
better understanding of why the policies implemented by the Concertación failed to 
address high levels of educational inequality.  
 
8.4.a  Marginalisation of social relations 
Although the Concertación targeted education through social policies, they were 
unable to disrupt the process that created inequality within relationships based on 
class, race, gender etc. The suggestion is that these individual units of analysis were 
not focused on and this permitted the process to continue. There is also a need to 
reflect on these elements at different scales as well, for example at the individual, the 
community and the national levels, all within a complex whole. 
 
Although many of the Concertación‘s schooling policies were directly linked to 
helping lower socio-economic groups, such as the Montegrande and ‗Chile Crece 
Contigo‘ projects, they failed to attend to the fact that it was the imbalanced 
relationship between rich and poor that maintained the structural inequality. By 
focusing completely on (albeit very important) issues such as vital learning skills the 
opportunity was missed to disrupt the structural processes that produced different 
qualities of education for different economic groups, and indeed to eliminate the 
elements of segregation and marginalisation that created cycles of dependency.  
 
As already argued, the decentring of the social relations of production in the approach 
to inequality contributes to the persistence of cycles of disadvantage and social 
immobility. The system that perpetuates these cycles, however, was actually supported 
and nurtured by the government, that being the commodification of education and the 
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introduction of consumer choice in a market system. By continuing to support and 
operate a voucher system that was established during the dictatorship, the 
Concertación has naturalised an unfair insertion for many into education. The system 
can be seen as a mirror of Chile‘s socio-economic stratification, a system of 
segmentation through price discrimination. This chapter has clearly demonstrated that 
publically- and privately-educated students can expect a very different quality of 
education at all levels. Of course, entrance into privately-run schools is not an option 
for the vast majority of children in Chile, so, put simply, in a country of high-income 
disparity such as Chile, a market approach to education seriously disadvantages those 
without resources.  
 
By producing such comparatively low levels of investment in public education and 
continuing to support a system that further widened the gaps of achievement, the 
Concertación failed to supply its poorest citizens with an equal opportunity to break 
the cycle of socio-economic disadvantage. Despite Lagos‘ innovative strategy to 
‗individualise disadvantage‘ through inclusive and rights-based programmes such as 
Programa Puente and Chile Solidario, it still dealt with individuals outside of 
relationships. This might improve the unique situations of individuals or families but 
would not release them from unfair contextual relationships, which maintained, and 
potentially aggravated, the condition of disparity.  
 
Although – as already seen – the Concertación instigated certain policies to reduce 
inter-ethnic inequalities of access and quality, they were either not easy to implement 
or didn‘t go far enough to integrate a knowledge of indigenous culture into the 
national curriculums (Loncón, 2011, pers. comm), and segregation has been allowed to 
persist within the system. These ‗micro-relationships‘ of inequality within the market 
system are reproduced in individual schools due partly to prejudices that are fuelled by 
a society that has clear winners and losers. Without intervention to provide quality 
public education in rural areas with an integrated curriculum, then these disparities can 
be expected to persist. 
 
Treviño (2011, pers. comm) and Loncon (ibid) both discussed the Sector Lingua 
Indigena, the special programme for bilingual schools, which was introduced by the 
238 
 
 
Chilean Ministry of Education in 2009.  The programme instructed all schools with at 
least 20% of indigenous students to have a course on indigenous languages. However 
there are very few trained teachers and inadequate resources to teach with, especially 
as many of the indigenous languages have a variety of dialects.  
 
As mentioned, socio-economic relations of dependency overlap with socio-cultural 
and geographical relationships too but the need remains to isolate them as much as is 
possible to attain a fuller picture of the process of inequality. The cycle of dependency 
needs to be broken by a fuller participation in schooling from ethnic minorities in 
Chile; this would lead to a support of the extension and implementation of 
programmes (e.g. ‗Sector Lengua Indígena‘).  The growth of initiatives such as 
‗Araucanía Aprende‘, piloted under the current Chilean government, which supplies 
transportation to connect rural schools is also a positive approach. The need for this is 
very evident in the statistics that 40% of all schools in Chile are in rural areas, but 
these schools only enrol 10% of students and usually only have one or two teachers. 
Such ideas would challenge segregation issues and consequently the issues of 
‗positional inequality‘ before students even get to participate in education. 
 
Disparity within the Chilean educational system is indisputable, both at a macro-social 
scale and within many contextual relationships at the micro-level. These scales interact 
to form a complex whole that perpetuates inequalities through cycles of disadvantage 
and dependence. Neostructuralism, in the form of the Concertación‘s social policies, 
failed to disrupt these cycles at any level, due to the marginalisation of the concept of 
social relations of production (as Leiva (2008, 9) observed, ―ECLAC jettisoned the 
‗core-periphery‘ paradigm‖) and a broad brushstrokes approach to reducing inequality 
for particular groups of various circumstances trapped in dependent relationships.   
 
8.4.b Commodifation of education  
Underlying all of these issues is the Concertación‘s decision to retain education as a 
quasi-market. This private sector created a school situation in which, as Carnoy and 
McEwen (2003, 18) suggest, ―vouchers encourage a large-scale sorting of students 
across public and private schools.‖ This stratification establishes relations of 
dependency, as already inferred, as students subsequently have a varied opportunity to 
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access quality education. Therefore a dependency approach suggests that a voucher 
schooling system, which also has a limited academic impact (see Carnoy and 
McEwen, 2003), contributes to consumption patterns and debt cycles that perpetuate 
inequality. Importantly, as Ffrench-Davis (2011, pers. comm) reminds us, ―The 
alternative to private wasn‘t nothing – it was public. We need the government to force 
equity.‖ In August 2009 Bachelet implemented the General Education Law (LGE), 
but this failed to change the market structure that the system operated within. 
 
A further example of the ‗profit-over-people‘ issues can be seen in the loan system for 
university students, which, according to Reeves (2011), is dangerous for middle class 
families as students from these families are likely to be only eligible for bank loans 
with 6% interest rates. None of the Concertación administrations made an attempt to 
remove the banks from the student loan system. These loans need to be paid back 
immediately after graduation, which can create considerable stress if quality work is 
not quickly obtained. There is a line of reasoning here, espoused by Meller (2011b, 
pers. comm), that calls for the government to control university fees and the interest 
rates on loans, and to regulate the universities‘ faculties and degrees based on 
employment supply and demand. Otherwise private universities, operating like private 
businesses, will continue to put profit ahead of people. Sunkel‘s (2011, pers.comm) 
opinion on this is clear; ―The boom of education – connected to the market, the 
voucher system – has led to debt.‖  
 
A visit to a school in the lower socio-economic Santiago communa of La Pintana, 
Centro Politécnico Particular San Ramón, emphasised the sense of frustration at the 
lack of opportunities. The teachers bemoaned that the businessman who runs the 
school has no accountability in how his investment is used and this doesn‘t need to be 
revealed publically. The Concertación did not promote regulations to ensure 
transparency in the financial management of these voucher schools. The teachers 
suggested that the profits were never re-invested into the school and so student 
resources and teacher salaries remained static. The teachers all confirmed that public 
school teachers got paid considerably less than those teaching in private schools as 
salaries were not regulated. When asked if the top-up fee system, when some schools 
ask for an additional fee from parents, created a disadvantage for these lower socio-
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economic students, the teachers agreed strongly. These fees were based on attendance 
and so if a student was absent the school did not receive any money. Therefore, due to 
the high levels of absenteeism in the community, the school had little money to invest 
in either infrastructure or teachers.  
 
This situation highlights ongoing issues of urban Mapuche, of which a significant 
number live in La Pintana. (Contreras, 2011, pers. comm) For rural Mapuche, other 
ethnic groups and all rural inhabitants, the issue of under-investment is important. 
Torche (2005, 7) comments: 
 
―Voucher schools prospered in urban, highly populated, 
areas, where they became an attractive alternative for middle-
income families who were unable to afford the expensive 
private-paid schools. Voucher schools were not profitable, 
however, in poor and rural areas.‖ 
 
Therefore, any attempt to disturb the social relations of dependency requires that the 
government increase investment in public schools in rural and lower-economic areas, 
to improve the quality of teaching and resources.  
 
At the very heart of the question of why education continued to be so unequal 
between 1990 and 2010, is the continuation of a heavily privatised system. By 
choosing to maintain the schooling structure, the Concertación effectively resigned 
itself to producing reactionary, piecemeal policies that would never be capable of 
dismantling the networks of unfair social relations that ultimately drove disparity. So 
long as education was operated as a commodity and not a right, debt traps and 
patterns of consumption would prevent equal access to quality education. 
 
8.4.c Structural heterogeneity 
Infante and Sunkel (2009, 143) state, 
 
―the Chilean economy, and thus Chilean society, are divided 
into differentiated and largely unconnected worlds. The first, 
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the world of high-productivity firms, is the one that drives the 
economy and pays good wages, while the others, the worlds 
of medium- and low-productivity firms, do not greatly 
influence growth, even though they absorb the bulk of the 
workforce.‖ 
 
Therefore, while the Concertación presided over a period of economic achievement 
and a busy period of social – and explicitly educational – policy, the segregation that 
has blighted Chile for so long worsened. As Infante and Sunkel indicated above, one 
such impact is a severely segregated society and such gaps are maintained by a 
structural heterogeneity in the production system. However the Concertación did not 
improve this situation; it was unable to create productive employment or secure 
adequate participation for the majority of workers in the production process, leaving 
many continuing to work in vulnerable and informal jobs.  
 
The Concertación consistently displayed a focus on social policies, however to rely on 
social policy as an instrument of redistribution and social progress is precarious. This 
is not only because it depends on the performance of the economy but also because it 
enables a superficial social linkage solely through subsidies and resource transfers, 
rather than constructive employment, which continues to contribute to the cycle of 
socio-economic immobility. Consequently, there is an argument to avoid such 
dependent and uncertain relationships and place the social relations of production as 
central to any development approach. This would create a conducive context within 
which social policies, the like of which seen throughout the Concertación‘s tenure, 
have a greater opportunity for success. 
 
By allowing social mobility to remain static over such a long period of time, the 
Concertación permitted the ‗positions‘ to stagnate, which resulted in an unequal 
insertion into ‗participation‘ for a large proportion of Chilean society and for existing 
social status to become naturalised. Leiva (2008, 12) argues that this has come about 
due to the marginalisation of social relations from theorisation. He lists labour-capital 
relations, capital accumulation, class, labour and the gendered nature of the economy 
has elements that have been pushed aside. He writes: 
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―Latin American Neostructuralism fails to delve into the 
nature of power relations that characterise the current 
dynamics of the international political economy.‖  
 
This failure is not only relevant to the concept of the international political economy, 
as it can also be seen to have created a highly stratified Chilean society that was 
largely accepted under what Leiva (ibid) calls ‗non-antagonistic‘ policies. Hugo 
Romero (2011, pers. comm), from the Universidad de Chile, agrees, stating that, ―The 
Concertación only marketed equality and social welfare; in reality nothing changed 
from Pinochet‘s time – not education, not health, not mining. Nothing.‖ Such 
comments indicate that there were no policies that seriously challenged either the 
established social relations of dependency, nor the severe social stratification in Chile, 
and therefore the obstacles to a fairer integration into social participation remained.  
 
It can therefore be argued that the Concertación, despite consistent social policies, 
failed to respond to the issue of structural heterogeneity. Successive governments 
failed to create productive or adequate employment opportunities for a great number 
of Chileans, leaving them in insecure jobs that constrained the possibility of attaining 
individual value goals. The consequence of this was an intergenerational inequality 
that prevented many students from accessing a quality education.  
 
8.4.d Summary 
The Concertación strove to forge an image of globalisation ‗with a human face‘, 
seeking growth with equity. This approach maintained education as a quasi-market 
that hoped to make the system more efficient with greater quality. However, Chile has 
continued to suffer from persistent educational disparities at all levels, specifically 
regarding access and academic outcomes. It is suggested that this is because the 
Concertación‘s policies, uncoordinated across the various dimensions, did not 
successfully address the social cycles of disadvantage and dependency: at the macro-
social, macro-economic or micro-social levels. Leiva (2008, 12-13) adds to this by 
highlighting the fact that neostructuralism ―explicitly characterises key economic 
relations as essentially nonantagonistic…a society sanitised of conflict and 
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asymmetrical power relations.‖ One reason for this can be taken from Carnoy and 
McEwen‘s (2003) suggestion that the approach was nothing more than new policies 
patched onto the existing system of market fundamentalism. Ultimately, the 
Concertación failed to address the complex whole that Cardoso and Faletta (1979) had 
highlighted, ignoring the obvious consequences of worsened social stratification in 
order to maintain their faith in the market mechanisms of the school voucher system.  
 
 
8.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has outlined a dependency analysis of the Chilean situation of 
educational disparity, 1990 – 2010. An adapted process model from Chapter Three 
(position – integration – participation) was used as a framework for the analysis and 
this resulted in the identification of a selection of mechanisms that were proposed as 
drivers of educational inequality. These were: the marginalisation of social relations, 
the commodification of education and structural heterogeneity. The process of 
integration was discussed in the dependency context of marginalisation and exclusion. 
Subsequently various other dependency concepts, such as consumption patterns and 
internal colonialism, were introduced to allow for a deeper understanding of how 
these mechanisms were formed and operated. This ultimately led to a discussion of 
why the policies were unable to identify and stop these mechanisms, and therefore 
prevent ongoing inequality in the education system.  
 
The following chapter summarises the research undertaken in this thesis and also 
discusses potential policies, both specifically for educational disparity in Chile but 
also for broader themes, which may result from this dependency analysis.  
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Chapter Nine 
Summary and conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the various issues and themes addressed in this thesis are summarised 
and conclusions offered. The chapter is divided into six main sections based on the 
four aims established in Chapter One plus separate sections for policy 
recommendations and theoretical implications, in which both educational disparity 
and broader socio-economic inequality are considered.  
 
The aims of the thesis were set up as: 
Conceptualisation: to examine the notion that underlying structural dependency plays 
an integral role in the production and continuance of socio-economic disparity 
 
Description: to set-up an exploration of this notion through the tracking of Chilean 
socio-economic inequality between 1964 – 2010 and the policies that sought to 
address it, with a specific investigation of educational disparity, 1990 – 2010 
 
Analysis: to investigate why policies were ineffective in reducing disparity in 
education during 1990 – 2010 and consider the role played by structural dependency 
in its production and continuance 
 
Prescription: to investigate the application of a revisited dependency approach to 
disrupt asymmetrical relationships in education during this timeframe and 
consequently initiate a discussion on how this approach may be used to reduce 
socioeconomic disparity at various scales 
 
As each aim is discussed, the objectives outlined in the first chapter will also be 
evaluated.  
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9.2 Aim One – Conceptualisation: the processes of inequality 
The underlying purpose of this research has been to contribute to the understanding of 
how socio-economic inequality operates and suggest potential approaches to prevent 
its formation and perpetuation. To do this inequality as a concept and why it is 
important were discussed, and this built a foundation for the exploration of the notion 
of a conceptual process model of socio-economic inequality.  
 
Objective A: To ascertain the processes that operate to create socio-economic 
inequality 
The objective to determine the processes of socio-economic disparity was designed to 
be both analytical and explanatory of the process. This initially required a thorough 
definition of socio-economic inequality. The concept is a complex and 
multidimensional one. When considering the diverse qualities that are compared, and 
the entities involved, it quickly becomes apparent that inequality exists across time 
and space and can at once demand a moral and an economic response.  
 
Chapter Three consolidated these opinions and by discussing inequality in terms of its 
units of analysis, natural / artificial and economic / non-economic categories, and on 
various scales (global, national and local), it established an appropriate framework 
within which to consider its processes. A conceptual process model was introduced 
from a structuralist perspective in order to visualise the mechanisms that play a role in 
creating and perpetuating inequality. The model was based upon the approach that 
disparity is dynamic and privileges some at the same time as placing others at a 
disadvantage. It reveals the underlying social and economic structures (also called 
power and prejudice barriers) that construct a process that individuals, communities, 
nations or regions pass through in an attempt to attain an equal playing field of 
opportunities. The initial social, political, physical or economic position is understood 
to influence the extent of participation in society or in markets. Ultimately it is the 
level of participation decides the opportunity to achieve objectives or ‗value goals‘.  
 
The model consolidates the conviction that things can get better, that inequality is not 
a result of fate but an outcome of alterable circumstance and policy. Disparity does 
not exist nor develop in isolation; there are many variables to consider, one of which, 
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it is proposed, is the mind-set of those suffering from it. Chapter Three argues that for 
individuals to have access to a true equality of opportunity then the dangers of 
indefensible social stereotyping must be recognised and rendered ineffectual. 
 
The potential research implications of this aspect of the research are primarily 
theoretical, as a conceptual process model allows the nature of inequality to be 
disaggregated into structural causes, as well as: categories of disparity; contexts; 
overlapping but discrete units of analysis and scale. Such a break down subsequently 
invites further investigation into the various aspects that contribute to an overall 
definition of social disparity and therefore affords an opportunity for theoretical 
approaches to these ‗micro-relationships‘ to create policy applications. If disparity can 
be understood in terms of structures and social relationships then its complexity can 
be reduced and disparate policies can be pulled together into a coherent methodology.  
 
Having proposed that underlying structural dependency plays a role in the production 
and perpetuation of socio-economic disparity, a case study was required to examine 
this relationship further. 
 
 
9.3 Aim Two – Description: socio-economic disparity in Chile, 1964 - 2010 
The second aim was to establish a framework for the analysis of a process of 
inequality, and this was achieved by tracking and quantifying disparity in various 
social contexts between 1964 and 2010, before focusing on a more specific context 
(education) and timeframe (1990 – 2010) under the Concertación.  
 
Objective B: To quantify social and economic inequality in Chile, 1964 – 2010 
Objective C: To undertake Aim 2 with special reference to inequality in economic 
(income), social (education and health) and structural (labour and housing) spheres 
The objectives of quantifying social and economic inequality in Chile between 1964 
and 2010 with special reference to inequality in economic, social and structural 
spheres required a detailed statistical overview of various contexts of disparity across 
almost half a century. These contexts were divided into the period of 1964 – 1989 
(Chapter Five) and 1990 – 2010 (Chapter Six). Across the five decades and across all 
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these examined social spheres, levels of disparity were consistently measurable and it 
indicated that the multidimensional nature of inequality is a vital component in the 
creation of inequality traps.  
 
Objective D: To quantify disparity in the context of education, 1990 - 2010 
For the objective of quantifying educational disparity Chapter Seven focused on the 
period of 1990 - 2010 under the Concertación. Disparity was measured in terms of: 
student performance; student attendance; years of schooling; completion rates; and 
average income for years of schooling. The statistics used in this chapter clearly 
quantified the significant disparities suffered by low-income, rural and indigenous 
students.  
 
The information presented in Chapters Five to Seven achieved the objectives of the 
second aim of the thesis by quantifying levels of socio-economic disparity across 
various social spheres between 1964 - 2010. This accomplishment established the 
framework for the third aim, which was to investigate the effectiveness of the policies 
that were implemented by the different administrations over the same timeframe.  
 
 
9.4 Aim Three – Analysis: the effectiveness of policies to reduce inequality 
An underlying feature of this research has been the notion that a range of political 
approaches to the dilemma of inequality has failed. Hence the objectives for the third 
aim were more analytical. The aim was to explore why the variety of structuralist, 
socialist, neoliberal and neostructural policies implemented in Chile between 1964 
and 2010 were unable to diminish the levels of socio-economic inequality, and more 
specifically why the Concertación failed to reduce inequality in education and, by 
doing so, investigate the role of structural dependency in the process.  
 
Objective E: To consider the effectiveness of policies and broad political objectives 
designed to alleviate inequality, 1964 – 2010 
This thesis does not intend to provide a mathematical or inferential statistical analysis, 
but rather a broader political-economic perspective on the impact of policy. It has 
been possible to collate a substantial list of such policies to complement the statistical 
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evidence of the thesis‘ second aim. In this way, it is possible to observe the impact, or 
lack of, various policies from across the political spectrum. This would appear to be 
one of the unique contributions of this research. It validates the notion that inequality 
levels were largely unaffected by any particular policy, or cluster of policies, 
implemented by any of the administrations in power over the last fifty years. What it 
also infers is that the political positioning of the administrations also had little or no 
impact on social disparity. However it is difficult to establish the direct successes or 
failures of policies due to a number of issues, including time lag and intervening 
external factors (such as the global financial crisis). Nevertheless, the sheer 
consistency of disparity levels across such a significant timeframe does infer socio-
economic disparities that are resistant to policy changes. 
 
Objective F: To analyse the role of structural dependency in inequality within the 
context of education in Chile, 1990 and 2010 
By focusing on the case study of educational disparity under the Concertación‘s 
governance the collated data was more directly related to specific policies. This meant 
that the persistence of inequality in this context could be analysed more closely, 
without so much interference from time lag issues, cross-correlation or external 
occurrences. The result was a successful ‗snap shot‘ of how neostructural policies, 
explicitly linked to the reduction of inequality, were unable to prevent such high 
levels of disparity both of access to quality and of accomplishment. The Concertación 
strove to create a condition of growth with equity, and this approach was maintained 
within the educational sector, creating a quasi-market that hoped to make the system 
more efficient with greater quality. It is suggested that the failure to achieve this is 
because the Concertación‘s policies did not successfully address the social cycles of 
disadvantage and dependency: at the macro-social, macro-economic or micro-social 
levels. The implication is that the Concertación ignored the obvious consequences of 
worsened social stratification in order to maintain the school voucher system. The two 
features that emerged as a result of this were the commodification of education and 
the ongoing condition of structural heterogeneity.  
 
The research indicates that a broad variety of policies failed to counteract ongoing 
socioeconomic disparity in Chile and subsequently creates the opportunity to examine 
249 
 
 
the relevance of a dependency analysis to the process of educational disparity under 
the Concertación, and to the broader discussion of the role of structural dependency 
within the creation and persistence of inequality.  
 
 
9.5 Aim Four – Prescription: the value of a revisited dependency approach 
At the very heart of this research is the idea that a revisited dependency approach 
might be relevant to the ongoing – and worsening – issues of socio-economic 
disparity. This connection was proposed in Chapter Four. Therefore the final aim was 
to establish if a revisited dependency approach has relevance to the contemporary 
context of Chilean education. To achieve this aim the objective was to define what a 
revisited dependency approach might look like. The last objective was to discuss the 
potential application for further research in addressing broader socio-economic 
inequality in Chile and globally. 
 
Objective G: To define what a revisited dependency approach might look like 
The failures to disrupt ongoing educational disparity under the Concertación were 
placed within the conceptual process model introduced in Chapter Three to help 
understand them better. This process model is based on an idea that inequality is a 
process, not a condition. Within this model relevant dependency concepts were 
associated with the various failures of the Concertación; this was done to explore the 
reasons for ongoing disparity within a theoretical context. Crucially, the social 
relations of dependency were made central to any analysis. With this in place, it was 
easier to explain the mechanisms of internal colonialism, patterns of consumption, 
debt traps, exploitation and the notion of education enclaves. 
 
The dependency analysis in Chapter Eight indicated that at the various points of this 
process (position, integration and participation) dependency concepts acted as 
mechanisms. Positional inequality was proposed to be the result of restricted social 
mobility and the marginalisation of the social relations of dependency, and these 
issues were linked, via a dependency analysis, to the ideas of internalisation and ‗the 
monopolisation of the mind‘. Uneven integration was understood in terms of 
exclusion, marginalisation and disarticulation, while the features of commodification 
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and structural heterogeneity were argued to largely determine the levels of 
participation. Relevant dependency concepts, such as debt traps, consumption 
patterns, educational enclaves and internal colonisation were proposed as mechanisms 
for such a process. A dependency analysis of commodification suggested a system in 
which retail patterns are paralleled, debt traps are entered into, and profit creates a 
lack of responsibility for the quality of schooling. Such a system places students into a 
highly stratified system that impacts their ability to participate in society on an equal 
footing, creating social relations of dependency that will pass along generations. A 
similar analysis of the issue of structural heterogeneity suggested that an improved 
income could assist in breaking the debt trap and the intergenerational cycle of social 
relations of dependency in an educational context. 
 
The result of the work in Chapters Eight was a coherent response to the question of 
why the Concertación‘s policies failed to stop inequality in education, ultimately 
suggesting that a revisited dependency was the key for progress. Such a response 
reiterated the general key aspects of a dependency approach, including the need to 
work at micro-levels of dependency, investigating the concrete examples of social 
relations of dependency for lower socio-economic groups, ethnic groups and rural 
dwellers, which can be seen to overlap to form a complex whole. Therefore by 
disrupting the processes of dependency at ‗micro‘ levels, the process of disparity can 
be similarly interrupted at a larger scale.  
 
Crucially, such an approach needs to engage in a critical dialogue concerning the 
criticisms that left the dependency movement marginalised in discussions of 
development and underdevelopment, and this challenge was taken up in Chapter Four. 
An ongoing criticism of dependency has been its failure to put social relations at the 
centre of its analysis, but one of the key features of the revisited analysis is how social 
relations are fundamental to it. By doing this, it disaggregates and isolates situations 
and relationships, ensuring that the concerns that a dependency approach isn‘t able to 
produce concrete policy outcomes are eradicated, as the potential for policies to 
disrupt inequalities at various levels subsequently becomes significant. By working at 
various scales, it is also possible to highlight the dynamism of the marginalised 
groups, which reveals the potential for movement and changes over time, therefore 
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invalidating the criticisms that dependency remains determinist with passive margins. 
Strong responses to historical and well-documented criticisms such as these, 
potentially give dependency the scope to engage with other contexts of inequality 
other than education in Chile. 
 
Objective H: To discuss the potential application for further research in addressing 
broader socio-economic inequality in Chile and globally 
The role of socio-economic disparity in the process of underdevelopment is too 
complex a concept to be ‗solved‘ by one overarching theory or approach. There are 
processes of inequalities operating at various scales that are mutually perpetuating 
both each other and larger scale imbalances, such as between nations on a global 
level. These processes exist within social relations of dependency, which function 
within social contexts, such as education, health or employment. The overlapping of 
these contexts contributes to the creation of situations of socio-economic and socio-
cultural inequality. Such internal pressures combine with external interests, such as 
economic and historical-cultural elements, to generate a complex whole. As such, a 
revisited dependency approach allows a multi-scalar approach to inequality and an 
opportunity to work at various levels to disrupt ongoing processes. The conceptual 
process model could also be incorporated into further studies to explore the validity of 
testing it as an operational model. 
 
With this in mind, the most immediate use of such an approach is inside Chile but 
within different social contexts. The process model of position-integration-
participation can be seen to operate within the social relations of, among others, 
ethnicity, gender, spatial segregation and income groups, and these relations can be 
examined within contexts where disparity is present such as: access to healthcare, 
employment vulnerability, or decent housing and living environment. By 
investigating the social and class structure and relations a revisited dependency 
approach can reveal how various mechanisms work. As previously discussed, such 
mechanisms include: internal colonialism, exploitation and consumption patterns. 
Having broadened the analysis, larger scale patterns could be examined in Chile to 
disrupt structural heterogeneity, high-income disparity and an over-reliance on 
primary products (due to a potentially diversified production).  
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The concept of dependent-development is also relevant here, as the impacts of foreign 
investment and control can also be argued to create situations of dependency. Tausch 
(2006, 63) wrote a discussion titled ‗The Most Promising Direction For Future 
Dependency Research on Structural Violence, but Dependency Theory Fails to 
Explain Economic Growth and Income Inequality‘ in which a variety of social issues 
were linked to dependent states caused by high foreign savings and invasive practices 
by multi-national corporations. Concepts of repression, political and social conflict, 
female life expectancy, suicide rates and CO2 emissions were – among many others – 
argued to be connected to multi-national penetration into local markets. This would 
certainly be an interesting direction in which to take a revisited dependency approach, 
creating reasonable comparisons with Cardoso‘s (1973) writings on associated-
dependent development and Wilkinson and Pickett‘s work in The Spirit Level (2009). 
It would be consistent with an analysis of micro-level relationships of dependency to 
see how the build-up of disparity can have major consequences at larger scales, for 
example the ‗Chilean Winter.‘ The idea of national and social disintegration has been 
around for some time. Sunkel (1973, 163) said that development, underdevelopment, 
dependence, marginality and spatial imbalances ―are not only interrelated, but that in 
fact they are different manifestations of a single global process, which is 
simultaneously a process of transnational integration and national disintegration.‖  
 
When talking about dependency on a global scale, there are a number of active 
unbalanced relationships. Kay and Gwynne (2000) in  ‗Relevance of Structuralist and 
Dependency Theories in the Neoliberal Period: A Latin American Perspective‘ 
outline a number of ongoing dependency mechanisms and contexts: financial, 
technological, globalisation and unequal exchange to name a few. If these are added 
to the conclusions of this research then it is consistent to read Tausch (2010, 483) 
declare that: 
 
―today, the prognoses of classical theories of dependency all 
come true with a vengeance, and dependency is at the root of 
all the current European malaise. The mechanisms have 
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remained the same, only the geography of the victims of 
dependency have changed.‖  
 
In a separate article, Tausch and Heshmati (2010, 60) suggests that Sunkel and 
Cardoso correctly predicted the outcomes of intensive foreign capital penetration. 
Sunkel foresaw social polarisation, while Cardoso envisaged the penetration of the 
periphery and semi-periphery as creating an unbalanced economic structure. This in 
turn would lead to restricted growth in the peripheries and a specific pattern of class 
relations. A revisited dependency approach might compartmentalise elements of 
economic and technological relationships between countries to investigate whether 
there are situations of dependency operating at various scales within those contexts 
and seek policy outcomes to disrupt any processes. These might be between certain 
countries or potentially within countries‘ ‗Triple Alliances‘ (Evans, 1979). Such an 
approach would certainly pull dependency back from the development margins, 
particularly in the current economic climate.  
 
 
9.6 Policy recommendations 
It has been proposed that the Concertación‘s neostructural policies were too 
reactionary, general, descriptive and short-term, resulting in ongoing and increasingly 
dependent structural relationships. Consequently the process of inequality within these 
relationships continued to operate at various scales despite the range of approaches 
implemented by the Concertación. Although many of the policies were valid and 
potentially relevant, the method was non-antagonistic to the established market 
approach and was uncoordinated across the various dimensions that inequality 
operates at, allowing disparity to persist in many contextual relationships. The 
following range of policies suggestions create a policy package from a dependency 
perspective: a response to both micro situations of dependency (within income, ethnic 
and spatial groups) and, consequently, to a contextual situation of disparity, e.g. 
education.  
 
When Kay (1989, 96 - 97) outlines the policies implications suggested by the Centre 
for the Economic and Social Development of Latin America or DESAL (Centro para 
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el Desarollo Económico y Social de América Latina) to measure and prevent 
marginality, he mentions the need to overcome both a rigid class structure and ―the 
persistence of sectoral discontinuities or disequilibria such as those prevalent between 
the rural and urban worlds.‖ Both of these barriers are significant to social relations of 
dependency, as is the idea that it is necessary to first: 
 
 ―overcome the atomisation of the individual by the formation 
of solidarity links around a common goal or function. This 
type of internal functional integration can be achieved by 
promoting the establishment of grass-roots organisations.‖ 
 
He also promotes the need to design ―institutional mechanisms to integrate marginal 
groups into wider society.‖ Although the context (of preventing communism) from 
which DESAL made these recommendations was historically unique, the policy 
themes are still applicable to the contemporary situation of educational disparity in 
Chile. Such a ‗grass-roots‘ concept is valid for a dependency approach that is 
analysing micro relations of dependency that have been created through ongoing 
mechanisms related to the concepts such as internal colonialism.  
 
Drago and Paredes (2011, 172) caution that the confirmation of educational inequality 
actually ―tells us little about what types of policies we need to introduce in order to 
benefit the very considerable percentage of students who attend municipal schools 
and have no real chance to transfer to another type of school.‖ There is considerable 
literature investigating potential policies on this topic, but this section uniquely 
locates a series of relevant policy recommendations within a dependency perspective 
that focuses upon the process model used throughout the thesis, using ‗position‘ to 
refer to policies that focus on access to education and ‗participation‘ to refer to 
resources and investment. The proposal is that any successful package needs to 
recognise the ‗complex whole‘ of inequality processes and operate simultaneously at 
community and national scales, at all school levels, recognising the various social 
relations that create dependency, such as location, income and gender. Due to 
intergenerational inequality, policies will require an expansive consensus that outlasts 
terms of government, ―both to ensure continuity and ever- increasing achievement and 
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to provide the resources needed for a leap forward in education and knowledge that 
matches up to the challenges.‖ (Hopenhayn, 2003, 185) 
 
9.6a Position and access 
This research has shown that ‗social position‘ is a significant factor in educational 
access and as such it is imperative that policies focus upon ensuring that no student is 
denied the opportunity to experience a suitable level of quality education. This 
concept of equalising access was discussed in ECLAC‘s 1992 publication, Education 
and Knowledge: Basic pillars of changing production patterns with social equity. 
Seven policy areas were identified and proposed to strengthen the connection between 
production, education and equity, and one of these was ensuring universal access to 
the codes of modernity, by which was meant the necessary knowledge and skills for 
full social participation. To achieve such impartiality education needs to be able to 
neutralise background factors and this requires a disruption in social relations of 
dependency. 
 
The context of education is significantly influenced by social relationships shaped by 
income. A dependency analysis requires that policies be considered to prevent income 
disparity from negatively influencing the quality of education of some students. One 
such attempt was proposed in 2007, when Bachelet established a commission to study 
broad socio-economic issues and to propose suitable public policy. One proposal that 
emerged was an income transfer to households from the lowest income quintile. It 
was a conditional transfer, and necessitated that the children attend school and receive 
health check-ups. ―The combined effect of these transfers would reduce poverty from 
13.1% to 9.9%, extreme poverty from 3.1% to 1.9%, and the 90/10 household income 
ratio from 9.1 to 7.7.‖ (Larrañaga, 2009, 28 - 29) In the same publication Larrañaga 
also discussed Chile Solidario, the programme that guaranteed participants access to 
the social programmes available in education, health, training, and employment and 
also provided a temporary income transfer. Both these examples, which were 
introduced in Chapter Six, indicate that the Concertación did propose social policies 
that sought to remove social disadvantage but, as previously mentioned, not within a 
dependency analysis. Although conditional income transfers would carry significant 
benefits, a dependency approach, within an educational context, would not rely solely 
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on such transfers but work towards dismantling the structure that caused the disparity, 
that being the system of different school types and qualities.  
 
An urgent re-evaluation of the private / private-voucher / public Chilean school 
system is necessary to ensure students have equal opportunities to access schools of 
regulated quality. The structure of the schooling system, which began under Pinochet 
and was carried on by the Concertación, would appear to continue to hinder students 
that attend public schools, placing them into social relations of dependency that create 
a cycle of disadvantage. A recent New Zealand report by the Education Policy 
Response Group (2012, vi) entitled, Charter Schools for New Zealand: An 
investigation designed to further the debate in New Zealand on education policy in 
general and on charter schooling in particular, concluded that there was little 
evidence that charter / voucher schools would: provide choice for large numbers of 
low income parents; promote greater equality; or eliminate underachievement. Such 
conclusions could be further developed in the Chilean context with discussion on how 
social dependency might contribute to / further consolidate these findings. 
 
Such a re-evaluation would also require discussion of the following features of an 
uneven school system: stricter regulation of entrance criteria; quotas created by the 
distribution (rural and urban) of the private, voucher and public schools; appropriate 
levels of profit-making in education and subsequent family/consumer debt; as well as 
more thinking on the impacts of certain schools ‗creaming‘ the best students. Policies 
need to be considered to restrict such a practice, both when accessing education and 
when leaving it. ―If, for example, elite employers really are recruiting ‗people like 
them‘, providing students from non-dominant backgrounds with routes into elite 
universities will do nothing to encourage employers to change their practices.‖ 
(Strathdee, 2009, 93) Strathdee‘s comments highlight the need for regulations to 
prevent certain schools attaining social prestige through cherry-picking the best 
students.  
 
As Carnoy and McEwen (2003, 19) point out: ―It is clear that a full evaluation of the 
Chilean reform—or any voucher plan, for that matter—should weigh the beneficial 
effects of competition against the potentially harmful effects of cream-skimming.‖ 
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Chilean education – operating in such a system – requires an acceptance of inequality 
and has created and reproduced mechanisms to maintain social advantage for some. A 
dependency approach has highlighted the intergenerational nature of this 
disadvantage, of social immobility and the marginalisation of social relations, 
demanding that these social relations (both of production and dependency) are central 
to any thinking so as to remove social prejudice. 
 
A more comprehensive collection and analysis of student results from propedeuticos 
would also be beneficial to help prevent positional disadvantage. A dependency 
approach would look to see if students, regardless of social status, were motivated by 
the opportunity to prepare for university in this way. Consequently, there may be a 
disruption in the affect of the internalisation of how students see themselves in 
relation to other social classes, permitting an easier transition into social participation. 
These preparatory institutions have the potential to neutralise the effects of a highly 
stratified society for some students by challenging established social expectations of 
who goes to university.   
 
9.6b Participation and resources  
Further policy targets outlined in the 2010 OECD publication, PISA 2009 Results: 
Overcoming Social Background - Equity in Learning Opportunities and Outcomes 
(104-5) are useful in considering potential approaches for creating equal classroom 
experiences. These include the targeting of low educational performance, regardless 
of students‘ background, either by focusing on low-performing schools or low-
performing students within schools. This would require a specialised curriculum and 
additional instructional resources or economic assistance for these students. Such 
policies would contribute towards the elimination of ‗education enclaves‘, which 
reproduce benefits of elite groups by channelling particular socio-economic groups 
into certain schools. Hopenhayn (2003, 173) sees such disparity operating in class 
bias at intermediate level and high education, but not so much at primary level. He 
comments that, ―This is serious, since statistics show a positive correlation between 
education and equity, which means that the countries whose educational attainments 
are most widely spread also have smaller income differentials and are more 
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egalitarian in their social structure.‖ Such observations support the need for the 
multidimensional approach that is promoted here.  
 
There is also an ongoing need to disrupt the consequences of the internal colonialism 
that appears to reproduce discrimination through the mechanisms of linguistic, private 
education and rural dwelling. Subsequently, policy work is recommended in the areas 
of rural schools and indigenous students. Particularly, greater support is required for 
the extension and implementation of inclusive programmes (e.g. ‗Sector Lengua 
Indigena‟), which ensure indigenous languages and cultures, are taught. Continued 
growth of initiatives such as ‗Araucania Aprende‟ to support students in rural schools 
is also recommended, as is more significant government investment in rural schools to 
improve the quality of teaching and resources.  
 
Policies concerned with restricting practices such as ‗creaming‘ would also have a 
positive impact on the accumulation of debt that is a result of the Chilean school 
system. Families concerned that elite employers do only recruit from certain schools 
will feel under pressure to finance their child‘s enrolment into those schools. These 
schools tend to have access to greater funding, which subsequently leaves them better 
resourced for staffing and materials. There is a need to obstruct this ongoing scenario 
that results in ‗profit-over-people.‘ Consumer behaviour of parents and students 
attending these schools consequently mirrors social consumption patterns, creating 
debts traps. Severe social stratification would suggest that these schools are better 
placed to form networks and social relationships, meaning that policies are required to 
effectively advocate for stronger governmental regulation of qualifications and the 
employment market to ensure that the supply and demand balance is correct and not 
only rewarding particular skills. ECLAC (1992) highlighted this requirement by 
proposing the strategy of overcoming the relative isolation of education by connecting 
it to social needs.  Ffrench-Davis (2010, 22 & 24) considered the need for such a 
relationship within a macro-economic context: 
 
―The domestic market is home to the great majority of workers 
and firms. Improved systemic competitiveness achieved in this 
way helps to reduce domestic structural heterogeneity, a 
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precondition for greater equality in the labour market and 
between the array of different-sized business… the choice of 
macroeconomic approach decisively affects the stability and 
speed of growth, and influences the degree of equity built into 
the structure of domestic markets.‖  
 
This policy package proposes a concerted effort to prevent structural heterogeneity and 
vulnerability that reproduces uneven social relations and resultant educational 
disparity through intergenerational cycles. To do this there is a need to create 
productive, supported and secure employment at local and national scales. It could be 
argued that every Concertación administration attempted to do exactly this but their 
lack of success has perpetuated the high levels of educational disparity. Therefore any 
serious effort to resolve inequality in the school system needs to include policies that 
will dismantle social relations of dependency and stimulate fair competition in the 
labour market. 
 
 
9.7 Theoretical implications  
This section considers the theoretical implications of the research in order to establish 
a broader relevance for a revisited dependency approach. Some of these implications 
have already been discussed earlier in this chapter, and in Chapter Eight, but it is 
certainly worthwhile to develop such suggestions further. The thesis has not in any 
way attempted to reconstruct the dependency approach but has simply revisited it to 
highlight its contemporary relevance. Naturally this has led to a ‗refreshing‘ or 
‗revitalising‘ of some concepts due to a different context and time. Care has been 
taken throughout to emphasise that the dependency approach is still considered as an 
analysis and not a theory. It is primarily a framework to understand social relations of 
dependence and the structures within which they operate. However, this research has 
unquestionably produced important theoretical implications that can be followed up 
for further evolution of the analysis.  
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9.7.a Antagonistic and alternative 
This research has confirmed that dependency needs to be antagonistic to the current 
dominant approaches of neoliberalism and neostructuralism, in so much as they can 
be differentiated (Murray and Overton, 2011). It must act as an alternative to these 
and not propose mutually advantageous relationships between global flows, 
accumulation, economic growth and equity and social development of Latin 
American societies. Leiva (2008, 13) spells out the nature of such an approach: 
 
―[The] marginalisation of power relations from production, 
the sphere of social reproduction, and international economic 
relations along with a utopian, sanitised version of corporate-
led globalisation.‖  
 
Leiva demands that power relations are fundamental to any social or economic 
analysis and goes on to suggest that the Concertación were too scared to do this as it 
wanted to avoid potential conflict with the still military backed right wing during the 
1990s. However he recognises that ―a theoretical perspective which explicitly 
incorporates power relations into economic, social and political analysis‖ is required 
(ibid, 12). The approach towards the educational condition in Chile under the 
Concertación indicates how this may be done, while also centring the importance of 
analysis of social and class relations. 
 
9.7.b Social relations of dependency 
Kay and Gwynne (2000, 53) suggest that the combination of power and social 
relations contributes to the ongoing issue of underdevelopment. They comment, ―It is 
in the internal class configuration and the role of the State within the peripheral 
country that the main reason for the continuance of underdevelopment is found.‖ A 
revisited dependency analysis recognises the necessity of a class focus to sit alongside 
the influence of external influences and consequently acknowledges a contextual 
‗complex whole‘. The resultant relationships are a combination of economic, cultural 
and spatial elements. Leiva (2008) also voices concern at the omission of key features 
of social relations from theoretical approaches, including: labour-capital relations; the 
capital accumulation-social reproduction nexus; the gendered nature of the economy; 
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and the transformations of social arrangements at the community/individual level. By 
achieving the absorption of both power and social relations into an analysis these 
omissions can be included, as they are vital to the production and reproduction of 
structurally dependent relations. For example, the labour-capital relationship can 
create opportunities for new investigations about the increasing informalisation of the 
employment market and the subsequent levels of vulnerability for so many. 
 
9.7.c Determinism 
The social relations of production are said to be involuntary and so too, it is proposed, 
are the social relations of dependency. They are also conditioned (but not necessarily 
determined) by the mode of production, i.e. capitalism. This is another influence on 
the process of disparity and with so many ‗moving parts‘ it is impossible to label such 
an approach as deterministic. Dependency was often criticised as leaving the 
periphery as passive; a deterministic approach which meant that the periphery was 
nothing but a pawn to external interests, leaving it unable to help itself to move out of 
conditions of dependency and underdevelopment. However, it is possible to reject the 
tag of determinism due to the dynamic nature of the process of inequality and the 
overlapping social relations. A dependency analysis investigates how the conditions 
for such high levels of disparity have arisen but it does not suggest that those within it 
cannot change the situation and this indicates an ongoing and influential process that 
cannot be described as passive. This has theoretical implications because it means that 
dependency can operate and explore the mechanisms of disparity at various scales.  
 
9.7.d Scale 
Dependency has often been understood to work largely on a global scale but this 
research has emphasised its value across various scales. This thesis has shown 
dependency to be a potentially practical approach with disaggregated contexts and 
categories of inequality allowing more precise policy responses at different scales. 
Although a refreshed dependency analysis would avoid a dominant focus on a 
particular scale, it is still essential to understand how individuals view themselves in 
social relations of dependence. These ideas of scale can certainly be further developed 
and utilised by a dependency analysis. The UN (2005, 136), however, do have a 
warning for an over-reliance on such an approach, stating that, as useful as 
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community-based policy targeting can be for reducing inequality, ―it should not 
become a substitute for universal coverage.‖ Therefore, the balance of a complex 
whole is again reiterated. 
 
There would also need to be a return to the centrality of a core-periphery paradigm, on 
all levels. There are a number of advantages of such a framework for understanding 
the reproduction of dependent relationships, but on a global scale it is essential for the 
defensible conception that the ―process of development and underdevelopment is a 
single process: that the centre and periphery are closely interrelated, forming part of 
one world economy.‖ (Leiva, ibid, 9) Kay and Gwynne (2000, 51) support this notion 
by proposing, ―Structuralist and dependency theories have continuing relevance since 
they view the problems of underdevelopment and development within a global 
context.‖  
 
 
9.8 Further research questions  
Having discussed the potential broader uses of a revisited dependency approach, some 
further research is suggested below.  
 
If the conceptual process model introduced in this research was trialled operationally 
within particular contexts, what units of analysis (e.g. gender, income groups) would 
be used and could such research isolate more social relations of dependency for 
further research?  
 
Concepts of repression, political and social conflict, life expectancy, obesity, suicide 
rates and pollution have been argued at various times to be connected to multi-
national penetration into local markets and increasing socio-economic disparity. This 
would certainly be an interesting direction in which to take a revisited dependency 
approach, creating comparisons with Cardoso‘s writings on associated-dependent 
development and Wilkinson and Pickett‘s work in The Spirit Level (2009).  
 
It would be fascinating to track how a build-up of disparity can have major 
consequences at larger scales, for example the ‗Chilean Winter.‘ The opportunity to 
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build on these ideas using the contemporary global condition of unrest (the Chilean 
Winter, the Arab Spring, riots in the UK, and the escalation of the ‗Occupy‘ 
movement) alongside the work of Sunkel (‗national disintegration‘), Tausch and 
Wilkinson and Pickett is intriguing and potentially valuable for understanding the 
greater impact of dependency on disparity. 
 
A revisited dependency approach could compartmentalise elements of economic and 
technological relationships between countries to investigate whether there are 
processes of dependency operating simultaneously within those contexts and seek 
policy outcomes to disrupt any processes on national and regional scales.  
 
A final question is, if the inefficiencies of a capitalist global system can be more 
clearly outlined within a dependency analysis by better understanding how inequality 
is produced and reproduced, then might dependency be adopted as a theoretical 
approach by governments wanting to reduce levels of disparity?  
 
 
9.9 Final remarks 
This thesis has made a case for the validity of a revisited dependency analysis to be 
used in understanding how socio-economic inequality is produced and reproduced.  It 
has shown that over almost half a century a succession of Chilean governments has 
been unable, despite policies from across the full political spectrum, to disrupt the 
processes and mechanisms of disparity. In a case study focused on educational 
inequalities under the Concertación, 1990 – 2010, it became evident that the features 
of structural heterogeneity and educational commodification, along with a failure to 
place social and class relations at the centre of such an approach, prevented any 
positive change. Such a context provided the possibility to investigate what a 
dependency analysis might present as a pathway to eradicate these social relations of 
dependency and create an equality of opportunity, and the result was a coherent set of 
theoretical assertions and policy recommendations that sought to counter the 
criticisms that have forced dependency to the peripheries of development thinking 
since the 1960s. From this investigation a broad set of proposals, both theoretical and 
policy-orientated, have followed, setting up potential opportunities to extend this 
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work. In summary, this research has made what is hoped to be significant theoretical, 
empirical and policy contributions to the understanding of the processes of socio-
economic disparity and consequently to the future production and implementation of 
policies that can reduce levels of dependency and create a greater equality of 
opportunity both within and beyond education and Chile. 
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Appendix 
Interviews 
 
 
a. Interview information Sheet 
 
Information sheet for an interview on policies related to inequality in Chile, 
1964 – 2010 
 
Researcher: Colin Kennedy, Development Studies, School of Geography, 
Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington 
 
I am a PhD student in Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. The 
research I am undertaking considers the effectiveness of policy on levels of 
socioeconomic inequality in Chile between 1964 and 2010. The University has 
granted ethics approval for this research. 
 
Participants will take part in a semi-structured, semi-formal interview in English, 
during which they will be asked their opinions on: 
- why socioeconomic inequality has persisted in Chile, 1964 – 2010 
- what policies were implemented to influence this inequality 
- if those policies successful – and why or why not? 
- what might work in the future to reduce inequality in Chile 
 
All interviews are of a voluntary nature and participants do not have to answer any 
question they do not want to. Interviews will take place at a pre-determined location 
and are not expected to last more than one hour at a maximum.  
Responses collected will assist my research and will be integrated into the written 
thesis. If requested, names will not be attached to opinions. If the participant consents 
to their opinions being attributed to them, then this information may be included. 
Interviews may be recorded with the participant‘s consent. No other person besides 
me and my supervisor, Professor Warwick Murray, will see the interview transcripts 
or listen to the recordings. The participant may withdraw (or withdraw any 
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information they have provided) from this research before 31 July 2012 without 
having to give reasons. 
 
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Geography, Environment 
and Earth Sciences. Material will be destroyed immediately after the completion of 
the thesis.  
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the 
project, please contact me at colin.kennedy@vuw.ac.nz or my supervisor, Professor 
Warwick Murray at warwick.murray@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Colin Kennedy 
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b. Interview consent form 
 
Consent to participation in research  
 
Running to stand still: the persistence of inequality in Chile, 1964 - 2010 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research. I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand 
that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this research 
(before the thesis is complete) without having to give reasons. 
 
       I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to me 
or 
       I do not consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to 
me (in this case you will not be quoted as having given these opinions) 
       I consent to this interview being recorded 
       I understand that the recording of this interview will be cleared at the end of this 
research unless I indicate that I would like it returned to me 
      I agree to take part in this research  
 
Signed: 
 
Name of participant:  
(please print clearly) 
 
Date: 
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c. Interview list 
 
 
13 
Oct 
Felipe Cousino Director, International Relations, 
Ministry of Education (Chile) 
Felipe.cousino@mi
neduc.cl  
14 
Oct 
Jonathan Barton Instituto de Estudios Urbanos y 
Territoriales. Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile 
jbarton@uc.cl  
18 
Oct 
Prof Hugo Romero Profesor, Departamento de 
Geografia, 
Laboratorio de Medio Ambiente y 
Territorio, Facultad de Arquitectura 
y Urbanismo, Universidad de Chile 
hromero@uchilefau
.cl  
25 
Oct 
Francisco Lagos 
Marín 
Jefe Centro de Estudios, 
División de Planificación y 
Presupuesto 
Ministerio de Educación, Chile  
Francisco.lagos@m
ineduc.cl  
25 
Oct 
Matías Reeves Director Social, Educación 2020 mreeves@educacio
n2020.cl  
26 
Oct 
Fernando Piño Departamento de Geografía, 
Facultad de Arquitectura y 
Urbanismo, Universidad de Chile 
fpino@uchilefau.cl  
26 
Oct 
Rafael Pastor Cruzat ,Ortuzar & Mackenna Ltda 
Baker & McKenzie LLP 
Nueva Tajamar 481, Torre Norte, 
Piso 21, Santiago, Chile 
Rafael.Pastor@ 
bakermckenzie.com   
2 
Nov 
Moritz Bilagher Regional Coordinator Evaluation 
and Trends Analysis. Latin-
American Laboratory for the 
Assessment of the Quality of 
Education (LLECE), 
OREALC/UNESCO Santiago 
m.bilagher@unesco
.org  
3 
Nov 
Danae Sinclair Member of Izquierda Autonoma 
and medical student at University 
of Chile 
dsinclaire@gmail.co
m  
3 
Nov 
Prof. María 
Soledad Erazo 
Jiménez 
 
Directora Doctorado en Ciencias 
de la Educación,  
Universidad de Santiago de Chile 
Maria.erazo@usach.
cl  
4 
Nov 
Ernesto Treviño 
Villarreal 
Director, Centro de Politicas 
Comparadas de Educación, 
Universidad Diego Portales 
Ernesto.trevino@m
ail.udp.cl, 
ernesto.trevino@cp
ce.cl  
7 
Nov 
Elisa Loncon 
Antileo 
 
Experta en Educación Intercultural, 
Departamento de Educación, 
Facultad de Humanidades 
Elisa.loncon@usach
.cl  
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Universidad de Santiago de Chile 
8 
Nov 
Irene Claramunt Principal, Centro Politécnico 
Particular San Ramón 
infovenancia@ 
politecnicosanramo
n.cl 
9 
Nov 
Rocio Venegas 
Vivanco 
Secretaria de Communicaciones, 
Federación de Estudiantes, 
Universidad de Valparaíso 
Rocio.venegasv@g
mail.com  
9 
Nov 
Udo Jacobsen Academico, Universidad de 
Valparaíso 
udok@jacobsen.cl  
10 
Nov 
Gustavo Pacheco 
Figueroa 
Encareado Nacional, Unión 
Nacional Estudiantil, Universidad 
de Chile  
Gustavo.pacheco@
ucach.cl  
11 
Nov 
Felipe Salazar Investigador, Centro de Politicas 
Comparadas de Educación, 
Universidad Diego Portales 
Felipe.salazar@cpc
e.cl  
11 
Nov 
Professor Juan 
Vielmas Cerda 
Director, Escuela de Enfermería, 
Facultad de Medicina, Universidad 
de Chile 
jvielmas@med.uchi
le.cl  
14 
Nov 
Carmen Cisternas 
Zañartu 
Directora de Relaciones 
Institucionales, Fundación Belen 
Educa 
ccisternas@belened
uca.cl  
14 
Nov 
Patricio Meller Investigador, CIEPLAN 
(Corporation de Estudios Para 
Latinoamerica) 
Patricio.meller@cie
plan.org  
15 
Nov 
Daniel Contreras Consultor, Fondo de las Naciones 
Unidas para la Infancia, UNICEF 
dcontreras@unicef.
org  
15 
Nov 
Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis 
Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad de Chile 
rffrench@econ.uchi
le.cl  
16 
Nov 
Dr. Guillermo 
Williamson Castro 
Director Departmento de 
Educación, Universidad de la 
Frontera 
gwilliam@ufro.cl  
17 
Nov 
Alejandro Herrera 
A. 
Director, Instituto de Estudios 
Indígenas, Universidad de la 
Frontera 
aherrera@ufro.cl  
17 
Nov 
Yéssica González 
Gómez 
Directora, Escuela de Pedagogia, 
Universidad de la Frontera 
jgonza@ufro.cl  
18 
Nov 
Osvaldo Sunkel Presidente del Consejo Editorial / 
Chairman, Editorial Board, CEPAL 
Review 
Osvaldo.sunkel@ce
pal.org  
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